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ABSTRACT
THE IDEA OF A REALISTIC UTOPIA
COLLIN ANTHONY
KOK-CHOR TAN
The purpose of this dissertation is to articulate the proper aims and limits of political
philosophy by expanding upon John Rawls’s idea of a realistic utopia and applying it to
various debates in contemporary political philosophy. First, I defend the importance of
ideal theory in constructing a theory of justice and respond to various critics, such as
Amartya Sen and others, who argue that ideal theory is neither necessary nor sufficient
for our work to advance justice in society. Second, I argue that empirical facts must be
included in our reasoning about fundamental principles of justice, contrary to theorists
such as G.A. Cohen who argues that political theorizing should proceed independently
of such facts. Finally, I conclude with some reflecting thoughts on the importance of
articulating a conception of justice that avoids hopelessly utopian ideals. In doing so, I
defend the vision of a realistically utopian society as one that both answers our most
fundamental interests and also provides us with the best chance of realizing justice in
the world.
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PREFACE
This work in political philosophy explicates and defends Rawls’s idea of a realistic utopia
in order to respond to many debates that have arisen in the contemporary philosophical
literature surrounding the nature of justice. These debates include: the relevance of
utopianism and realism, the relationship between principles of justice and empirical
facts, and the importance of ideal theory in constructing a conception of justice. Not
surprisingly, new work is produced within these topics at a healthy pace and some of
this material could not be fully explored in this dissertation. One work that is worthy of
note is Gerald Gaus’s book, The Tyranny of the Ideal, which was published after my
chapter on ideal theory had already been drafted and completed.1 As such, despite its
importance, my dissertation does not directly address its main arguments, and only
refers to it in a limited capacity . Nevertheless, many of the ideas advocated for here
can be expanded upon and applied to his work, which I will leave for future research
and exploration.

1

Gaus, Gerald. The Tyranny of the Ideal. Princeton University Press, 2016.
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Chapter 1: Three Dichotomies in Political Philosophy2
I. The Purpose of the Dissertation
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore three dichotomies that can be said
to characterize several debates in political philosophy: realism vs. utopianism, ideal vs.
nonideal theory, and fact-sensitivity vs. fact-insensitivity. Each of these dichotomies
involves interrelated issues surrounding the methods of political philosophy, the nature
of justice, and the proper goals and aspirations we should have when constructing a
theory of justice. The claim that I defend is as follows: the idea of a realistic utopia—an
important idea that appears in the work of John Rawls—is the most appropriate
framework for resolving these three dichotomies and will yield important insights about
the goals and methods of political philosophy. In developing the idea, I argue that
Rawls’s understanding of justice represents a position that (a) establishes the
importance of ideal theory, (b) requires a sensitivity to empirical facts, and (c) provides
a vision of society that is utopian, yet is still realistically achievable.
Before turning to our explication of these dichotomies, let me illustrate the
importance of these questions with an example. Suppose a socialist egalitarian asserts
that justice requires the complete equality of resources among all persons, and that we
reply with the following: “Your conception of justice is unachievable—human beings
will never be able to act in ways to sustain perfect equality of resources due to human
All notes to Rawls’s work after the first citation will follow this notation: Theory of Justice (TJ), Political
Liberalism (PL), Justice as Fairness (JF), The Law of Peoples, (LP), “Kantian Constructivism,” (KC), and
Collected Papers (CP).
2

2

motivational limitations and imperfect human institutions. Consequently, your
conception of justice must be false as it is clearly infeasible and incompatible with our
human nature.” Imagine that the socialist replies: “That is no objection to my theory at
all, for I am not making any background assumptions about human behavior, psychology
or social institutions. If we hold human psychology as an irrelevant variable, my theory
is without flaw. Justice mandates perfect equality. If it turns out that human beings are
hopelessly selfish, then so much the worse for humans. The content of justice is not
undermined by our imperfect nature and our inability to realize it.”
These exchanges are not uncommon in debates surrounding the demands of
justice, and they highlight important issues about some sources of disagreement
between different schools of thought. From this example, we can see that error, if there
exists any, is much more likely to be the result of different underlying assumptions
about what should and should not be taken for granted when theorizing about political
philosophy in the first place, and not the result of logical flaws in conclusions drawn
from the stated premises. For, it may very well be true that if human psychology were
irrelevant, perfect equality should be our target. But is this really the most appropriate
way to argue for this conclusion? Should we really ignore features about humans when
reasoning about justice? Does it come at too high a cost, akin to a Pyrrhic victory? To
answer these questions, we must investigate the methodology and background
assumptions about political philosophy itself. Upon doing so, we may find that how we
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answer these more fundamental questions shapes the principles we select as candidates
for how best to live in society with one another.
From our initial example between the socialist and her critic, we can expand
upon it and parse out the multiple dichotomies where disagreements lie with respect to
these more basic methodological questions about political theorizing. They can be
characterized in the following ways:
(a) Ideal and Nonideal Theory
One such dichotomy we can use to characterize these disagreements is between
ideal and nonideal theory. 3 For instance, we may choose to characterize the socialist as
utilizing ideal theory to make her claim that perfect equality is required. But what does
it mean to say “ideal” theory? One way to describe it is to say that ideal theory is a
method of theorizing that “idealizes” away certain variables—such as human
psychology—to either emphasize a normative point, or to simplify our reasoning about
justice. The general motivation to do so would be that the social world and human
behavior are too complex to evaluate all at once, and that the best tactic would be to
isolate features by holding others constant so that we can pinpoint something of
normative importance.
We are already used to this kind of tool in the empirical sciences—that is, we
ignore friction in physics, or we assume the perfect competition of markets in
3

For an alternative account for how to capture the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory, see
Valentini, Laura. “Ideal and Nonideal Theory: A Conceptual Map.” Philosophy Compass 17 (2009): 332-55,
and Hamlin, Alan and Zofia Stemplowska. “Theory, Ideal Theory, and the Theory of Ideals.” Political
Studies Review 10 (2012): 48-62.
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economics. We know that variables such as friction matter, but in order to make
headway in determining more fundamental principles, we need to idealize away from
them and then slowly add these variables in later as we come to better grasp the
scientific principles at stake more clearly. 4
Similarly, some uses of ideal theory in political philosophy can be said to mirror
some of these tactics. We have already seen in our initial example how some
egalitarians may choose to ignore features of human psychology when arguing for their
claims. Other instances can be described as well. For example, in global justice, some
theorists may choose to ignore the existence of borders when theorizing about the best
principle to govern the distribution of resources in the world. For these theorists, it is
not that they completely disregard the importance of borders—just like physicists know
that friction is important—it is rather that borders are not morally relevant for deciding
fundamental principles. 5 For these theorists, the existence of borders only confounds
our thinking about justice; it is best if we ignore them and settle the fundamental
principles of justice first before can we consider other variables, such as borders. As this
4

Some philosophers of science argue for the distinction between “abstraction” on the one hand and
“idealization” on the other. The central idea is that abstraction ignores a feature of the world, whereas
idealization assumes something that is false in order to simplify the world. For example, a physicist may
abstract from friction (since it is subtracted away from the world), and an economist may idealize a
market (perfect competition is false as it does not exist). See Cartwright, Nancy. How the Laws of Physics
Lie. Oxford University Press, 1983. For a further discussion of this distinction see Weisberg, Michael.
“Three Kinds of Idealization,” The Journal of Philosophy 104, no. 12 (2007): 639-659. Also, to see how
abstraction and idealization relates to ethics, see O’Neill, Onora. Towards Justice and Virtue: A
Constructivist Account of Practical Reasoning. Cambridge University Press, 1996: 40-45. Also see Gaus,
Gerald. The Tyranny of the Ideal. Princeton University Press, 2016: 36-38.
5
For an example of this kind of theorizing, see Beitz, Charles. “Justice and International Relations,”
Philosophy and Public Affairs 4, no. 4 (1975): 376. He argues that “we should not view national
boundaries as having fundamental moral significance,” and seeks to apply a principle of redistribution to
the entire globe.
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example illustrates, we can better see how theorists “idealize” away certain features of
the world in order to theorize more fruitfully about principles by removing some of the
complexity involved.
Of course, the method of ideal theory—understood in this way—is not without
challenges. Many critics have voiced concerns about the danger of idealizing away
central features of the world—such as borders—or of human capacities. While these
critics are typically labeled as proponents of “nonideal” theory, it is a bit of a misnomer
to do so. For what bothers many critics of ideal theory is not the engagement in
idealization per se, but the variables being idealized away themselves. For instance, a
common objection to the global theorist who ignores the existence of borders is to say
that borders are relevant at the fundamental level and should never be idealized away. 6
The objection is not that no idealization can ever occur. Even the harshest critic of ideal
theory would agree that it is acceptable to ignore some features of the world. For
instance, few would object to the idealizing away of individual differences about tastes
and preferences, or of the variation of individual personality traits. 7 Moreover, we can
do so without denying the normative importance that some of those features may
eventually have further downstream in our moral framework. In other words, such
features would simply operate at a later stage—similar to how friction may be added

6

Many theorists hold that borders matter for they define a normatively salient set of associations and
relationships that exist among the members within the borders. See, for instance, Scheffler, Samuel.
Boundaries and Allegiances. Oxford University Press, 2002.
7
We may acknowledge that there are individual differences, but we can idealize away from the specific
sets of preferences—such as the preference for vanilla ice cream over chocolate.
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back into our consideration at a later point of our investigation after we have uncovered
a more fundamental principle of physics.
Consequently, when we describe a “nonideal” theorist, we should envision one
who is highly critical of idealizing away a certain set of variables, namely ones that have
been commonly discussed in the literature—features such as human selfishness, the
workings of social institutions, the existence of borders, or the assumption of full
compliance, to name a few. Such theorists remind us to be extremely cautious when
engaging in idealization and exhort us to be certain that we have adequate justification
for ignoring certain features of ourselves and the world when theorizing about justice.
(b) Realism and Utopianism
Another dichotomy that can be described in debates surrounding the constraints
and methods of political theorizing is the distinction between realism and utopianism.8
Some interpret the task of political philosophy to mean that we should strive to describe
the principles that would govern a utopia that is the best of all possible worlds. In this
sense, one might imagine that our theoretical task would be to “start from scratch” in
the building of our world, using whatever normative guidance and reasoning we have in
order to determine what kind of life we should live and what kind of beings we should
become. 9 There would be, in a sense, no limits at all to our inquiry, with the exception
of perhaps our capacity for imagination and of our rationality and moral intuitions.
8

The literature sometimes describes this dichotomy as part of the ideal/non-ideal distinction. See
Valentini (2009). However, for clarification purposes, I wish to distinguish them.
9
Rawls describes Leibnitz’s philosophy as falling into this category: “Another idea is that of moral
philosophy as importantly a study of the ethics of creation, that is, of the principles of good and evil and
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Since there are relatively few contemporary examples of this approach, a more
modest account of this dichotomy should be articulated. According to this more limited
approach, utopianism allows us to largely ignore concerns about feasibility and
achievability when constructing a picture of what the perfect society is. For instance,
G.A. Cohen argues that a socialist society is desirable and the best we can envision for
ourselves, even though he concedes that he is agnostic about whether or not it is
achievable.10 For Cohen, feasibility is not a general constraint on our political principles,
and the construction of the perfect utopian society is an exercise that is independent of
the question of how to implement such a society in the actual world.
What value is there to such an approach? After all, if we cannot achieve the
perfect society—on what basis can we argue for it? There are two replies we can offer
here. First, Cohen could argue that it is a mistake to assume that all value lies in
implementation, and that there is value to be attained in discerning the very idea of a
utopian society as a purely rational feat. Mathematicians may rely upon similar
justifications for their work when the possibility of applying any of it to the actual world
may be limited.
However, a second way to defend the irrelevance of feasibility and achievability
is to illustrate it with the Kantian idea of a regulative ideal. According to Kant, one of
of right and wrong that guide the divine will in the creation of the world.” See Rawls, John. Lectures on
the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. by Barbara Herman. Harvard University Press, 2000: 107.
10
See Cohen, G.A. Why not Socialism? Princeton University Press, 2009. Also see Gilabert, Pablo.
“Debate: Feasibility and Socialism,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 19, no. 1 (2011): 52-63. And
Gheaus, Anca. “The Feasibility Constraint on the Concept of Justice,” The Philosophical Quarterly 63, no.
252 (2013): 445-464.
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our duties is that of self-perfection. However, Kant believes that perfection is
impossible for us to ever attain—it is instead “a rudder by which to steer oneself.” 11
Kant states: “It is a human being’s duty to strive for this perfection, but not to reach
it . . . and his compliance with this duty can, accordingly consist only in continual
progress.” 12 Hence, a regulative ideal can be valuable irrespective of our ability to
achieve it, for it can guide us toward correct actions and help us eradicate the everdeceptive and ubiquitous motive of self-love.13
On this reading, utopian modes of thought—characterized by the irrelevance of
feasibility or achievability—may allow us to construct perfect models that can direct the
design of institutions in political philosophy, or guide our intentions in the domain of
moral philosophy. So, while it may be impossible to ever reach a utopia, the model can
still provide us with guidance when attempting to improve our current state of affairs.
On this account, without such guidance, our reformations would be aimless and without
a clear goal. Put simply, to improve the current state of affairs, one must have a
blueprint to guide decision making.
Not surprisingly, realists object to these two strands of utopianism. With respect
to the notion of “starting from scratch” and building the best possible world, realists
resist the broad and limitless explorations into what society could be like. They assert
that, while these musings may be appropriate as works of fiction within literature, they
See Grenberg, Jeanine. Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Virtue.
Cambridge University Press, 2005: 89.
12
Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. and ed. by M.J. Gregor, in The Cambridge Edition of
the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge University Press, 1991: 446.
13
For a more detailed account of this see, Grenberg (2005): 89-95.
11
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cannot have much philosophical value with respect to how we should organize society.
At best, they could perhaps expand our imagination by enabling us to envision alternate
realities. But at worst, they can be dangerous fancies that lead us astray from what we
can actually hope to achieve—forever tempting people with a vision that is impossible,
leading to endless frustration and implacable resentment. 14 For this reason, realists also
reject the idea that we should ignore concerns of feasibility and achievability in our
theories of justice. They tend to appeal to the dictum that “ought implies can,” and
argue that, if the perfect society cannot actually be attainable, then the normative force
of the utopian vision should be blunted.
In addition, other theorists argue that the fixation on determining what the
perfect society is will not provide us with the necessary tools to make improvements in
society. Amartya Sen, for example, has argued that constructing a utopia that is
perfectly just is “neither necessary nor sufficient” in aiding us in our choice to improve
the current state affairs. 15
In light of these worries, realists tend to highlight the “here and now” and
emphasize the limitations that current political structures or individual motivational
patterns pose for any attempts at change to society. Consequently, realists will not
devote much argumentative efforts in constructing the perfect or flawless society, but

See Galston, William. “Realism in Political Theory,” European Journal of Political Theory 9, no. 4 (2010):
385-411, for a discussion on this point.
15
See Sen, Amartya. The Idea of Justice. Harvard University Press, 2009. Also, Sen, Amartya. “What do
we want from a Theory of Justice?” The Journal of Philosophy 53, no. 5 (2006): 215-238.
14
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rather highlight feasible improvements that we can make to society, given what we
already know and whatever limitations are in place. 16
(c) Fact-Sensitivity vs Fact-Insensitivity
The final dichotomy that I explore relates to two separate issues: first, whether
or not our fundamental principles of justice are “fact-free” in the sense that they do not
rely upon any facts to justify them, and second, whether or not it is permissible to allow
any facts whatsoever into our justification of principles of justice. According to G.A.
Cohen, for a principle of justice to be truly fundamental, it must lie at the summit of our
normative convictions and cannot express any reliance upon facts. 17 If it does, as he
believes Rawls’s conception of justice does, we should be able to unearth a fundamental
principle by probing for the ultimate justification for it that explains why those facts are
relevant.
If we return to our example of the socialist and her critic, the socialist could be
asserting a “fact-free” commitment to equality in the sense that she believes that there
are no facts required to justify her stance—it is simply the most fundamental belief she
has: “justice demands equality.” We can test this by inquiring why she believes this. If
she does not need to appeal to a fact to do so, she has reached the summit of her
beliefs.

See Wiens, David. “Prescribing Institutions without Ideal Theory,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 20,
no. 1 (2012): 45-70.
17
Cohen, G.A. Rescuing Justice and Equality. Harvard University Press, 2008.
16
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We can now turn to the second element of the dichotomy, according to which
facts should have no bearing whatsoever in our justification of justice. The socialist, in
defending her conception of equality, challenges her critic for invoking facts about
human nature to counter her claim. Philosophers such as Cohen would argue that such
a move is unwarranted, as such considerations are irrelevant to justice. Justice, on this
account, is primarily a conceptual truth that is applied to factual circumstances. What
justice requires, in other words, can never be challenged by factual circumstances.
Other philosophers, such as Rawls, deny this claim. They argue that facts must
be at the forefront of our theorizing about justice. Otherwise, we are left with a
conundrum as to how we should go about determining principles of justice that persons
can agree upon. For, if we cannot rely upon facts, it is unclear that people we have
enough information to figure out what justice requires.
In addition, Rawls believes that our reliance on facts makes justice applicable to
us. If we ignore factual constraints, our resultant theory of justice will be distant and
detached from our own conception of ourselves. As such, it could not serve the basis
for a public criterion of justice that is capable of generating agreement.
II. Moving Forward
Having laid out the three dichotomies with respect to the methods and aims of
political philosophy, I am now in a position to outline the chapters of my dissertation: In
chapter 2, I briefly describe Rawls’s idea of a realistic utopia, drawing upon textual
support to provide a more detailed picture of his goals and methods for political
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philosophy. In chapter 3 and 4, I argue for the importance of ideal theory as defined by
Rawls and defend it from various critics, including Amartya Sen who argue that it is
neither necessary nor sufficient for advancing justice in the world. In chapter 5, I argue
for the importance of empirical facts in our understanding of justice, and show that we
cannot abstract away from all such facts when articulating the requirements of justice.
And finally, in chapter 6, I conclude by highlighting how Rawls’s methodology for
determining principles of justice avoids hopelessly utopian ideals and argue for why
Rawls’s vision of a realistic utopia is the proper orientation of political philosophy.

13

Chapter 2: The Idea of a Realistic Utopia
We view political philosophy as realistically utopian: that is, as probing the limits
of practicable political possibility. Our hope for the future of our society rests
on the belief that the social world allows at least a decent political order, so that
a reasonably just, though not perfect, democratic regime is possible. So we ask:
What would a just democratic society be like under reasonably favorable but
still possible historical conditions, conditions allowed by the tendencies of the
social world? What ideals and principles would such a society try to realize
given the circumstances of justice in a democratic culture as we know them? 18

I. Introduction
At first glance, the idea of a realistic utopia appears contradictory—what
conceptual clarity could be gained by juxtaposing two seemingly incompatible notions
together in a single idea? In order to answer this question, I must unpack the various
components that inform Rawls’s understanding of it.
Rawls first mentions the idea of a realistic utopia within the context of global
justice in the Law of Peoples. 19 While the idea initially refers to the capacity for liberal
and non-liberal decent societies to achieve lasting peace, Rawls himself extends the
application of the idea to a conception of justice more generally in Justice as Fairness. 20 I
will focus on that more general application here.
According to Rawls, inherent in the notion of a realistic utopia is a commitment
to two governing judgments about what a conception of justice should do:
(1) “Extend what are ordinarily thought to be the limits of practical
political possibility;” 21 and

Rawls, John. Justice as Fairness. Harvard University Press, 2001: 4.
Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples. Harvard University Press, 1999.
20
JF, 4-5, 13.
21
LP, 11
18
19
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(2) “Depict an achievable social world….not a mere logical possibility, but
one that connects with the deep tendencies and inclinations of the social
world.” 22
Each of these judgments corresponds, respectively, to the utopian and realistic
elements of justice. I will discuss each of these elements below.
(a) A Realistic Utopia
The first judgment gives voice to the utopian aspirations of a theory of justice. In
society as we experience it, we are regularly reminded of the obstacles that limit the
foreseeable possibilities of social progress, such as the memory of our historical failures,
the perpetual conflicts of interest, and the feelings of political estrangement. Moreover,
these obstacles tend to cement themselves into our normative attitudes towards the
world, taking root in our considered judgments and coloring our view of what is
ultimately possible for society. To provide an illustration, Rawls states, “there are long
periods in the history of any society during which certain basic questions lead to deep
and sharp conflict and it seems difficult if not impossible to find any reasoned common
ground for political agreement.” 23 Rawls cites the brutal conflict between Catholics and
Protestants during the Reformation, the debates between the Federalists and the AntiFederalists during the drafting of the American Constitution, and the perennial debates
regarding the balance of liberty and equality in modern societies as examples that
influence our pessimism about the possibility for genuine agreement about principles
for a just society. From this history of disagreement, we may ultimately think that
22
23

LP, 128.
JF, 1.

15

justice can only be an endless power struggle between different competing and
irreconcilable interests, with the only hope for agreement being a mere modus vivendi.
Or, we may come to accept as part of the natural order the necessity of deep social
inequalities with little recourse available to those who are worst off. As these
illustrations show, the real danger, for Rawls, is that we may simply learn to respond to
these intractable disputes by resigning ourselves to our existing situation, unable and
unwilling to reach for the basis of a broader consensus or political agreement.
In the face of these pessimistic tendencies, a conception of justice must be, in
part, utopian; it must expand our worldview and enable us to imagine new possibilities
for society that have been deemed infeasible by our hardened hearts through our daily
confrontations with the world. As Rawls states, “the limits of the possible are not given
by the actual,” and it is therefore up to us to construct a framework for justice that
extends beyond the actual by showing how social and political institutions may be
arranged differently, giving rise to a new political reality that is more just than the
current state of affairs. 24 Without these aspirational elements of justice, we will
perpetually be constrained by our actual circumstances and doomed to replicate our
frustrations and disappointments without any reasonable hope for improvement.
Described in this way, a theory of justice should be, in a sense, expansive and
broadening. It must give us reason to hope for an alternative arrangement of society
that seeks to better respond to our fundamental interests as citizens.

24

LP, 12.
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(b) A Realistic Utopia
The second governing judgment reflects the realistic dimensions of justice. It
urges us to temper our aspirations and ground them in the realities of human nature
and the circumstances of society which pose limitations on what we can strive to
achieve. As Rawls insists, we are not interested in mere “logical possibilities” of
perfectly just societies, but rather genuine options that can reliably connect with the
general capacities of human beings and the indelible features that characterize liberal
democratic societies.
The reason for this is because we want to ensure that we have principles of
justice “that we can understand and act on, approve, and endorse.” 25 If our conception
of justice fails to connect with our fundamental interests and our capacities, there is
little assurance that humans will reliably act upon it over time. In this sense, an
important realistic thread of Rawls’s work is the importance of stability in our political
theories. It is of no use to us to produce a picture of the perfect society that can only
have momentary success amidst very specific circumstances. Instead, we require a
society that answers to the general features of social life and of our psychological
capacities. It is only then will a stable and just society be possible for us.
Failure to internalize these realistic elements will yield conceptions of justice
that are inapplicable and even harmful to human societies. Let us illustrate with an
example from Hume:

25

LP, 7.

17

We shall suppose, that a creature, possessed of reason, but unacquainted
with human nature, deliberates with himself what RULES of justice or
property would best promote public interest, and establish peace and
security among mankind: His most obvious thought would be, to assign
the largest possessions to the most extensive virtue, and give every one
the power of doing good, proportioned to his inclination. In a perfect
theocracy, where a being, infinitely intelligent, governs by particular
volitions, this rule would certainly have place, and might serve to the
wisest purposes: But were mankind to execute such a law; so great is the
uncertainty of merit, both from its natural obscurity, and from the selfconceit of each individual, that no determinate rule of conduct would
ever result from it; and the total dissolution of society must be the
immediate consequence....A rule, which, in speculation, may seem the
most advantageous to society, may yet be found, in practice, totally
pernicious and destructive. 26
From this passage, we can see that Hume issues a serious warning to utopian modes of
reasoning; if we were to speculate, while being “unacquainted with human nature,” or
without regard to the effects of that rule on society, we would produce a “destructive”
result. In Hume’s example, if we ignore the limitations of human knowledge—if we do
not acknowledge that we are not infinitely intelligent and are sometimes unaware of
our own intentions, let alone the intentions of others—there would be no way to
determine how to employ the rule “to each according to his virtue” without devolving
into muddled and limited speculations. As a result, it should be eliminated as a
possibility for a principle of justice. Hume ends his discussion by saying: “We may
conclude, therefore, that, in order to establish laws for the regulation of property, we
must be acquainted with the nature and situation of man.” 27
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Rawls echoes Hume’s conclusions here by quoting Rousseau, who famously
claims that we must “take men as they are” when devising principles of justice. 28 Rawls
interprets this to mean that we must be aware of the limitations that human nature
imposes upon us and that we must employ “workable” principles of justice. 29
“Workable” for Rawls means that they must be public conceptions of justice that are
“openly observable” and amenable to “interpersonal comparisons” in society. 30 The
principle, “to each according to one’s virtue,” would fail this test for, as Hume points out,
there is no easily accessible method by which public institutions could determine each
person’s level of virtue and the requisite reward for it.31
So far then, the realistic elements of justice emphasize the following: (1) human
nature, (2) the general circumstances of society, (3) stability, and (4) workability. Of
course, significant debate lies in the much harder question regarding which features of
human nature and of society are important, and how these relate to stability and
workability. I will discuss these in greater detail in later chapters.
(c) A Realistic Utopia
So, how does Rawls combine these two different goals into one coherent vision?
According to Rawls, there are several features that a realistic utopia as a whole must

LP, 13. For the reference to Rousseau’s injunction, see Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract, in
Classics of Political and Moral Philosophy, 2nd edition, ed. by Steven Cahn. Oxford University Press, 2012:
561.
29
LP, 13.
30
Ibid., 13.
31
Rawls himself argues that the principle of utility and the capability approach to justice would similarly
fail as workable public conceptions of justice. See Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. Columbia University
Press, 1993: 13 for this argument.
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contain if it is to be an appropriate conception of justice. First, a theory of justice must
“use political (moral ideals), principles and concepts to specify a reasonable and just
society.” 32 While this may sound broad and more utopian in spirit, Rawls insists that
these ideals must be completely contained “within the category of the political.” 33
What Rawls means is that the conception of society and of the concepts employed to
articulate a conception of justice must be “available in the public political culture of a
liberal constitutional regime” and “not [from] any comprehensive doctrine, which
always extends beyond the category of the political.” 34 In other words, the notion of,
say, freedom and equality employed by many conceptions of justice cannot be
understood solely from within a singular religious worldview or from a comprehensive
philosophical doctrine about the nature of free will. Instead, the freedom and equality
of persons must be available in the language, structure and shared history of democratic
institutions that citizens employ openly to one another. In doing so, there is greater
scope for agreement and consensus on principles of justice that are based on shared
normative concepts that are available and accessible to all citizens.
Other political norms that Rawls includes—in addition to the freedom and
equality of citizens—is a set of political virtues such as the desire for “cooperation,” “a
sense of fairness,” “tolerance,” and “a willingness to meet others half-way.” 35 These
guiding norms do not require us to appeal to a unique moral doctrine for their ultimate
32
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justification—they can be supported from a multitude of different conceptions of the
good—and they can be assumed as a “given” within society in which people accept that
social cooperation for mutual benefit is its defining feature. 36 If we define society in any
other way—say, as the joint endeavor to ensure the salvation of souls, or as a
cooperative effort to produce perfect selfless individuals—our political ideals and
virtues will extend into objectionable utopian standards that will unlikely yield
agreement or attain stability over time.
One important political norm to highlight on its own is that of reciprocity.
According to Rawls:
This criterion [of reciprocity] requires that, when terms are
proposed…those proposing them must think it at least reasonable for
others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated
or manipulated or under pressure caused by an inferior political or social
position. 37
In this sense, reciprocity works with other political norms to establish a standpoint of
justice that transcends current political and social realities in which vast inequalities may
generate an unequal bargaining position between citizens. No conception of justice can
be formulated if citizens cannot deliberate within a fair and reasonable standpoint from
which citizens may decide upon principles of justice. Otherwise, any agreements would
be unstable compromises, easily undermined by shifts in power or changes in interests.
The norm of reciprocity ensures that any agreement that is reached after deliberation is
agreed to for the right reasons—not out of fear, intimidation or unfair bargaining
36
37
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positions. In other words, it imposes a limit on the circumstances under which
deliberation may take place that all parties should be able to accept as fair and
reasonable. Such agreements will then be stable and at low risk of being undermined by
changes in circumstances.
The norm of reciprocity is in this sense utopian, for it requires that citizens move
beyond their current interests and think normatively within a standpoint that answers
to our more fundamental interests as citizens: the ability to freely pursue a conception
of the good, and to develop a sense of justice—or what Rawls calls the “two moral
powers.” 38
And yet, at the same time, the criterion of reciprocity is realistic. Rawls is not
demanding that we cultivate a capacity that we do not have, or one that is unreliable
and limited. A concern for reciprocity, unlike say beneficence or altruism, is a reliable
and stable human capacity that can be said to be at the heart of relations within a
political society. In Part III of a Theory of Justice, Rawls even develops an account which
establishes how “reciprocity is the fundamental psychological mechanism implicated in
the development of moral motivation” and that, because of this, principles based upon
reciprocity would “develop naturally out of preexisting psychological materials.” 39 By
grounding the source of basic political norms in fundamental human psychology, Rawls
believes that accepting his conception of justice will not be an insurmountable task
38
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capable of only saints or the chosen few. It will be available to all, and will answer to
citizens’ deepest psychological tendencies, thereby ensuring stability and reliable
acceptance over time.40
By limiting our normative ideals to political concepts within the scope of human
psychology and within the culture of democratic institutions, we can maintain the vision
of a realistic utopia without contradiction. A conception of justice is utopian in that it
can expand the possibilities of social organization by appealing to normative goals that
can be utilized to critically examine current social institutions. Yet, at the same time, this
critical standpoint will be realistically grounded in what citizens qua citizens are already
capable of accepting as it is compatible with their deepest psychology, their
fundamental interests, as well as with the commitments within their social and political
culture.
A final feature of a realistic utopia is that there must be an acknowledgement
and acceptance of the fact of reasonable pluralism. 41 The fact of reasonable pluralism is
the fact that citizens will naturally arrive at differing conclusions about fundamental
values in life through the free use of their reason. The explanation for this is that
citizens are constrained by imperfect information and limited capacities to weigh and
evaluate evidence, or what Rawls calls “the burdens of judgment.” 42 In other words, it
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is unreasonable to expect citizens to converge on a particular conception of the good
given the immense diversity of experiences and the differing responses to these
experiences available to citizens. On Rawls’s view then, the fact of reasonable pluralism
must then be “permanent as it persists indefinitely under free democratic
institutions.” 43
Given the indelible fact of reasonable pluralism, we would not do well in
employing a principle of justice that ignored it—say, by instituting a principle of justice
that required the unanimous agreement upon a comprehensive religious or
philosophical doctrine. Doing so would disrupt the stability of a conception of justice
and would not garner reliable adherence to it, as the state would have to resort to
coercive tactics to enforce agreement. Citizens who would endure such policies would
garner resentment and hatred for the state, awaiting the chance to overthrow it and
replace it. This kind of inevitable vying for power would threaten to undermine and
delegitimize the governing institutions in society. As a result, persons would reject any
comprehensive doctrines as suitable claims for political organization, and would assert
the importance of reasonable pluralism as a guiding feature of society. Otherwise,
stability would not be realistically achievable, and persons would not be assured that
their fundamental interests could be adequately safeguarded.

43

JF, 4.

24

Given these considerations, Rawls states that “this fact of reasonable pluralism
limits what is practicably possible.” 44 While it may be an interesting philosophical
exercise to provide a hypothetical picture of the perfectly just society that existed in a
world in which humans were omniscient and did not suffer from the burdens of
judgement—perhaps yielding a society in which everyone agreed upon a unique
conception of the good—this would not be an acceptable guide for what justice actually
requires of us. The mere fact that we could theoretically perform that exercise would
be irrelevant and utopian in the negative sense, for it would not provide us with an
achievable conception of justice that can be attainable given reasonable limitations of
human nature and of liberal democratic societies. Hence, such imaginations should be
met with skepticism and caution.
Nevertheless, the commitment to reasonable pluralism is utopian in an
important sense for it ensures that citizens will be safeguarded with the capacity to
pursue a conception of the good of their own choosing. While it would not be possible
for an entire society to unite behind a common good, a fundamental interest of citizens
would still be protected, along with the ability for citizens to associate with others who
share similar values, as enumerated in the first principle of justice of any realistic
utopia—Rawls’s principle that protects the basic liberties. 45
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Ultimately, when we combine these various elements contained within a realistic
utopia—namely, a recognition of the practical limitations of human nature and of social
life, combined with political ideals that are accessible to all and capable of providing a
critical standpoint from which to judge our principles—Rawls believes we will have
grounds for the reasonable hope in the possibility of achieving a reasonable and just
society that is stable across time. Moreover, Rawls says, in his discussion of Hegel, that
we will be able to reconcile ourselves to our society and its institutions, as opposed to
merely “resigning” ourselves to them. 46 In this sense, we misunderstand the notion of a
realistic utopia if we view it as a form of tragic compromise between realism and
utopianism. Instead, a realistic utopia should illustrate a vision that can be supported by
all citizens and accepted as reasonable, for it does not run contrary to—and actually
supports—the fundamental interests of persons to pursue a conception of the good and
develop a sense of justice, and aligns with the deepest psychological tendencies of
human nature and of social cooperation. This ensures that justice will be affirmed and
endorsed across time. 47
Of course, there are some natural limitations to the idea of a realistic utopia.
First, it assumes that there are favorable historical circumstances surrounding the
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development of society. 48 Conditions of extreme scarcity due to devastating natural
disasters or economic collapse, or historically unfavorable events such as catastrophic
war will preclude a realistic utopia from being realized. In these more unfortunate
circumstances, citizens may find it difficult to see society as a system of social
cooperation for mutual benefit, or their concern for safety and security will be so stark
as to preclude them from forming the requisite level of trust with one another for
reciprocity to shape social relations. In such conditions, an aim to restore favorable
conditions will be paramount so as to ensure that justice can be possible in society once
again.
A second limitation is that the implementation of a realistic utopia will not solve
all questions of meaning and purpose for individuals. As Rawls remarks, “a realistic
utopia…may be a social world whose many members may suffer considerable
misfortune and anguish, and may be distraught by spiritual emptiness.” 49 The reason
for this is because Rawls does not understand political society as a “community” or
“association,” if we mean by such terms the idea of living together under a single unified
common good.50 While it may be imaginable that such a group of persons could exist—
united and deeply fulfilled in their communal endeavor with all persons—the limitations
of reasonable pluralism cannot allow for its realization. Instead, Rawls leaves questions
of meaning and purpose to the freedom of individuals and their associations within
48
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political society. 51 Hence, while a realistic utopia does not guarantee complete
fulfillment in life, it affords everyone the effective opportunity to pursue his or her final
ends to the greatest extent allowable by a free society.
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Chapter 3: Justice and Ideal Theory
If ideal theory is worthy of study, it must be because, as I have conjectured, it is
the fundamental part of the theory of justice and essential for the nonideal part
as well. 52

1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to affirm the value and necessity of ideal theory in
political philosophy. As discussed in the introduction, ideal theory involves a certain
methodology for determining the correct principles of justice for society. This
methodology typically involves idealizing assumptions that ignore certain features of the
world, or imagines hypothetical features that do not currently exist. In addition to these
methodological features, ideal theory is said to be important for our understanding of
how we should proceed in “nonideal” conditions of society where justice is not met.
The idea is that, unless have a full understanding of what justice requires in an ideal
model, we cannot address the problems posed by the more complex circumstances of
social life. The task of this chapter is to evaluate these two different components of
ideal theory.
An inquiry of this kind is particularly apt given the growing chasm that has
appeared between ideal theorists on the one hand, who assert the primacy of ideal
theory for delineating the requirements of justice, and political realists on the other,
who largely eschew ideal theory and warn of its irrelevance, and even its potentially
dangerous effects. To illustrate this deep disagreement, consider the following tableau
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of the current debate: In the realist camp, Amartya Sen argues that ideal theory is
“neither necessary nor sufficient for advancing justice in society;” 53 David Wiens argues
that “we should abandon ideal theory in our attempts to address actual injustices;” 54
Charles Mills and Carol Pateman claim that there is an unjustified “hegemony of ‘ideal
theory’ in political philosophy.” 55
In support of ideal theory, John Rawls states that “ideal theory is the only basis
for the systematic grasp of…pressing problems [of injustice];” 56 Allen Buchanan believes
that “the task of ideal theory is to set the most important and most distant moral
targets for a better future,” and serve as “the ultimate standards for evaluating law.”; 57
John Simmons argues that “the political philosopher’s first job…is to refine and argue for
an ideal of justice;” 58 Adam Swift argues that “we need fundamental, contextindependent, normative philosophical claims to guide political action even in nonideal
circumstances.” 59
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The wide array of positions with respect to the role of ideal and nonideal theory
in political philosophy reflects, on my view, not only a confusion about what exactly we
mean when we say “ideal theory” and “non-ideal” theory, but also a lack of agreement
about what the proper methodology for doing political philosophy is and what role a
conception of justice is supposed to serve in our normative thinking. It is only after we
articulate a considered view of these questions can we begin to resolve the ideal vs.
nonideal debate that has since emerged in the contemporary literature.
Given this diagnosis of the problem, this chapter will serve two aims: (1) clarify
the meaning of the ideal/non-ideal distinction, and (2) argue that ideal theory, properly
understood, is necessary for theorizing about justice, and is intricately connected with
our obligations in so called “non-ideal” circumstances. The outline of this chapter is as
follows: First, I begin with a detailed account of Rawls’s understanding of ideal theory,
as it is typically at the forefront of various debates. In doing so, I highlight several
misunderstandings of his view and offer my own attempt to correct them in the spirit of
Rawls’s work. Next, I consider various objections presented by realists, who attempt to
undermine Rawls’s assumption that ideal theory is the proper method for theorizing
about justice. I argue that all of the objections to Rawls’s understanding of ideal theory
fail. In doing so, I argue that Rawls’s understanding of ideal theory is grounded in his
understanding of a realistic utopia, an idea which governs the goals and aims of political
philosophy itself.
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II. Rawls and the Ideal
The main impetus for the current debate between nonideal and ideal theory
stems from various components of John Rawls’s work in political philosophy, so it is
natural to begin our discussion of the topic with his account. While some theorists
regard Rawls’s treatment of the topic clear and straightforward, upon examining Rawls’s
work carefully, we come across numerous difficulties when attempting to account for all
the cases where Rawls employs the terms “ideal” and “nonideal.” 60 A sampling of some
of the key ideas of Rawls’s texts will suffice to demonstrate this complexity. For
instance, Rawls describes in the course of his work: the definition of “ideal theory” and
“nonideal theory,” 61 an “ideal conception of the person,” 62 an “ideal of society as a fair
system of social cooperation,” 63 the “ideal of a well-ordered society,” 64 an “ideal of the
rational and reasonable,” 65 and the “ideal of public reason,” 66 among many others.67
Those familiar with Rawls will recognize that these are some of the most important and
central ideas that govern and structure Rawls’s work. It is no coincidence, then, that
debates surrounding the ideal/nonideal distinction cover such a vast terrain and require
a deep engagement with Rawls’s underlying ideas. Nevertheless, to provide some
60
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structure to our inquiry, we will begin our discussion with what Rawls himself formally
calls “ideal theory” proper and “nonideal theory.”
(a) Rawls and Ideal Theory
One purpose of ideal theory, for Rawls, is to provide us with the most
appropriate methodology for establishing the correct principles of justice that would
govern the perfectly just, or “well-ordered” society. 68 The central components of
Rawls’s ideal theory are the two following idealizing assumptions: (1) an assumption of
“full or strict compliance,” and (2) an assumption of “favorable circumstances.” With
respect to full compliance, Rawls means that “(nearly) everyone strictly complies with,
and abides by, the principles of justice.” 69 Regarding “favorable circumstances,” Rawls
refers to the “historical, economic, and social conditions” that “make a constitutional
regime possible.” 70 There is much to unpack in these conditions, but for now, the
general idea is that, when determining which principles of justice would be best, Rawls
believes that we must begin our inquiry by assuming that everyone follows those
principles of justice and that the social circumstances are favorable for justice to arise.
In what sense are these assumptions ideal? The first assumption is “idealized” in
the sense that full compliance does not obtain in actual political societies. No society,
currently or historically, has ever ensured strict compliance with its rules among all
68
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citizens. The second assumption is idealized in the sense that it asks us to discount
abnormal conditions, such as the existence of war and famine, when determining which
principles are best—even though these are real and genuine problems that societies
must face.
While it may appear strange to begin an inquiry of justice with these
assumptions, it is helpful to remind ourselves that these techniques are not limited to
normative theorizing, and are pervasive in the empirical sciences as well. For instance,
in economic theory, there are no actual markets in which perfect competition exists.
Nevertheless, the assumption of perfect competition is used prominently as a formal
model that simplifies our domain of inquiry to provide some traction in tackling the
problem of understanding markets and prices. Similarly, in chemistry, the ideal gas law
proports to describe how ideal gases behave in “normal conditions” of standard
pressure and temperature. Chemists recognize that abnormal conditions can present us
with complex problems. Yet, they proceed to assume that they do not hold with the
belief that uncovering an ideal gas law will ultimately shed light on how to deal with
nonideal conditions when they arise.
Given this comparison, the idea of idealization should not be immediately
objectionable or unfamiliar to intellectual inquiry as such. What generates significant
debate, however, is what features should be idealized. In the sciences, it is a choice that
we must make—we choose to idealize away friction in physics, for instance, because we
believe that doing so will aid us in our understanding of fundamental physical laws. So,
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we must ask in our investigation of Rawls’s work whether or not these idealizing
assumptions actually aid us in our understanding of justice, or if they are merely
hindrances that obscure its true nature.
(b) What is Nonideal Theory?
Given Rawls’s understanding of ideal theory, we can then contrast it with his
account of nonideal theory. The subject of nonideal theory, for Rawls, involves the
unique problems that arise when conditions of (1) strict compliance or (2) favorable
circumstances do not hold. These are the conditions of “partial compliance” or
“unfavorable circumstances.” These conditions give rise to a new and distinct set of
questions for us to answer. Broadly, questions within nonideal theory address “topics
as the theory of punishment, the doctrine of just war, and the justification of the various
ways of opposing unjust regimes,” including civil disobedience. 71 Within the subject of
global justice, nonideal theory consists of developing principles for how to deal with
“outlaw states” or “burdened societies,” which correspond respectively to societies that
fail to comply with the Law of Peoples (noncompliance), or those societies which lack
sufficient resources or political will to establish a well-ordered or decent society
(unfavorable circumstances). 72
As is well known, much of Rawls’s work is primarily concerned with ideal theory,
with relatively little work done in nonideal theory. However, the main reason for this
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asymmetry is not because Rawls is insensitive or uninterested in problems of nonideal
theory, but rather because he thinks that “ideal theory is…the only basis for the
systematic grasp of these more pressing problems [within nonideal theory].” 73 In other
words, Rawls thinks that it would be difficult to attempt solutions to the problems of
nonideal theory—war, punishment, weak and unstable institutions, or deeply corrupted
government—without understanding the conclusions drawn from work within ideal
theory where full compliance and favorable conditions are assumed from the start. The
goal for our exegesis is to establish just why these assumptions are necessary and how
ideal theory can generate accurate guidance for the pressing problems that nonideal
circumstances pose.
(c) Why Full Compliance?
The assumption of full compliance typically generates significant debate with
respect to Rawls’s methodological assumptions of ideal theory. And, on first glance, it
seems like a puzzling assumption. Why should we think that assuming full compliance is
a reliable method for determining what principles of justice we should adopt to
eventually guide us in nonideal circumstances? Won’t this lead us astray?
One reason to think that the full compliance assumption is problematic is that it
appears to simply idealize the central problem of justice (noncompliance) away from the
very start, rendering the exercise irrelevant. Realists, for example, argue that the core
problem that a conception of justice must address is the problem of order and stability,
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of which noncompliance is an essential threat that must be solved.74 And so, the
objection goes, if we abstract away from noncompliance, then whatever principles we
come up with will not really be applicable in our world. Instead, they will be for some
other world that is vastly different from our own. David Schmidtz presents this point as
follows: “The trouble with ideas about what is fair in worlds without compliance
problems is that they are ideas about an ideal problem, and not a real one.” 75 Because
of this, realists caution that any attempt to apply these ideally constructed principles
framed under perfect compliance to the “nonideal” circumstances of the actual world
will tend to have disastrous consequences—after all, if they were constructed by
assuming that compliance was irrelevant from the very start, why should we think that
they will solve problems rather than exacerbate them?
Let us consider an example to help motivate the problem. Suppose I am
searching for the best principles of justice. I start with the belief that I am permitted to
idealize away problems of noncompliance and begin with the assumption that everyone
will adhere to my principles. Moreover, I am entitled to favorable circumstances to
ensure that abnormal factors do not interfere with the realization of a society governed
by these principles. I then proclaim: “Since I do not have to worry about compliance, I
assert that the ideal principle of justice is one in which everyone should proclaim their
faith in the Christian God and be rewarded according to the Christian understanding of
See Williams, Bernard. In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument.
Princeton University Press, 2005. Also, Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, ed. by Richard Tuck. Cambridge
University Press, 2007.
75
Schmidtz, David. “Ideal Theory: What it is and What it Needs to be,” Ethics vol. 121, no. 4 (2011): 778.
74

37

virtue and merit.” To anyone who would object to my principle by claiming that not
everyone is a Christian, I can merely say, “That is a problem for nonideal theory and not
my concern here. I am modelling the perfectly just society, and if compliance is not an
obstacle, then everyone affirming one religious doctrine is ideal.” To anyone who claims
that Christian teachings are not always available to people, I can invoke the “favorable
conditions” clause, and assume that everyone has reasonable access to Bibles, Christian
Churches, and the willingness and aptness to put their faith in God. And now, with the
true principles of justice at hand constructed using ideal theory, I can move to nonideal
theory and address the problem of heathens (partial compliance) or “barbaric” and
“uncivilized” nations who have not heard the word of God (unfavorable conditions).
Framed this way, the idealizing assumption of full compliance looks troubling. It
appears to have the power to render moot any number of barriers that may apply in the
real world for complying with principles of justice. As such, the results will be
catastrophic when we attempt to implement them for society. As William Galston
warns, “if one supposes that a republic of virtue is within reach, then the failure to
attain it reflects either inadequate effort or deliberate but remediable human perversity.
Acting on this belief is bound to end in oppression, even terror.” 76 The idea here is that
tyranny is the inevitable conclusion to our attempts to apply an ideal theory of justice
that is based on an implausible assumption of what humans are capable of achieving.
And since the full compliance assumption conceals the obstacles and limits on human
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capabilities, any attempt to approach that ideal will result in policies that may severely
threaten liberty as trial upon trial is met with only the recalcitrance of human
imperfections.
We can describe this problem more expansively by postulating a vast array of
principles of justice that would pass through the strict compliance assumption with little
resistance or objection at the level of ideal theory: (a) perfect equality of resources—by
assuming everyone will comply with taxing their income to the point of equality; (b)
theocratic/communitarian principles—by assuming that everyone will comply with the
dictates of a religion or cultural standard, or (c) perfectionism—by assuming that
everyone will acknowledge the same universal standard of goodness. If these principles
can ignore any problems of adherence in their formulation, the realists remind us that it
is easy to see how a transition into nonideal circumstances armed with these principles
could generate significant resistance.77
So, the realists wonder, how can the full compliance assumption in Rawlsian
ideal theory be useful? It seems to be an inert exercise that cannot yield satisfactory
conclusions about what we should do in the nonideal world since it idealizes away core
problems of justice.78
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To answer the realist objection, we must probe a bit more deeply into the
justifying reasons Rawls provides for his assumption of full compliance. In doing so, we
will see how the aforementioned objections rest on a misunderstanding of Rawls’s view.
(d) The Importance of Full Compliance: The Stability Condition
For Rawls, one reason for assuming full compliance in ideal theory is to simplify
our analysis of the stability condition that Rawls emphasizes for principles of justice. It
is not to be used as a formal model to construct a picture of what the perfect society
would look like absent all constraints related to compliance whatsoever. This is a
significant source of error in criticisms of Rawls so it is worth explicating at length
Rawls’s view of the stability condition and how the assumption of full compliance aids
us in testing it.
Rawls’s stability condition represents a substantive constraint—if not the most
neglected substantive constraint—on our principles of justice. 79 It is based on the idea
that principles of justice must endure over time and gain reliable adherence by citizens
if they are to be suitable candidates for the regulation of society. This is because we are
not interested in principles of justice that could only enjoy momentary success or those
that would require miraculous fortune to achieve. Nor are we interested in principles of
justice that could only be adhered to with great difficulty through the disfigurement of
our moral psychology. Instead, for Rawls, we aim to discover principles of justice that
grounds, ultimately yielding his favored principle of justice—luck egalitarianism--which requires
inequalities due to luck to be neutralized. See Cohen, G.A. Rescuing Justice and Equality. Harvard
University Press, 2008.
79
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reliably connect with the deep and internal psychological mechanisms of persons. This
ensures that citizens will adequately develop a sense of justice to adhere to its
mandates over time. Rawls states:
It is evident that stability is a desirable feature of moral
conceptions…However attractive a conception of justice might be on
other grounds, it is seriously defective if the principles of moral
psychology are such that it fails to engender in humans beings the
requisite desire to act upon it. 80
Given that Rawls focuses on the compatibility of principles of justice with human
motivational capacities, Rawls is actually in agreement with many realists who argue
that we must be concerned with the compliance question with respect to justice as it
relates to the reasons why citizens may or may not be able to comply with the
requirements of justice.
In addition to connecting the stability of justice to moral psychology and human
nature, Rawls, more controversially, argues that the stability of justice can only be
safeguarded if justice can be shown to be part of the human good—known in Rawlsian
scholarship as the congruence argument.81 While I cannot fully explicate this argument
here, 82 I will briefly remark that the main impetus for this additional component is the
hope that justice can be internally endorsed as a good for us, as opposed to merely
being accepted instrumentally. The worry is that, if it turns out that justice is
detrimental or disconnected from our good, or if it cannot be endorsed from within,
80
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then we can only be externally motivated into accepting its demands through fear and
threats, or bargaining and compromise.83 Rawls rejects this basis for stability and
attempts to show how acting for the sake of justice enables us to realize the more
fundamental aspects of our moral personality, whatever conception of the good we
happen to choose. As such, it is central to the good of all rational and reasonable
persons. Rawls couples this with the “Aristotelian Principle,” according to which we
derive pleasure and satisfaction from the development of our higher order capacities,
including the sense of justice. Consequently, developing our capacity to act for the sake
of justice can be experienced as a highest-order good by all.84
We have now shown that Rawls’s stability condition consists of two limitations
on principles of justice: (1) they must be compatible with human nature and moral
psychology, and (2) they must be capable of being affirmed within our good. Taken
together, the two elements of Rawls’s concern with stability has both an empirical and a
normative component and corresponds directly to the realistic and utopian threads of
Rawls’s project.
With the full idea of the stability condition in mind, we can now return to the
importance of the full compliance assumption within Rawls’s ideal theory. As we have
already shown, it would be a mistake to claim that Rawls engages in the assumption of
full compliance in order to conceal all the reasons why people fail to comply with a
Similar to, say, Hobbes’s conception of stability as based upon “compromise, coercion and a modus
vivendi among essentially conflicting interests,” see Freeman (2006), 102.
84
See TJ, 372-380 for a discussion of the Aristotelian Principle and its relationship to the sense of justice
and the good of persons.
83

42

principle of justice. Instead, Rawls utilizes ideal theory to help us evaluate methodically
which principles, when strictly complied with, could be realistically stable, given features
of human nature and our moral psychology. If it turns out that our proposed principles
would fail to be supported by citizens through reliable psychological mechanisms, they
will be rejected. As John Simmons puts it,
The strict compliance assumption is designed only to allow us to imagine
the results of getting ‘up and running’ the institutions embodying
different conceptions of justice, which requires imagining that those
subject to those institutions support and comply with them, at least
initially. But it may turn out that some conceptions…’exceed the capacity
of human nature,’ such that long-term support and compliance are
unlikely or impossible.85
In other words, the assumption of full compliance is a heuristic device to test whether
our candidate principles of justice would endure through time, or if they would instead
“exceed the capacity of human nature.” Freeman corroborates:
The stability problem for Rawls requires showing how a conception of
justice is realistically possible given human nature and certain fixed
conditions of social life. To do so, Rawls assumes the ideal case of a wellordered society [in which strict compliance is a component]. If a
conception of justice is not workable there, then it is not feasible under
less than ideal conditions. 86
So, the full compliance condition enables us to test the workability and feasibility of our
various principles of justice by modelling them in a well-ordered society. If it turns out
that the strains on our moral psychology are too great, or if justice cannot be secured
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through internal motivations that are connect with our good, then we should reject the
principle.
(e) The Importance of Full Compliance: Removal of Confounding Variables
In addition to aiding us in assessing the stability of a principle of justice, the full
compliance assumption of Rawls’s ideal theory enables us to isolate the relevant
normative features of a principle when comparing it to another conception of justice.
As Simmons points out,
If we compare the operation of societies ordered by competing principles
of justice while assuming strict compliance with those principles, the
different effects we observe can reasonably be taken to be wholly the
responsibility of the different ordering principles themselves. If instead
we try to evaluate principles in terms of how societies governed by them
would operate with a ‘normal’ amount of noncompliance with them, we
will likely find that our evaluations yield quite indeterminate results.87
What Simmons has in mind here is that, by assuming full compliance, we can be
confident that our acceptance or rejection of a principle is due to normative features of
the principle itself, and not a confounding variable. As such, the full compliance
condition allows us to compare different conceptions of justice against one another on
equal footing.
By way of illustration, we can examine an analogy in the methodology of the
sciences to demonstrate the importance of isolating variables. 88 Suppose I wanted to
test the effectiveness of two different social policies on educational outcomes in lowincome neighborhoods. It is a basic methodological rule in the social sciences that,
87
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when we test the competing policies, we ensure that the relevant variables are the
same in both cases. So, if we test policy A on school system S, and test policy B on
school system T, we would do well to ensure that the relevant variables in S and T are
identical—say the level of income and test scores in each school district.89 Otherwise, it
would be extremely difficult to measure the successfulness of the two policies in any
reliable and convincing manner.
Through this analogy, we can see that Rawls’s assumption of full compliance is
one way of holding the relevant conditions in society constant so that we can more
effectively gauge the outcomes of different principles of justice. If we do not hold
compliance constant, it will be difficult to disentangle all the various causes and factors
that may explain noncompliance—some of which may have little to do with the
normative content of the principles. Noncompliance, for instance, might be the result
of a lack of trust in institutions due to past political failures, or perhaps due to the
prevalence of false information in society, or maybe corrupt politicians. These problems
of noncompliance are not relevant in the right way to our assessment of principles of
justice. We want to test for noncompliance that is due to the principles of justice
themselves, and not these other reasons. As such, we assume full compliance to isolate
and better evaluate the normative content.
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(f) The Importance of Assuming Favorable Circumstances
We are now in a position to segue into Rawls’s second idealizing assumption in
ideal theory: the assumption of “favorable circumstances.” The rationale for assuming
favorable circumstances is similar to the reasoning for the assumption of full compliance:
we want to ensure that we are accurately evaluating our principles of justice without
undue influence of irrelevant factors. These irrelevant factors will become evident as
we explicate what Rawls means by “favorable circumstances.”
By “favorable circumstances,” Rawls means two different things. First, Rawls
includes what he calls the “circumstances of justice” which are “the normal conditions
under which human cooperation is both possible and necessary.” 90 Rawls focuses on
the conditions of social cooperation because they are the conditions in which concerns
of justice arise. This requires the capacity for persons to view their cooperative
endeavors as capable of being governed by fairness and reciprocity. If we find ourselves
in unfavorable circumstances—such as a brutal state of war, or a condition of resource
scarcity due to catastrophic natural disaster, or any other destabilizing condition that
makes social cooperation impossible—it will be difficult for persons to acquire the
requisite motivation to act for the sake of justice at all.91
To illustrate, in a longstanding condition of civil war, people may reject
distributive principles that apply to their adversaries; or, in conditions of global
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catastrophe, people may refuse to give up resources to benefit others when they
themselves have a tenuous possession of the goods necessary for their own livelihood.
In these conditions, people will not generally be willing to act for the sake of upholding
just institutions in society that govern the relations of social cooperation. Instead, they
will fall back on other norms for action such as simple prudence or self-preservation. 92
As a result, if we do not assume favorable conditions, it will be difficult to formulate
what the best principle of justice is, given that people will not develop the requisite
disposition to see their social activity as constrained by justice in the first place.
Second, Rawls includes in “favorable circumstances,” the “historical, economic,
and social conditions” that “make a constitutional regime possible.” 93 These conditions
include the “economics means…education, or the main skills needed to run an economic
regime.” 94 As such, unfavorable circumstances may include conditions in which citizens
may not have a sufficient historical memory or historical precedent for newly erected
democratic institutions; or, societies may lack the economic resources to institute and
implement a just intuitional regime; or, citizens may lack the background framework
and skills necessary for citizens to reform and refine their institutions through the
political process.
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In general, favorable circumstances are designed to mirror the general
conditions most citizens in liberal democratic societies find themselves in already. This
elegantly corresponds to Rawls’s realistic elements of his project, for he views his task to
find principles of justice that answer to our current political situation, and not for some
foreign or unfortunate condition of society. While “less happy conditions” would
certainly be important problems for society to address, Rawls believes that we must
work out principles of justice for the general case in ideal theory first before proceeding
to handle these other cases. 95
This realistic strand in Rawls’s favorable conditions assumption also relates to
another important limiting factor in Rawls’s project. Rawls believes that constructing
principles of justice that apply to “all possible circumstances” is a misguided approach,
and will likely yield mistaken principles. This is because, for Rawls, we are not interested
in the question: “What principles of justice apply universally across all contexts?”
Instead, Rawls says:
We focus on ideal theory because the current conflict in democratic
thought is in good part a conflict about what conception of justice is most
appropriate for a democratic society under reasonably favorable
conditions. This is clear from what, for our purposes, we called the
fundamental question of political philosophy.96
It would be a mistake, then, to understand principles of justice to be applicable
everywhere and in all contexts—i.e. in times of famine, or in a previous historical era
that does not have a template for democratic institutions. Of course, this does not
95
96

TJ, 216.
JF, 13 [emphasis added].

48

mean that no principles can guide conduct in these circumstances—it is just that these
principles will be different from the principles of justice that are applicable to
democratic societies in favorable conditions. In this sense, Rawls’s project is more
limited in scope.
To summarize, Rawls’s two assumptions in ideal theory are designed to
accomplish the following tasks: (1) serve as a heuristic device for evaluating the stability
condition on principles of justice, and (2) aid us in isolating the relevant variables and
eliminating the confounding variables when testing and comparing principles of justice.
In no way are Rawls’s idealizing assumptions designed to ignore problems of feasibility
or problems of noncompliance. Quite the contrary, by effectively testing and comparing
principles of justice in the ideal case, we can establish whether or not it will be possible
that such principles will be feasible and complied with in the actual world. For if such
principles fail the stability test even in favorable circumstances, then we have good
reason to reject these proposed principles on the grounds that they will not be tolerable
for us when we attempt to implement them in nonideal circumstances. In this regard,
Rawls’s ideal theory is grounded in a concern with the constraints of realism and serve
to provide coherence to Rawls’s conception of justice as a realistic utopia.
(g) An Illustration of Ideal Theory: Rawls’s Rejection of Utilitarianism
Let us provide an illustration to see how Rawls’s methodology of ideal theory is
supposed to yield judgments on competing principles of justice. Given the importance
of utilitarianism, and of Rawls’s attempts to provide an alternative to it with his two
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principles of justice, it is a good choice for evaluating the merits of Rawls’s
methodology. 97 When assessing utilitarianism as a candidate for a principle of justice,
we begin by assuming strict compliance with its principles in a well-ordered society with
favorable conditions. Next, we then test the stability requirement by evaluating
whether or not citizens can develop the requisite sense of justice and motivational
capacities to adhere to and endorse such principles over time. To aid us in this test, we
can ask ourselves the following questions:
(1) Is it feasible for persons to reliably comply with utilitarian principles?
(2) What are the primary reasons for why citizens are able to comply with it?
(3) It utilitarianism compatible with moral psychology and human nature?
(4) Is utilitarianism compatible with the human good or does it frustrate it? 98
With respect to the first question, Rawls does not believe that the principle of utility is
feasible for citizens to reliably accept.99 In a society in which everyone strictly complies
with utilitarian principles, Rawls believes there will be circumstances in which persons
will be required to sacrifice some of their rights, liberties, or opportunities if doing so
would be in the interests of the greater good. Rawls couples this premise with an
appeal to what he calls the “strains of commitment,” which is a recognition by
individuals that there will be certain outcomes that are unacceptable to them given
Rawls believes that one of the main goals of his Theory of Justice is to provide a systematic alternative
to utilitarianism. See TJ, xvii. While Rawls’s main apparatus is the use of the original position and the veil
of ignorance to establish his main argument against utilitarianism, the components of ideal theory and
stability are an important corollary to this argument and will be the focus of this section. For a more
complete account of this relationship, see Scheffler, Samuel. “Rawls and Utilitarianism,” in A Companion
to Rawls, ed. by Samuel Freeman. Cambridge University Press, 2003.
98
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their commitment to their own rational plan of life, and their sense of self-respect.100
Requiring individuals to forgo core opportunities to advance their conception of the
good for the sake of those who may already have a greater share violates these strains
of commitment—it would be difficult for citizens who view society as a system of fair
cooperation to accept such a sacrifice as it does not adequately respect their own
contribution to it, and nor does it offer enough protection to the fundamental interests
in pursuing a rational plan of life. As such, Rawls believes that persons would reject
utilitarianism, for “having to acquiesce in a loss of freedom over the course of their life
for the sake of a greater good enjoyed by others,” would be unacceptable. 101
One common objection to Rawls’s criticism of utilitarianism here is that the
principle of utility will not require the sacrifices imagined by Rawls. That is, utilitarians
hold that it is generally the case that our basic liberties and rights will be respected in
the normal conditions of political society, and citizens will not be asked to forgo them or
an adequate share of resources and opportunities for the sake of others, let alone the
already better-off. 102 It would only be through imagined or drastic scenarios in which
these undue sacrifices would ever be required and so are not relevant for our purposes.
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This is an important objection because we are working within ideal theory and
with the assumption of favorable circumstances. As such, it would be inappropriate to
reject utilitarianism if we only tested it using contrived counterexamples that would not
likely emerge in the normal course of political society. 103 Instead, we must aim to show
how the endorsement of utilitarianism by citizens would generate problems of stability
given the general facts of human beings and their social world. A simple
counterexample in an extreme scenario will not suffice.
Given this condition, how does Rawls demonstrate that utilitarianism requires
the sacrifice of some rights, liberties and opportunities for the sake of others within
ideal theory? Rawls accomplishes this task, not by presenting us with specific
hypothetical counterexamples—they would not be sufficiently general for the purposes
of ideal theory—but by describing the decision-making model of utilitarianism itself and
the conception of the person that underlies the methodology. Upon doing so, we end
up with a portrait of an ideal legislator who will not be represented as having the
requisite concerns to safeguard our basic liberties, rights and opportunities and to
103
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respect our fundamental interests in pursuing our own rational life plan. In other words,
Rawls aims to show that utilitarianism’s unacceptability and unreasonableness to us is
endemic to the theory itself as it is understood in its ideal conditions.
The dominant method for understanding how utilitarianism is to be applied for
the purposes of justice and the organization of social institutions is through the
“impartial spectator” model, whereby we imagine one perfectly rational and
sympathetic person who experiences the desires of everyone and makes decisions that
accurately incorporate the desires of all. 104 On this model, “many persons are fused
into one,” and the impartial spectator represents “the desires of all persons into one
coherent system of desire.” 105 What results is the “conflating of all persons into one
through the imaginative acts of the impartial sympathetic spectator.” 106 Rawls asserts
that this model obliterates the “distinction between persons,” and later argues that this
model of the ideal legislator only represents “the ethic of perfect altruists.” 107
Why might Rawls assert that it is only perfect altruists that utilitarianism would
be best suited for? It is because the only social organization that would endorse and
accept such a model would be an association of bees or ants, which regularly requires
the sacrifice of the good of the individual for the sake of the hive with little regard to the
final ends of the singular ant or bee. But since bees and ants are much more prosocial
in nature—perhaps not perfect altruists in the strict sense, but far closer than we are—
This is primarily with respect to “classical utilitarianism.” See Smith, Adam. Theory of Moral
Sentiments, ed. by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie. Oxford University Press, 1976.
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the impartial spectator model would be appropriate and applicable to them. In contrast,
this “hive mind” approach to the organization of our institutions and policies would be
wholly unacceptable to us, even if we acknowledged that it would maximize overall
happiness. This is because, unlike ants, we do care about how our individual lives turn
out, and we do not completely regard our good as merely a part of the whole. This, of
course, does not mean that we are entirely selfish, but rather that we care enough
about our own lives such that we require special protections to ensure that great
sacrifices are not genuine and expected possibilities of our social life.
It is in this sense that Rawls believes that persons would reject utilitarianism, for
the ideal model of the impartial spectator does not provide any assurances to persons
that their rational plan of life will be safeguarded. As such, persons will have great
difficulty endorsing and adhering to the principle of utility over time, and the stability of
the system will be threatened.108
Utilitarians will likely reply to Rawls’s argument here in one of two ways. First,
they may reiterate that in the normal circumstances of political life, these sacrifices will
not be required, and so the idealizing assumption of favorable circumstances should
exclude it from consideration. Or, they may argue that, since there are few cases in
108
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which citizens will be asked to sacrifice their good for the sake of others, it will not upset
the overall stability of society—that is, there would be strong enough mechanisms to
ensure the endorsement of utilitarian principles over time despite these sacrifices that
citizens must occasionally make.
With respect to the first reply, this obscures the importance of the favorable
circumstances clause. Suppose we compare utilitarianism with Rawls’s first principle of
justice, whereby the basic liberties and their priority are established right from the start
as a primary safeguard. Many utilitarians object to these prioritarian systems for being
insensitive to empirical circumstances where we would surely do better to sacrifice one
person’s rights in order to avoid great catastrophe to political society. 109 Yet, by parity
of reasoning, what prevents Rawls from invoking the favorable conditions clause in this
circumstance in order to deflect this criticism in the same way? To avoid this stalemate,
we should strive to evaluate the core mechanisms within each normative framework
and see which conception best coheres with our conception of ourselves and of our
moral psychology. We have already demonstrated how utilitarianism is most fit for
perfect altruists given its model of the ideal spectator, and that there is a disconnect
between it and our own conception of ourselves. This dissonance generates some
difficulty in our expectation that citizens would reliably develop the relevant motives to
endorse and support it over time. After all, human beings are not bees or ants, so why
should we be confident in a conception of justice that does not “take men are they
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are?” 110 and instead requires us to be governed by institutions that are designed to
aggregate our ends without regard to which ends are sacrificed and which are preserved?
We can now address the second possible reply by utilitarians—the argument
that it is possible for stability to be maintained in a society governed by utilitarian
principles, even if it requires persons to sometimes sacrifice their own rights and
liberties for the sake of others. The basis for this objection is rooted in the observation
that people regularly comply with principles that require great sacrifices for the sake of
others in a variety of contexts. 111 For example, the worst-off members across most
societies throughout history have been asked to sacrifice for the sake of those with
more power and wealth in society. So, the objection goes, is stability truly undermined
by utilitarian principles? 112
Rawls’s reply here involves the idea of “stability for the right reasons.” 113 As we
have explored, a major undercurrent in Rawls’s thought is to show how stability based
on internal endorsement and a compatibility with the human good and moral
psychology will be stronger than stability based on external force, threats or other
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instrumental reasons. The question for utilitarianism is, then, would the motives for its
acceptance be internal or external? 114
There are a variety of strategies for attempting to establish an internal
mechanism for its endorsement. First, we might hypothesize that there are sufficient
levels of altruism in society such that people could learn to accept to sacrifice their own
good for the greater good of all. However, the level of altruism we find in humans is not
strong enough to be relied upon to serve as the foundation of our compliance with
principles of justice. Altruism is typically limited to specific partial groups, such as
friends and family members, and is only sometimes realized for the sake of strangers—
only some will be selfless as a saint, but others will be severely guarded in their
affections. As such, altruism is not sufficiently generalized across all persons in society
to ensure adequate compliance with utilitarian institutions.
Second, some utilitarians might argue that the primary internal motive for
complying with a utilitarian principle would not be something like altruism, but
something more akin to duty. On this account, a utilitarian could argue that it is the
understanding of the moral correctness from an impartial point of view of the utilitarian
principle that should itself serve as the primary motivator. Once citizens come to
occupy the purely impartial point of view, they will recognize the normative force of the
principle and will acknowledge and accept its bindingness upon them, despite their
other motives to act in opposition to its mandates. To the extent that citizens fail to
For further discussion of this distinction, see “Weithman, Paul. Why Political Liberalism, Oxford
University Press, 2012: 43-51.
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appreciate the correctness of these principles, we should do the best we can through
education and tutelage to both strengthen the altruistic sentiments and expand their
capacity for impartiality to better equip citizens to accept and affirm utilitarian
principles.
In response, I believe that Rawls would argue that, while the motive to “do the
right thing”—which Rawls includes within his “sense of justice”—is certainly part of our
deepest human tendencies and important for stability, we cannot simply attach this
motive to a conception of justice without also outlining the process by which persons
come to acquire the motive itself. 115 The task for the utilitarian is to show how the
moral motive to act in accordance with the principle of utility could reliably be acquired
in citizens without undue difficulty. We have already discussed how there are
significant obstacles related to the conception of the person that utilitarians endorse as
a model for their theory. The tension between the requirements for altruism and the
mixed motives that citizens act upon will create some conflicts in the realization of the
utilitarian motive. Hence, it is not clear how successful our efforts at inculcation and
education will have on our capacity to expand our sympathies to include all citizens
within society.
In addition, it will be difficult to reconcile how the utilitarian system could be
compatible with the human good—another important feature of stability for Rawls. If
citizens will be asked to set aside their fundamental interests for the sake of others, we
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must ask how society will ensure that persons endorse this requirement. It seems likely
that a utilitarian society will solve the stability problem by relying upon bargaining,
compromise, or powerlessness by the minority to press their claims. For Rawls, these
are not reasonable forms of motivations to ensure compliance as they entail the
willingness of citizens to give up what is most important to them, whatever their
rational plan of life turns out to be, for the sake of justice. 116 While such a society might
be achievable for a brief period, it would not be stable for the right reasons.
Rawls’s principles of justice, by comparison, do not require sacrifices of us that
are deeply at odds with our own account of moral psychology and our most
fundamental aims. By safeguarding our rights and liberties, and securing the
opportunities and all-purpose means to exercising them through fair equality of
opportunity and the difference principle, Rawls presents us with a conception of justice
that secures our capacity to pursue our rational plan of life. This is not to suggest that
Rawls’s principles will never require sacrifices from us for the sake of others. What is
important is that these sacrifices are not based on altruism, acquiescence, or fear in the
ideal well-ordered society. Instead, they are based upon reciprocity, which is included in
a fuller account of Rawls’s sense of justice.
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As we have seen, one part of the sense of justice is related to the moral
sensibilities to act upon one’s considered convictions about what is right to do.117
However, there is also a more specialized sense in which Rawls employs the term.118
Rawls also includes within it the notion of reciprocity, which involves the desire to act in
accordance with the rules of fair social cooperation. Rawls states: “The sense of justice
leads us to promote just schemes and to do our share in them when we believe that
others, or sufficiently many of them will do theirs.” 119 Rawls believes that his two
principles of justice adequately express reciprocity between all citizens—requiring
sacrifices of them without compromising their fundamental aims. As such,
citizens will be sufficiently motivated to act upon justice in the well-ordered society.
Much more can be said about Rawls and his relationship with utilitarianism, and
whether Rawls’s arguments succeed. 120 However, this would divert us from the main
issue at hand. The purpose of this illustration is to establish with greater clarity the
purpose of the full compliance requirement in Rawls’s ideal theory with respect to the
stability requirement. And what it has shown is that it enables us to see with greater
clarity the strength or weakness of a given principle of justice by examining whether a
principle can reliably generate the basis for its own support. By assuming full
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compliance, we are better able to test the compatibility of our principles with the limits
of human nature and of the considered judgments of persons.
In this sense, Rawls’s methodology comports with his commitment to a realistic
utopia, for he uses ideal theory to generate the most reasonable and feasible principles
of justice that are compatible with the judgments of citizens and their deepest
psychological capacities and tendencies.
(h) Ideal Theory as Necessary for Nonideal Theory
We have thus far explored the first purpose of ideal theory for Rawls, which is to
provide us with an adequate measure to test normative principles against one another.
We are now in a position to examine the second purpose, which is to enable us to set a
clear target or goal for society should unfavorable circumstances or injustice arise.
Without this ideal target, we are left without a reliable guide as to what we should strive
for as we make improvements in our nonideal circumstances. As Rawls states: “Until
the ideal is identified…nonideal theory lacks an objective, an aim, by reference to which
its queries can be answered.” 121 In this sense, ideal theory provides us with a
conception of justice that determines what our goals and priorities should be. For this
reason, Rawls states that “ideal theory is the only basis for the systematic grasp
of…pressing problems [of nonideal theory].” 122
It is here that we see the relationship between ideal and nonideal theory more
clearly spelled out. Not only does ideal theory provide a framework that informs us
121
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what we should aim at generally, but it will “also help to identify which wrongs are more
grievous and hence more urgent to correct.” 123 In this sense, ideal theory can generate
a series of recommendations for which problems we should attempt to solve first. For
instance, for utilitarians, dealing with nonideal circumstances would be relatively
straightforward: those circumstances which produce the greatest amount of
unhappiness should be addressed first. On the other hand, Rawlsians will assert that
injustices that deprive citizens of equal liberties should be addressed first, before
moving to equality of opportunity or the difference principle. Rawls states:
The lexical ranking of the principles specifies which elements of the ideal
are relatively more urgent, and the priority rules this ordering suggests
are to be applied to nonideal cases as well. Thus as far as circumstances
permit, we have a natural duty to remove any injustices, beginning with
the most grievous as identified by the extent of the deviation from
perfect justice. Of course, this idea is extremely rough. The measure of
departures from the ideal is left importantly to intuition. 124
To provide an illustration, Rawls applies this framework to his discussion of civil
disobedience. 125 This example is a good choice to explore, since Rawls says that “the
discussion of civil disobedience…depends upon it [ideal theory]….a deeper
understanding can be gained in no other way.” 126
There are two ways in which ideal theory can aid us in addressing the problem of
civil disobedience. First, it can determine whether or not civil disobedience is justified.
Since civil disobedience is a “political act,” it must be “guided and justified by political
123

JF, 13.
TJ, 216.
125
TJ, 319-343.
126
TJ, 8. Also quoted in Celikates, Robin. “Civil Disobedience as a Practice of Civic Freedom,” in On Global
Citizenship, by James Tully. Bloomsbury, 2014: 212.
124

62

principles….not principles of morality or to religious doctrines.” 127 In addition, when
engaging in civil disobedience, “one intends to address the sense of justice of the
majority” and to declare that “the conditions of free cooperation are being violated.” 128
For Rawls, the political principles we should draw upon are precisely those that
determine the conditions of free cooperation—his two principles of justice. Hence,
Rawls states: “there is a presumption in favor of restricting civil disobedience to serious
infringements of the first principle of justice, the principle of equal liberty, and to
blatant violations of the second principle, the principle of fair equality of
opportunity.” 129 So, for Rawls, in order to be justified in engaging in civil disobedience,
one ought to press one’s claims by appeal to the sense of justice of the political
community through one of the principles of justice.
To contrast, without the framework of ideal theory, it would be difficult to
determine the purpose and shape of a protestor’s claims—is it someone who is acting
selfishly by refusing to pay her taxes, or is it someone who is in good faith objecting to
her disenfranchisement? On Rawls’s view, the capacity for citizens to state their case
through political principles that are part of our shared conception of justice aids us in
categorizing acts of disobedience and what the proper response to it ought to be—
should we punish a citizen with the maximum sentence, or exhibit leniency, and
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“suspend legal sanction?” 130 We require an ideal shared conception of justice to
address these questions.
Second, ideal theory enables us to determine whether or not civil disobedience
is possible. For Rawls, civil disobedience can only occur in a society that is “nearly just,”
which “implies that there exists a constitutional regime and a publicly recognized
conception of justice.” 131 However, this conception of justice need not be precisely
Rawls’s justice as fairness, but instead an “overlapping rather than strict consensus”
between different political conceptions, so long as “these conceptions lead to similar
political judgments.” 132 So, while Rawls does employ the lexical priority to establish
which violations are more urgent to address, he does allow that multiple conceptions of
justice may be appealed to, so long as they invoke the sense of justice and to a political
conception that admits special protections for liberty. However, if any of these
conditions do not hold—the lack of an overlapping consensus, the inability to appeal to
a sense of justice of the majority, or a seriously unjust society—then the conditions for
civil disobedience will no longer obtain. 133 In such cases, “the wisdom of civil
disobedience is highly problematic. For unless one can appeal to the sense of justice of
the larger society, the majority may simply be aroused to more repressive measures.” 134
In this sense, Rawls believes that ideal theory allows us to determine whether or not a
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given act of disobedience will likely backfire, or if it will potentially serve its intended
ends.
Some theorists have been critical of Rawls’s attempt to move from ideal theory
to address nonideal circumstances with respect to civil disobedience. For instance,
Robin Celikates argues that, instead of aiding our discussions of civil disobedience, “the
opposite is the case: ideal theory, far from being the only available route to a deeper
understanding, undermines the very attempt.” 135 According to Celikates, it is unlikely
that the conditions for civil disobedience will ever satisfactorily be met given Rawls’s
more constrained definition, and that many actual cases of civil disobedience in society
do not align with the framework outlined by Rawls. For instance, the paradigmatic acts
of disobedience of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Mahatma Ghandi, and Henry David
Thoreau do not, on Celikates’s view, neatly fit into Rawls’s system, for it requires us to
see these acts as occurring within “nearly just” societies in which a shared conception of
justice of the majority can legitimately be appealed to. But this seems at odds with the
public understanding of these acts—that society was manifestly unjust, and that there
was no recourse to a shared conception of justice of the majority.136 Hence, Rawls’s
account leads us to a puzzling dilemma: either the acts of King and others were not
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wise as they would likely backfire and cause greater resistance, or that other forms of
resistance—more violent or disruptive—would be justified. 137
As a result, Celikates rejects our reliance on ideal theory to aid us in handling
cases of civil disobedience and that we are much better off with a ground-up approach
that is “resolutely non-ideal – ‘practical, critical and historical.’” 138 On this approach,
civil disobedience is not best understood nor justified from our ideal conception of
justice—in fact it is of little relevance to cases of civil disobedience. This is because the
most challenging cases of civil disobedience arise when there is little agreement on
what this ideal shared conception of justice is in the first place. As a result, we do better
to work from within the current realities of society in which dissidents press contentious
claims that may not neatly fit into the categories of Rawls’s principles of justice. For
instance, how would Rawls respond to the acts of civil disobedience for the sake of
animal rights? On this point, Peter Singer argues that, on Rawls’s view, since animals
are not owed justice, there can be no legitimate civil disobedience. 139
For critics of Rawls, it is not the role of the theorist to attempt to justify or
condone acts of civil disobedience by first descending from a limited ideal standpoint;
we run the risk of being myopic in our proclamations on nonideal circumstances.
Instead, it is best to work from the bottom and begin with current instances of civil
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disobedience and how they are understood by a political community—usually different
factions of the community will understand them differently—and seek to find the best
way to reconcile them with the pluralist and disparate aims of society.
There are a variety of responses we can make to these criticisms of Rawls’s
application of ideal theory to nonideal circumstances. First of all, more generally, Rawls
recognizes that there are limitations to our inquiry within nonideal theory, and that we
must be particularly careful when executing our recommendations. Rawls says the
following:
We should not expect too much of a theory of civil disobedience, even
one framed for special circumstances. Precise principles that
straightaway decide actual cases are clearly out of the question. Instead
a useful theory defines a perspective within which the problem of civil
disobedience can be approached; it identifies the relevant considerations
and helps us to assign them their correct weights in the more important
instances. If a theory about these matters appear to us, on reflection, to
have cleared our vision and to have made our considered judgements
more coherent, then it has been worthwhile.140
Additionally, while it would have been a great asset to us if Rawls had continued to
develop his ideas to address the wide variety of special cases that may arise within
nonideal theory, we should not hold his entire framework hostage for his failure to
address all problems. In this regard, I will only attempt to defend Rawls given his own
defined limits of his approach.
For Rawls, the purpose of ideal theory with respect to the problem of civil
disobedience is to frame and isolate the relative normative issues that are at stake when
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a problem of injustice confronts the political community and is responded to by
violations of the law. It does not seek to prejudge any given act of civil disobedience by
descending from above and determining its legitimacy straight away. Instead, the
framework directs us to attempt a good faith effort to understand a dissenter’s claims
within the broader sense of justice within a community and to be attentive to whether
those claims can be recast, first, as a response to violations of basic liberties.
Celikates takes issue with this approach because it requires there to be a defined
sense of justice already within a community—an unlikely state of affairs—and that the
community is already “nearly just.” With respect to the latter point, Rawls’s language
may perhaps be infelicitous on this matter. 141 Rawls does not mean by “nearly just” a
society without significant violations of basic liberties or without suppressed minorities.
If he did mean this, it would be very curious as to why he would think civil disobedience
would ever pose a special problem in these “nearly just” societies—a problem he saw
important enough to devote a portion of A Theory of Justice toward addressing. As such,
we should understand Rawls’s claim here differently.
Rawls means by “nearly just” that there is an institutional framework in society
that can adjudicate constitutional disputes, and that persons within society are
motivated by a sense of reciprocity among its members. This need not include all
members of society, however. So long as there is a sufficient majority of persons who
do regard each other in this way can appeals by the minority begin to take hold.
141
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Andrew Sabl calls such societies “piecewise just” societies, in which there is a dominant
“in group” toward which the sense of reciprocity is the dominant attitude toward each
member, and an “out group” which is excluded and subjugated. 142 A society thus
characterized would be “nearly just” on Rawls’s account, for there still would be a
substantive sense of justice among its members that could be appealed to by
subjugated minorities.
It is based upon this understanding of “nearly just” that we should evaluate
Rawls’s theory of civil disobedience. And in this context, Rawls’s theory is very strong,
for many of the common illustrations of civil disobedience—Dr. King in particular—fall
within its bounds and can be justified as an oppressed minority appealing to the sense
of justice of the broader political community.143
We can now respond to Celikates’s second objection that there is rarely enough
agreement on a conception of justice for Rawls’s theory to be applicable to current
conditions. But this is to overstate the degree of convergence that is necessary for
appeals to gain traction. Rawls already admits that an overlapping consensus among
different political conceptions is sufficient to comprehend and legitimize the claims of
an oppressed minority within an otherwise fragmented society. 144 So long as we have
an institutional framework that guarantees and enforces the importance of the basic

142

Ibid., 311-12. Sabl cites Robert Dahl for making a similar point about the condition of 1950s America
with respect to African Americans. Dahl, Robert. Polyarchy, Yale University Press, 1971: 28-29, 93-94.
143
Rawls himself believes that Dr. King represents a good case to illustrate his own theory. While Dr. King
utilized moral and religious arguments to state his case, they were nevertheless politically justifiable in
the context of public reason. See PL, 250.
144
TJ, 340.

69

liberties and the all-purpose means to realize them, we have largely satisfied Rawls’s
requirements. 145 These broad prerequisites are not meant to swiftly delegitimize or
condemn acts of civil disobedience in the nonideal world, and nor are they meant to
obscure and reify them. Instead, they serve as important and genuine constraints on
what we can hope to achieve through the practice. If, for instance, there were a wholly
divided society in which appeals to a common sense of justice would be truly impossible,
this should serve as an indicator that a theory of civil disobedience is not going to be the
appropriate framework to employ in these circumstances. 146 Instead, we may consider
turning to a theory of violent resistance, revolution, or even succession.
Now, Rawls does not address the justification or legitimacy of these other forms
of social disruptions. However, this should not be interpreted as a failure of Rawls’s
ideal theorizing. Instead, ideal theory can be used to demonstrate how these conditions
are going to require new tools for thinking about them, as they lie outside the
conditions that frame the standard conditions of justice. Indeed, one of the main
benefits of ideal theory is that it represents our best attempt to isolate those features
that are central to our understanding of ourselves, our society, and how they impact the
requirements of justice—features such as the sense of justice, the conception of the
person, an account of our fundamental aims, our basic moral motivations, and so forth.
145
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If any of these pieces are completely absent or are radically altered in society, ideal
theory will direct us to seek out new frameworks until these conditions reemerge.
Applied to the problem of truly drastic nonideal circumstances, the only
recommendation that ideal theory may provide to us is to re-establish the conditions
that are necessary for justice to regulate our society once again. 147
These considerations should serve to largely assuage the worries that Rawls’s
ideal theory is too limited, shortsighted, or ineffectual in addressing problems of civil
disobedience as part of nonideal theory. Even in the somewhat limited context in which
Rawls outlines his theory of civil disobedience, we do not find ideal theory inert.
(i) Recap of Two Purposes of Ideal Theory
Let us pause for a moment to provide a brief recap of Rawls’s conception of ideal
theory before turning to more comprehensive objections to his view. Rawls can best be
understood as utilizing ideal theory for both methodological and goal-setting or
orienting purposes. It is methodological in the sense that he uses two “idealizing”
assumptions—favorable circumstances and full compliance—in order to accurately test
and evaluate principles of justice for stability in the normal course of social life. These
methodological assumptions are not intended to condone the irrelevance of feasibility
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or achievability conditions on the principles of justice. Quite the contrary, they enable
us to better test precisely those limitations by eliminating confounding variables and
isolating normative content.
On the other hand, Rawls’s ideal theory is goal-setting in the sense that, once the
principles of justice are chosen using this idealized methodology, we now have an “ideal”
that sets the target for a society. We can then compare our current society with the
ideal to gauge whether or not it is fully just. If it is not, then we are provided with a
broad framework for determining how to get there by establishing which corrections
are more urgent or pressing. Of course, ideal theory cannot by itself establish what we
should do. We will need to consult the empirical sciences to eventually determine the
best course of action. However, by using the ideal as a benchmark, we are better able
to see the relationship between ideal and nonideal circumstances—the ideal will serve
as the “end target” for these transitional periods in the nonideal circumstances of
society as it eventually aims towards justice.
When we put these two purposes together—the methodological and the goalsetting—we can see how Rawls’s conception of ideal theory incorporates both elements
of his idea of a “realistic utopia.” It is realistic in the sense that he takes seriously the
goal of stability for principles of justice, which, in turn, influences his choice of idealizing
assumptions. He wants to ensure that we accurately test these realistic constraints
appropriately and ensure that persons can develop the requisite motives to act upon
the selected principles of justice. It is utopian in the sense that it provides a goal or
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target that society should aim to achieve. Moreover, this goal extends beyond the
status quo and “probes the limits of the realistically practicable.” 148 The goal of
achieving the well-ordered society is assuredly difficult, but not out of reach for us, in
the sense that there is nothing in human nature or in the normal conditions of social life
that can prevent us from ultimately achieving the ideally just society that is stable across
time and affirms our good.
III. Objections to Rawls’s Ideal Theory
Now that we have a general picture of Rawls’s understanding of ideal and
nonideal theory, I wish to address several broader objections that have been made
against his view. First, I will respond to objections by political realists who reject Rawls’s
methodological assumption of full compliance. While we have discussed some of these
objections in our exposition of Rawls’s view, the ones presented here will be more fully
developed. Second, in the next chapter, I will address objections by Amartya Sen who
rejects the usefulness of the relationship between ideal and nonideal theory that Rawls
articulates.
(a) Realist Objection: The Impossibility of Full Compliance
Many realists are familiar with Rawls’s non-utopian elements of his theory, and
agree with Rawls that principles of justice need to be constrained by features about
human nature and concerns for stability. Nonetheless, realists persist in their objection
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to Rawls by highlighting several ways in which he does not take the realistic constraints
and goals of stability seriously enough.
First, with respect to Rawls’s methodology, realists strongly reject the
assumption of full compliance. Their claim is that full compliance with the requirements
of justice will never obtain, even in the best of circumstances. William Galston, for
instance, asserts that “realists deny that this assumption [of full compliance] is anything
close to feasible, and they contend that this fact affects the way we should think about
justice”.149 Noncompliance, in essence, is a permanent feature of society that cannot be
overcome, even if we hold “favorable conditions” constant and take seriously the
tendencies of human nature. For this reason, realists argue that noncompliance should
not be idealized away.
Why do realists believe that full compliance is impossible? It cannot simply be
the result of an acknowledgement that human beings are imperfect and are liable to
falter in their commitments. Rawls can certainly accommodate this fact in his
methodology. If Rawls’s assumption of full compliance required the idealization of all
imperfections, it would most likely be too idealistic—there are simply too many minor
deviations from justice that occur over the course of normal social and political life.
Rawls himself states as follows:
Strict compliance means that (nearly) everyone strictly complies with,
and abides by, the principles of justice. We ask in effect what a perfectly
just, or nearly just, constitutional regime might be like, and whether it
may come about and be made stable under the circumstances of justice,
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and so under realistic, through reasonably favorable, conditions.150
On my interpretation of “nearly,” Rawls allows for some departures from justice within
the well-ordered society in which the assumption of full compliance holds. The reason
this does not cause problems for Rawls is that these minor disruptions will not
destabilize the basic structure and institutions of society. Society has internal
mechanisms for returning to an equilibrium state when faced with offsetting conditions.
Indeed, if the structure of society could be so easily dislodged by a few departures from
justice, it would be miraculous that society itself could even be formed. As such, the
assumption of full compliance need not idealize away these imperfections—they are
inconsequential in our ability to evaluate the stability of society when we test our
principles of justice. Given this caveat in Rawls, we should understand the realist
objection differently.
Instead, realists object to the full compliance condition due to a much more
substantive reason that is related to the necessity of conflict that characterizes
democratic life. As Jeremy Waldron argues, Rawls is not sensitive enough to the fact of
deep disagreement—not just about what the good life consists in, but also about the
nature and demands of justice itself. 151 In other words, the problem with the full
compliance condition is that, even in the best of circumstances, citizens will not agree
on the basic principles of justice to govern society. Moreover, it will not simply be an
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inconsequential minority. The scope of disagreement will be significant such that the
institutions of society will ebb and flow between various mixed conceptions of justice
depending upon various circumstances in society.
What are some of these reasons for this deeper skepticism about convergence
on principles of justice? Steve Elkin, building upon Jeremy Waldron’s idea of the
“circumstances of politics,” argues the following:
[The circumstances of politics consists in] states of affairs in which there
is a large aggregation of people who (1) have conflicting purposes that
engender more or less serious conflict; (2) are given to attempts to use
political power to further their own purposes and those of people with
whom they identify; (3) are inclined to use political power to subordinate
others; and (4) are sometimes given to words and actions that suggest
that they value limiting the use of political power by law and harnessing it
to public purposes. 152
In other words, realists tend to highlight the partial and self-serving aspects of human
nature, and how the political process magnifies and exacerbates these tendencies that
inhibit the possibility for agreement. Consequently, they reject Rawls’s project to seek
principles of justice that can garner unanimous support, and instead propose alternative
solutions given the problem of deep disagreement.
What are some of these alternatives? Bernard Williams and William Galston, for
instance, have indicated that for liberal societies perhaps the best we can hope for is a
modus vivendi, which is a contingent agreement based on the mutual interests of
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conflicting parties, typically in the form of a compromise or political bargain. 153 Rawls
certainly rejects these kinds of agreements, as they represent inherently unstable
arrangements—if circumstances were to change, and interests shift, parties would
break the agreement and instability would ensue. 154 Nevertheless, Galston claims:
“When conjoined to pessimism about the possibility of purely rational consensus, the
need to abate conflict implies a more favorable stance toward coordination through
modus vivendi.” 155 And Williams echoes: “The very phrase ‘a mere modus vivendi’
suggests a certain distance from the political; experience suggests that those who enjoy
such a thing are already lucky.” 156
Realists’ pessimism about agreement also spills over into the second purpose of
ideal theory for Rawls—that of setting a goal for reform in nonideal circumstances.
After all, if consensus is not possible, even in the best of circumstances, then it is unclear
how fruitful the methodology is in generating a roadmap for how to proceed in nonideal
circumstances. At best, Rawls’s ideal theory might allow us to better appreciate how
each conception of justice faces its own unique set of challenges for adherence; but at
worst, it will yield false or illusory targets that cannot ever be attained, no matter what
the circumstances. As a result, Rawls’s ideal theory could potentially be dangerous,
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perpetually tempting us with a vision that is forever out of reach and providing us with
mistaken tasks for reform.
Given these charges against Rawls, Steve Elkin concludes the following:
We do not best grasp the nub of partial compliance theory [nonideal
theory] by focusing on ideal theory. Rather, we can best understand
partial compliance when we understand just why there can only be
partial compliance, and what we need to do to achieve even this modest
state of affairs. 157
Hence, for realists, the problems unique to nonideal theory can only be worked out
from within nonideal theory itself, by examining why noncompliance is endemic to
human life and figuring out how we can best structure institutions so that stability and
order can be maintained in civil society in the face of persistent disagreement.
To briefly summarize, implicit in the realist objection is the view that incorrigible
disagreement must disqualify Rawls’s ideal theory of justice—both in methodology and
in goal-setting. The methodology is faulty for it idealizes away a feature of society,
namely noncompliance, which is central to the problem of justice. It would be akin to
idealizing away features of human nature or the circumstances of justice. As a result,
when we test Rawls’s favored principles of justice for stability when we assume strict
compliance, stability would not, in fact, be possible. In turn, realists then reject Rawls’s
aspirational role or goal-setting aim of his ideal theory; they assert that it will only cause
harm and chaos to insist upon an ideal that is unachievable for us. As a result, they
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advocate more realistic achievements such as a modus vivendi as a suitable goal for
political life.
(b) Reply to Realists: The Transition from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism
What should we make of this critique? Should the persistence of deep
disagreement affect our method for theorizing about principles of justice? Does it
tarnish Rawls’s goal to provide us with an ideal to guide our action in nonideal
circumstances? The basis for my reply here will be one that relates to Rawls’s transition
from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism and the strategies Rawls employs to cope
with the problem of disagreement in society. 158
In Political Liberalism, Rawls sought to address a substantial problem faced in
liberal democratic societies. Rawls states the problem as such:
How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society
of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though
incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?159
In asking this question, Rawls affirms what he calls “the fact of reasonable pluralism,”
which is an inevitable feature of democratic societies that results from citizens’ free use
of their practical reason.160 However, instead of merely postulating or asserting this fact
of reasonable pluralism, he also believed it important to seek an explanation for this
feature about social life. He asks: “Why would free institutions with their basic rights
and liberties lead to diversity? Why doesn’t our sincere and conscientious attempt to
158
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reason with one another lead us to agreement?” 161 These two questions “call for
explanation.” 162
In answering these questions, Rawls first provides a few answers that are
ultimately dismissed. He speculates that perhaps people are only motivated to hold
views that “advance their own more narrow interests,” and that because people have
different interests, there would be different comprehensive views. 163 Next, he
considers whether people are perhaps just too “irrational and not very bright,” leading
them to hopelessly confused thinking, creating multiple doctrines as a result.164 Now,
realists such as Elkins or Williams would presumably accept these explanations as
sufficient to demonstrate the fact of disagreement—after all, people manifest these
traits in various circumstances in politics in society all the time, so what is the problem?
Aren’t these traits widespread enough to base our political theories upon them? And
yet, interestingly, Rawls rejects these explanations for reasonable pluralism, and it is
important to examine the language that he uses in doing so. He says:
These explanations are too easy, and not the kind we want. We want to
know how reasonable disagreement is possible, for we always begin work
within ideal theory. Thus, we ask: how might reasonable disagreement
come about?165
Now, at first glance, this might sound like Rawls is just repeating the question without
really clarifying what is wrong with the previous explanations of irrationality or narrowly
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self-interested thinking. Yet, if we take his claim about ideal theory as providing a hint,
we can construct a solution.
The main motivation for rejecting these kinds of explanations—and why we need
ideal theory—is that such explanations do not represent a suitably general account of
the person – they are, in a sense, based on a “nonideal” conception of the person.
When Elkins describes persons as driven to subordinate others and to use political
power to do so for their own narrow ends, there is no reason to believe, on Rawls’s view,
that such motives and impulses are the central motives of our political lives. They may,
instead, simply be the result of disfigured and corrupted institutions in society; or, even
if they may be genuine motives for us, they are not representative of our fundamental
aims and pursuits. 166 As such, they cannot be used to explain the problem of
disagreement in society. Hence, to avoid this problem, Rawls relies upon an “ideal
conception of the person” 167 in order to isolate the core features of our moral
personality and the central aspects of our political character. 168 We can then use this
conception to demonstrate how disagreement is possible in a more fundamental way.
The essential components of the ideal conception of the person (later called the
“political conception of the person” in PL) are related to how citizens in democratic life
conceive of themselves, namely, as “free and equal,” and having an interest in
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developing the “two moral powers,” which consist of (1) the capacity for a sense of
justice—to recognize the constraints that fairness and reciprocity require—and (2) the
capacity to revise and formulate a conception of the good.169 These two capacities are
directly related to what Rawls calls the “rational” and the “reasonable.” 170 These
notions all coalesce to provide a picture of a citizen who (1) has an interest in
formulating and revising a conception of the good, (2) aims to advance her good in
society while acknowledging that she must take responsibility for the ends she sets, and
(3) strives to cooperate with others on terms of mutual respect and reciprocity. 171
By providing an ideal conception of the person that represents our fundamental
political aims, Rawls provides us with a conception of the person that is suitably ideal
and general in the sense that “the deliberations of any one person are typical of all.” 172
In basing the conception of the person on our liberal democratic culture, we can be
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assured that we are appealing to features of persons that are truly representative of
citizens qua citizens.173
Broadly realist conceptions of the person, in contrast, do not accurately reflect
our deepest aims and do not express our political personality. They are either too
desolate and myopic—as reflected in the purely rational and self-interested person as
represented by Hobbes—or they are too circumstantial—as reflected in the pessimistic
realist who highlights the tendency for persons to use political power to subordinate
others. Instead, Rawls believes that we conceive of ourselves as more than simply homo
economicus, and that we have a far richer set of motives that enable us to cooperate
with one another in liberal democratic life.
With the ideal conception of the person at hand, we can now return to our initial
explanation of the fact of reasonable pluralism. Given that Rawls starts with an ideal
conception of the person as free and equal with an interest in developing the two moral
powers, we can now see how the normal activity of these persons in the course of
democratic life will invariably generate a diversity of views that are permanent. In
exercising the free use of their reason, citizens will come to recognize what Rawls calls
the “burdens of judgement,” which are the inherent limitations that citizens have in
making judgments in conditions where there is incomplete information, complex
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evidence, and differing methods for weighing values. 174 When citizens encounter these
burdens over the course of their lives, they will naturally develop competing views
about what should count as the good. More importantly, Rawls believes that our
understanding of ourselves as free and equal—and as reasonable and rational—will
prevent us from condoning the use of coercive state power to quash this pluralism. As
Rawls states: “A continuing shared understanding on one comprehensive religious,
philosophical, or moral doctrine can be maintained only by the oppressive use of state
power.” 175 It is “oppressive,” for there would be no feasible way to remove
disagreement about conceptions of the good from society without running afoul of our
fundamental political aims that are central to the ideal conception of the person. 176
We are now in a position to put all the pieces of the argument together and
respond to the realist criticisms of Rawls. Rawls clearly recognizes the force of the
objection by the realists that there cannot be unanimous (or near unanimous)
agreement in a society characterized by deep disagreement. Rawls’s account of the
burdens of judgment and the ideal conception of the person guarantee that such
disagreement will be a permanent feature of society. Moreover, Rawls believed that his
understanding of reasonable pluralism caused him to revise his argument made in A
Theory of Justice. Rawls states:
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The fact of a plurality of reasonable but incompatible comprehensive
doctrines…shows that, as used in Theory, the idea of a well-ordered
society of justice as fairness is unrealistic. This is because it is
inconsistent with realizing its own principles under the best of
foreseeable conditions. The account of the stability of a well-ordered
society is therefore also unrealistic and must be recast. 177
From this statement, we can see that Rawls rejects the idea that it is feasible to expect
citizens to converge on his unique conception of justice as fairness in society.
Nevertheless, Rawls did not conclude that the best we could hope for was a modus
vivendi, as realists would have us suppose. 178 Instead, in Political Liberalism, Rawls
argues for the possibility of an “overlapping consensus” to emerge among a series of
reasonable conceptions of the good that could find justification of political principles
from within their own doctrines. 179 What would emerge is a “free-standing” political
conception of justice that was independent of controversial metaphysical claims about
the good, and could be endorsed from reasonable comprehensive views separately.
Framed in this way, a Catholic, for instance, could accept justice as fairness by
connecting it to God’s notion of equality for all his creation; a Millian could endorse
justice as fairness as the best way to promote individual autonomy; and a Kantian could
accept it as the expression of ourselves as free and autonomous beings.
However, Rawls recognized the limits of this overlapping consensus, and
eventually came to realize that an overlapping consensus on a single conception of
justice—justice as fairness—was unlikely, and that it was only “a family of reasonable
177
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though differing liberal political conceptions” of justice that would be subject to an
overlapping consensus (provided that such conceptions guaranteed the priority to the
set of basic liberties and provided some guaranteed minimum all-purpose means). 180
Nevertheless, despite Rawls’s own revisions to his theory, it is important to note that
these were not concessions to the external criticisms of realists. This is evident in the
fact that (1) Rawls never endorses modus vivendi liberalism and, that (2) Rawls offers a
deep explanation for disagreement that does not rely upon a pessimistic or narrowly
self-interested account of personhood. Instead, Rawls constructs an idealized
conception of the person and proceeds to demonstrate how reasonable pluralism is
possible from within that conception.
This should serve as a vindication of Rawls’s ideal theory, for Rawls has
established in the most general way possible that disagreement is both possible and
necessary in democratic life by linking it with our most fundamental aims and the
limiting facts of social life. Disagreement is not based upon a conception of human
desires that is foreign to our considered judgments about ourselves and our aims.
While Rawls undoubtedly recognizes our tendencies to dominate or subjugate others,
he does not believe that these are the most representative of our own considered
convictions about who we are as citizens in democracies. As such, any political
conception of justice based upon a combative or domineering portrait of human agency
180
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will be unreasonable and unacceptable to us. In other words, a strongly realist
conception of the person will not frame our understanding of the root causes of
disagreement in society. If it did, we would have little reason to believe that stable
agreements upon broadly liberal conceptions of justice could be possible. Any stability
would be of momentary success and could only be maintained at great cost to our moral
personality and our deepest aims. For Rawls, this would be a tragic outcome—one that
is strongly at odds with his vision of a realistic utopia, for it would entail that the best we
could hope for in society was a political conception of justice based largely upon
external threats or mechanisms to keep our combative or self-serving desires in check.
While Rawls does not disavow these sources of stability as impossible, Rawls’s project is
based upon the notion that we can internally accept and regard as reasonable our
conception of justice. Otherwise, justice must be viewed as a foreign and oppressive
force in our lives and not ultimately compatible with who we are as citizens. It would be
difficult to “reconcile” ourselves to such a world in which justice could not be endorsed
by citizens from within. 181
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Chapter 4: A Reply to Amartya Sen
I. Introduction
We have already examined some realist criticisms of Rawls’s methodology of
ideal theory related to his assumption of full compliance and examined the problem of
deep disagreement in society. However, other realists, such as Amartya Sen, have
targeted different aspects of Rawls’s ideal theory for criticism. 182 In particular, Sen has
challenged the usefulness of the goal or target setting aspects of Rawls’s ideal theory.
Recall that, in addition to providing a methodology to test principles of justice against
one another, Rawls aims to articulate an ideal of the perfectly just society—what Rawls
calls the “well-ordered society”—in order to provide a formal model of what we should
strive to achieve or aim for in our transition from nonideal circumstances to more ideal
ones. The idea is that, by constructing a picture of the ideally just society, we can then
make principled recommendations for improvement when faced with injustice by
highlighting more urgent problems to address. For Rawls, it is only after we formulate
the ideal can we can make genuine headway toward addressing injustice.
Sen rejects this model of the relationship between ideal theory and nonideal
circumstances and advances the following thesis: an ideal theory of justice is neither
182
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necessary nor sufficient for addressing cases of actual injustice in the world. 183 While it
may have other merits, providing us with guidance for correcting injustice is not one of
them.184 As such, Sen believes that political philosophers since Rawls have spent too
much time articulating a vision of what the ‘perfect,’ ‘pristine,’ and ‘spotlessly’ just
society would look like. Instead, Sen argues that a new way of thinking about justice is
required for us to be able to address problems of the nonideal world.
Before we can address Sen’s argument, we should provide a bit of vocabulary
that Sen employs to characterize his objections. Sen characterizes theories of justice
that focus on articulating the ideally organized society as “transcendental theories of
justice.” 185 These top-down approaches descend to the nonideal world only after fully
articulating what the ideal society ought to be. That is, transcendental approaches do
not begin to address the problems of the nonideal world—oppression, poverty, or lack
of healthcare—until a full and complete conception of justice is outlined that relates all
of the parts of justice together into one coherent whole.
In contrast, Sen’s articulates an alternative approach to theorizing about justice,
which he calls the “comparative” approach.186 Central to this method is the idea that
we are better off comparing two possible remedies of injustice against one another and
evaluating which one enhances citizens’ functionings better using tools from social
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choice theory and the capabilities approach to justice. 187 For instance, if our problem is
poverty, we should select two concrete feasible proposals and do a pairwise analysis of
the effects of these different systems on income and wealth distribution across society.
Whichever model can produce better outcomes across the broad metric of the
capabilities approach should be favored over the other. The aim of a comparative
approach, then, is to outline the best method to rank and compare these alternatives in
the real world, rather than wait until a total picture of justice is complete before we can
begin to address injustice.
For Sen, the comparative model is superior to the transcendental model for
several reasons, notably because it accurately reflects how we deliberate and argue for
remedies to injustice in the actual political world. Sen’s puts the point as such:
The answers that a transcendental approach to justice gives—or can
give—are quite distinct from the type of concerns that engage people in
discussions on justice and injustice in the world, for example, iniquities of
hunger, illiteracy, torture, arbitrary incarceration, or medical exclusion as
particular social features that need remedying. The focus of these
engagements tends to be on the ways and means of advancing justice—
or reducing injustice—in the world by remedying these inequities, rather
than on looking only for the simultaneous fulfilment of the entire cluster
of perfectly just societal arrangements demanded by a particular
transcendental theory. 188
The problem, then, is that the transcendental approach is largely detached from the
clamors for justice in the actual world and is largely powerless and inert in its efforts to
address them. In essence, those who suffer from injustice must wait in abeyance until
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these timeless disputes about pristine justice are resolved once and for all before they
can receive guidance about how to remedy the iniquities of the world. This model for
thinking and theorizing about justice, according to Sen, should be unacceptable to us.
Rather than devote precious intellectual capital constructing the ideal society, we
should instead expend our efforts towards creating tools to evaluate proposals that
offer incremental advantages over their predecessors. It is through this piecemeal
approach to rectifying injustice can we genuinely impact the world and correct its
numerous and diverse failures.
With this brief sketch of Sen’s project in place, we can now outline the purposes
of this section. First, I reconstruct Sen’s argument that ideal theory is neither necessary
nor sufficient for addressing problems of injustice. In doing so, I further buttress Sen’s
argument with a discussion of a well-known problem in economics known as the
“problem of the second best.” Next, I discuss in greater detail Sen’s alternative
“comparative approach” to justice. Finally, I respond to Sen’s criticisms on behalf of
Rawls, highlighting the importance of ideal theory for our thinking about justice even in
nonideal circumstances.
II. Sen’s Criticism of Rawls’s Ideal Theory
Let us begin with Sen’s statement of his thesis: “A transcendental approach is
neither necessary nor sufficient for answering questions on the advancement of justice
that urgently demand our attention, which call for a robustly comparative approach.” 189
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The core of Sen’s argument rests on a sufficiency claim and a necessity claim, which we
will address in turn.
(a) Transcendental Justice is not Sufficient for Advancing Justice
According to Sen, a perfect theory of justice is not sufficient for enabling us to
make successful judgements regarding the urgency or priority of injustices to be
remedied. He states: “The identification of transcendence does not yield any means of
addressing these problems to arrive at a relational ranking of departures from
transcendence.” 190 Sen provides an illuminating analogy to highlight this point: “The
fact that a person regards the Mona Lisa as the best picture in the world does not reveal
how she would rank a Gauguin against a Van Gogh.” 191 She may think that it is the
technique, color, and thematic ambiguity that, when combined, produce the ideal
painting. However, given this information, we have little reason to think that we are
now equipped with the tools that would be sufficient to compare other works of art
against one another. Sure, we might be able to claim that all other works of art are
“imperfect” for the simple reason that they are not the Mona Lisa, but we generally
want more than this from a theory of aesthetics if we are going to make judgements
between two imperfect works of art.
We can apply this analogy to the evaluation of societies with respect to justice.
Sen argues that, just like our account of the perfect painting tells us nothing about how
to rank and compare alternative paintings against one another, an account of the
190
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perfect society is inert with respect to our capacity to rank the desirability of feasible
pairwise alternatives. We may, for instance, be able to describe the perfect society as
one that realizes Rawls’s two principles of justice, but this information is insufficient to
provide guidance for how to rank nonideal alternatives that will vary in their failures
across multiple dimensions with respect to their departures from the two principles of
justice.
Suppose we have a society that violates multiple dimensions of the principle of
liberty—citizens suffer, say, from both limited free speech and restricted freedom of
religion. Or, citizens are both starving and do not have equal access to vote. In these
cases, how are we to weigh these different competing concerns against one another?
“Should we,” Sen asks, “regard hunger, starvation and medical neglect to be invariably
less important than the violation of any kind of personal liberty?” 192 Rawls’s system, on
Sen’s account, simply labels these circumstances as “unjust.” 193 As such, Sen argues
that Rawls’s theory is not helpful for addressing problems of actual injustice that
societies face. We need a framework that is better equipped to handle the weighing of
costs against one another. For these kinds of problems—those that involve weighing
different alternatives— we require a “comparative” approach to thinking about justice
that is designed specifically with a system for evaluating these kinds of trade-offs.
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(b) An Illustration of the Sufficiency Objection: The Problem of the Second Best
One way to expand upon Sen’s general objection to the transcendental approach
is to compare it with a well-known problem in economics which has received some
attention: the problem of the second best. 194 First introduced by economists R.G. Lipsey
and Kelvin Lancaster, the central problem contains two logically related claims. The first
asserts that:
The general theorem for the second best optimum states that if there is
introduced into a general equilibrium system a constraint which prevents
the attainment of one of the Paretian conditions, the other Paretian
conditions, although still attainable, are, in general, no longer
desirable. 195
The second, corollary claim is as follows:
There is no a priori way to judge as between various situations in which
some of the Paretian optimum conditions are fulfilled while others are
not. Specifically, it is not true that a situation in which more, but not all,
of the optimum conditions are fulfilled is necessarily, or is even likely to
be, superior to a situation in which fewer are fulfilled. 196
The general idea is that, if we have a list of conditions that are part of the ideal, it is not
necessarily the case that, if one those features is missing, the other features will still be
desirable. We can illustrate the problem using a familiar example. Suppose I believe
that the ideal cookie is a cookie that has chocolate chips and pecans. Now, we can ask
the question, do we have sufficient information to be able to determine what the
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second-best, third-best, and fourth-best cookies are? In other words, are we able to
rank cookies that are nonideal? The general tendency is to assume that the second-best
cookie should have some of the elements of the ideal cookie—surely it will have
chocolate chips! However, according to this theorem—and Sen’s sufficiency objection—
this is not necessarily true. In fact, the second-best cookie may simply be a macadamia
nut cookie, and may have nothing to do with chocolate chips or pecans. 197
Using this analogy, Harvard economist, Dani Rodrik invoked the general theory
of the second best to criticize proponents of laissez-faire capitalism and to argue in
favor of government-controlled markets. 198 Adherents to the laissez-faire approach
would generally condemn any form of governmental market regulation. The rationale
was that, since unrestricted free markets were the ideal and most efficient model, any
governmental regulation would take us further away from our realization of it and must
therefore be worse.
However, Rodrik’s reply to these economists was to invoke the problem of the second
best. He argued that the second-best solution for us may have little in common with
the unrestricted market, and instead, rigorously controlled markets by the government
could be second-best.
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Bringing the analogy to bear on our current topic, we can apply this reasoning to
the limitations of transcendental theories of justice. The argument would be that
Rawls’s ideal of the well-ordered society governed by the two principles of justice is not
sufficient to inform us how to rank alternatives that are nonideal. For, while it may be
tempting to think that the second-best society would be a kind of gradual and mixed
realization of Rawls’s two principles of justice, it may be the case that it is actually a
utilitarian society, while the third best would be a libertarian society.
Moreover, this can have important implications when attempting to determine
how we should improve our current state of affairs. After all, if it turns out that the next
best thing for us is a utilitarian society, then it would be a serious mistake to employ
Rawls’s ideal of a well-ordered society to instantly condemn proposals aimed at
maximizing average utility in society if the ideal was not currently a feasible alternative
for us. If we return to the cookie analogy, we might say that it would be improper to
condemn the chef for buying macadamia nuts instead of chocolate chips, if it turned out
there were no pecans.
Of course, these are mere speculations regarding what the second-best or thirdbest societies would be for us. The important point, however, is that the problem of the
second best cannot be solved “a priori,” as Lipsey and Lancaster claim. We cannot read
off from the well-ordered society how to determine the next best course of action when
the ideal is unavailable. Instead, we require an additional framework to handle these
kinds of assessments.
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To put it back in Sen’s terminology, the ideal of transcendental justice would not
be sufficient to provide us guidance in nonideal circumstances. We require a
“comparative” approach to justice in order to identify proposals that would enhance
justice in society from a worse state of affairs to a better one.
(c) Transcendental Theories are not Necessary for Advancing Justice
In addition to claiming that transcendental theories of justice are not sufficient
for correcting injustice, Sen also argues that they are not necessary for it either. Sen
illustrates this objection with a compelling example:
Mount Everest is the tallest mountain in the world, completely
unbeatable in terms of stature by any other peak, but that understanding
is neither needed, nor particularly helpful, in comparing the peak heights
of, say, Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount McKinley. There would be
something very deeply odd in a general belief that a comparison of any
two alternatives cannot be sensibly made without a prior identification of
a supreme alternative. There is no analytical connection there at all.199
Here, Sen illustrates that we do not require an ideal model—Mount Everest is the
highest mountain—in order to make pairwise comparisons between two alternatives—
Mount Kilimanjaro is taller than Mount McKinley. If we apply this analogy to the case of
justice, the claim would be that we do not require a picture of Rawls’s perfect wellordered society in order to assert the injustice of, say, global poverty and widespread
illiteracy and advocate for concrete, piecemeal improvements in any of these metrics.
Indeed, on Sen’s reasoning, it would be absurd to claim that, unless we knew what
perfect justice required, we could not advocate for health policies designed to alleviate
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serious global illnesses, or proposals to provide education to women in developing
countries. For Sen, we already have agreement about these problems in order to
establish a priority in addressing them. There is no necessity to search for the perfect
society to make progress in these initiatives.
Framed in this way, Sen is highlighting the irrelevance of ideal theory if we are
interested in advancing justice and eliminating injustice in society. There is no
“analytical connection” between recognizing the benefits of providing healthcare to
poor families and the picture of the perfect society governed by Rawls’s two principles
of justice. As such, we would be wasting our efforts debating the intricacies of Rawls’s
pristine theory of justice when real work could be done employing a comparative
approach to justice that would be designed to better implement and justify workable
improvements to our deeply unjust world.
(d) Do Comparative Theories entail Transcendental Theories?
Sen immediately foresees a potential counterargument to his position, namely,
that the ability to make pairwise comparisons must entail the ability to identify a
transcendental ideal. Or, as Sen puts it, “if comparative assessments can be
systematically made, then that discipline must also be able to identify the very best.” 200
The intuition here is that, surely if we can compare the height of two mountains, we
have enough information to be able to determine what the highest mountain is.
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However, Sen argues that this is a “non sequitur.” 201 It does not follow that “a sequence
of pairwise comparisons invariably leads us to the very best.” 202 Instead, the exercise
only permits the identification of better alternatives, as the very best may not exist at all.
For instance, in the case of mountains, just because we can compare the relative heights
of two peaks does not tell us anything about Mount Everest—its height, its location, or
whether it even exists. To emphasize this point, Sen points out that our set comparisons
will inevitably be incomplete—it is impossible that we will be able to generate a total set
of all possibilities to compare. So there is no reason to think that our ability to make
comparisons in one—or any finite number of situations—will entail our capacity to
identify or locate the very best.
In this regard, Sen’s account of justice is fundamentally open-ended—a neverending task of incremental improvements with the hope that our gravest injustices in
the world will eventually be eliminated. Whether or not we ultimately converge on
some perfect society is neither here nor there for these purposes. In fact, to attempt
such a task would be an irrelevant distraction that would hamper our capacity to solve
concrete and identifiable problems that demand rectification.
(e) Judgments of Justice are Always Incomplete
In addition to being more open-ended, Sen admits that the comparative
method he advances may not always yield definitive judgments to questions about
which proposal would be better than another. There will always be an essential
201
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“incompleteness” regarding a proposal’s effectiveness in advancing justice. The reasons
for this, according to Sen, are as follows: “Incompleteness may be of the lasting kind for
several reasons, including unbridgeable gaps in information, and judgmental
unresolvability involving disparate considerations that cannot be entirely eliminated,
even with full information. 203 Given these problems that are endemic to practical
judgement, he admits that the comparative approach will never produce full or “totalist”
principles that provide “complete” answers. 204
However, Sen does not view this as a fault within comparative theories. Instead,
Sen believes that we can still arrive at reasonable decisions that will eliminate injustice,
even in the face of indeterminacy. For example, using the comparative approach, we
could strongly denounce “endemic hunger or exclusion from medical access” despite
“durable incompleteness” regarding the inability to determine whether or not the ideal
tax rate in the highest bracket is 45% or 46%. 205 We could easily set that question aside
while still making headway in advancing justice in society. Put more starkly in contrast
to Rawls, we need not determine which given tax scheme best comports with the
difference principle if we have sufficient data and evidence to increase taxes to address
major violations of justice. To get bogged down by that indeterminacy would paralyze
us, rendering our theory of justice inert. 206 In contrast to Rawls, Sen claims: “The
challenge of assessing advancement, or identifying regression, will very often be not
203
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compromised at all by the presence of substantial incompleteness in the rankings of
justice.” 207
(f) What do we Want from a Theory of Justice?
Given these various objections to transcendental approaches, Sen asks us to
reframe our thinking of the very idea of justice:
The question “What is a just society?” is not a good starting point for a
useful theory of justice. To that has to be added the further conclusion
that it may not be a plausible end point either. A systematic theory of
comparative justice does not need, nor does it necessarily yield, an
answer to the question “What is a just society? 208
For Sen, asking “What is a just society?” will never yield answers on its own to what we
should do to promote justice in our world. Instead, Sen believes that we would be
better off asking a different kind of question, perhaps such as, “How can we reasonably
advance justice in society?” This would involve assessing the current state of affairs,
and comparing it with a feasible alternative. So long as it produces an improvement
from the previous state, we can be assured that we have eliminated injustice and done
the best we can in improving our world.
(g) Sen’s Comparative Approach
Through Sen’s criticisms of Rawls, we have briefly suggested at some of the goals
that the comparative approach to justice should accomplish. Most importantly, it
should enable us to weigh alternatives in a clearer and more precise manner than
Rawls’s transcendental approach without requiring us to provide a complete answer to
207
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the question: “what is the just society?” Sen develops this proposal in greater detail
through his more extensive work, The Idea of Justice. 209
Briefly, Sen advocates for an approach that combines elements of social choice
theory, a capabilities approach as the relevant metric of justice, consequentialism,
public reasoning, and a theory of impartiality that is related to Adam Smith’s account of
an impartial spectator. 210 The general idea is this: When deliberating about various
social policies in the public forum, we should imagine ourselves as an impartial
spectator who is charged with adopting the preferences of all. Our aim should be to
maximize the capabilities for functioning for citizens, suitably constrained by
considerations of individual rights and fairness. 211 We are then to assess which proposal
would best satisfy these considerations.
As Sen warns, the comparative approach outlined requires a great deal of
knowledge about social choice theory, mathematical modelling, and empirical analysis—
tools that philosophers have little expertise in. 212 Social choice theory generally
specializes in determining what the best choice for society should be when preferences
and values among people are vastly different. A great deal of literature spans this
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subject regarding the best model to use, especially given the influential results of
Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which states that we cannot have a choice procedure
that is both rational and democratic that successfully translates individual preferences
of citizens into a clear social preference. 213 Nevertheless, Sen believes that his
comparative approach is best equipped to address these interdisciplinary problems.
III. Reply to Sen
While Sen provides some powerful points regarding the limitations of ideal
theory, and presents an interesting alternative to thinking about justice in a
comparative framework, many of his criticisms fail to adequately establish the claim
that we should abandon ideal theory and transcendental theories of justice. In this
reply, I will first address Sen’s claim that ideal theory is neither necessary nor sufficient
for advancing justice in society. Next, I will evaluate Sen’s own comparative approach to
justice and argue that his own proposal does not adequately solve the problems he
believes beset Rawls’s own model. Finally, I will respond to Sen’s claim that ideal theory
is a distraction form more pressing concerns of injustice.
(a) Is the Ideal Sufficient?
According to Sen’s sufficiency argument, Rawls’s principles of justice cannot, by
themselves, accurately assess varying departures from the ideal model, nor provide a
rank ordering between alternatives. Only a comparative approach to justice can do this.
Now, strictly speaking, Rawls denies this, for he believes that the lexical priority of the
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principles establishes which departures from the ideal are more urgent to address.214
For instance, when faced with a situation in which we must choose between protecting
liberty or promoting equality of opportunity, we should favor establishing the equal
basic liberties. However, Sen rejects this reply and argues that such recommendations
can lead to a form of “extremism” that can be at odds with the empirical realities of the
world. 215
However, Rawls does recognize that the lexical priority rule can admit exceptions,
so the accusation of “rule-worship” is misplaced. Rawls states: “To accept the lexical
ordering of the two principles, we are not forced to deny that the feasibility of the basic
liberties depends upon circumstances.” 216 For instance, a situation in which people
lacked sufficient resources to even exercise the basic liberties would clearly be a case
where the lexical priority would not hold. Rawls says:
This principle [of liberty] may be preceded by a lexically prior principle
requiring that basic needs be met, at least insofar as their being met is a
necessary condition for citizens to understand and to be able fruitfully to
exercise the basic rights and liberties.217
So, to answer Sen’s supposedly rhetorical question, “Why should we regard hunger,
starvation and medical neglect to be invariably less important than the violation of any
kind of personal liberty?,” our answer is that we shouldn’t, and Rawls does not commit
us to the view that we should.218 If the basic needs of citizens are not met—if citizens
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are facing starvation—the relief of such circumstances will be lexically prior the basic
liberties insofar as rectifying those problems ensures that the basic needs can eventually
be restored.
Sen is still critical, however, that Rawls’s theory does not do more than this. It
does not, for instance, provide us with precise ways of weighing different basic liberties
against one another, other than to ensure that we have “a fully adequate scheme of
equal basic liberties.” 219 But Rawls thinks that it is inappropriate for fundamental
principles of justice to admit of such precision. Rawls says that it is a mistake to “think a
political conception should be framed to cover all logically possible cases, or all
conceivable cases.” 220 This is because these basic principles of justice require
interpretation as part of the “four-stage sequence” of application for principles to
society. 221 For instance, according to Rawls, the principle of liberty “applies not only to
the basic structure but more specifically to what we think of as the constitution.” 222 As
is well known, constitutional principles such as the Equal Protection Clause or the
freedom of the press can develop into a numerous array of implications for citizens that
are not known a priori from Rawls’s first principle of justice. As such, it would be too
demanding and unrealistic to expect constitutional principles to settle all disputes
without any further interpretation at a later stage in application of those principles—
either judicial or legislative. Sen, in other words, is simply asking for too much for our
219
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most abstract expressions of the standards of justice for society. These principles will
eventually be applied to address the concerns that Sen is rightfully concerned about
during the application stage of these principles.
Given Rawls’s more limited aims, it is doubtful that Rawls believed that his ideal
theory on its own could accomplish any more than a general structure of our priorities
and our goals. Rawls plainly admits that much needs to be filled in when applying an
ideal theory of justice to the circumstances of the real world:
As far as circumstances permit, we have a natural duty to remove any
injustices, beginning with the most grievous as identified by the extent of
the deviation from perfect justice. Of course, this idea is extremely rough.
The measure of departures from the ideal is left importantly to intuition.
223
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points out in his explication of Rawls, “nonideal theory will require judgments of both
philosophical and social-scientific sorts.” 224 So Rawls is actually in agreement with Sen
regarding the insufficiency for ideal theory to provide us with a complete roadmap with
respect to addressing departures from the ideal.
However, where Rawls and Sen differ is with respect to whether Rawls’s picture
is sufficiently able to provide any guidance with respect to assessing and correcting
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injustice. As we have just explored, an odd implication of Sen’s criticism here is that it
calls into question the purpose of all constitutional documents that contain general
abstract principles, as Samuel Freeman notes.225 Sen’s position appears to lead to the
striking conclusion that foundational documents that outline broad principles for society
are pointless for advancing justice. As such, Sen’s criticisms are too strong and lead to
an unwarranted suspicion of the relevance of the background principles that structure
our own society.
Let us now return to Sen’s analogy comparing famous works of art which he
relies upon to illustrate his criticisms. Recall that Sen asserts that our knowledge that
the Mona Lisa is the best painting cannot provide us with any information regarding
how to rank a Van Gogh versus a Gauguin. However, this simplified analogy is
misleading, and, upon further examination, it misses crucial aspects of our identification
of the ideal. To illustrate, if we are only provided with the minimal claim that “The
Mona Lisa is the best painting,” we will of course not have learned much. However,
once we probe more deeply into the reasons why we believe the Mona Lisa is the best
painting, we will certainly have a basis for evaluating other nonideal paintings. 226 For
instance, if asked to justify the preference for the Mona Lisa, we will presumably
uncover something about the importance of theme, style, and technique and how those
elements shape our understanding of art. It would be quite strange indeed if these
225
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values had no relevance to our evaluation of other imperfect paintings. After all, how
would it make sense for our judgements about style or technique to simply disappear
from our assessments of other paintings? It is simply not possible for these evaluative
elements to drop out of our comparison of nonideal paintings.
Similarly, we can apply this reasoning to address the “problem of the second
best” illustrated by economists. If we return to the analogy with the cookie, it is clear
that, once we uncover the reasons why we believe the chocolate chip and pecan cookie
to be the best, we can draw upon those explanations to see why the macadamia cookie
would be second-best. The lesson of the “problem of the second best” is, therefore,
only the following: We should not rely on surface attributes for determining which
properties the second or third-best solutions will have. 227 Of course the second-best
cookie might not have chocolate chips. The chocolate chips are just a façade for the
deeper rationale for why that cookie is best. Once we shift to our knowledge of the
value judgments and evaluative comparisons, the problem disappears. Our intimate
knowledge of these more fundamental elements will always be applicable to whatever
nonideal element we are analyzing.
Let us provide a more dramatic example to illustrate this point. Suppose you
knew which cookie was the ideal cookie and you knew why. What follows from this?
You would have to know everything important about cooking and about all the
ingredients, and all the values associated with weighing different styles of cooking.

227

Goodin (1995): 45 uses the language of “surface attributes.”

108

Otherwise, how could you have identified the ideal? Surely, if you could do this, you
would know how to rank nonideal cookies against one another, as well as identify the
second and third best. In fact, pace Sen, you would be able to establish a complete rank
ordering of them.
Now, we might object and say that I have proved too much with this example.
For we then may wonder, how can Rawls truly establish the ideally just society? Does
Rawls know everything about all possible societies and all possible elements? Surely not.
However, this does not weaken my argument, for two main reasons: (1) Rawls limits
the scope of his investigation and (2) Rawls does not view the “ideal society” in the
same way we might think of an ideal cookie.
With respect to (1), Rawls is not interested in the ideally just society for all
possible worlds and all possible people. 228 Instead, Rawls limits his inquiry to liberal
democratic societies under the circumstances of justice and favorable conditions, and to
human beings who regard themselves as free and equal and are subject to human
constraints. Nor does Rawls allow deliberators all possible conceptions of justice when
determining which principles should govern society. Rather, he presents them a list of
various conceptions that have currency in the political culture.229 This should already
simplify a great deal the conditions under which an ideal is identified.
With respect to (2), Rawls does not think that identifying an ideal society is about
maximizing something in the way we might think that an ideal cookie somehow
228
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maximizes pleasure, or how an ideal form of travel maximizes speed. We greatly
misunderstand Rawls if we think his vision of an ideally just society somehow mirrors
these other kinds of ‘ideal’ conceptions that aim to maximize. Instead, Rawls believes
that an ideal society is one that is identified by principles that we believe to be the most
reasonable for us given certain specified conditions. They are most reasonable not
because they are shown to maximize something or abide by some comprehensive
doctrine of perfection, but rather because they answer to our deepest considered
convictions implicit in our liberal democratic culture and are capable of being agreed
upon by citizens who regard themselves as free and equal.
It is within this defined context that Rawls identifies an ideally just society. And
within this context, Rawls does believe to have best incorporated all the different
considered convictions (the “cooking ingredients”) into one ideal vision that each citizen
can individually acknowledge to be the ideal. What follows is that, given our intimate
understanding of the various components that determine our selection of the principles
of justice, we should be able to have sufficient knowledge to judge at least the broad
framework for ranking nonideal alternatives and identifying second or third best
societies. Put in another way, through the process of identifying the ideally just society,
each citizen would know much more than just the two principles of justice. In fact, each
citizen would understand the deep reasons that inform the basis for them—the social
basis of self-respect, the importance of reciprocity, the importance of our conception of
the good and having the primary goods to pursue it, and the relevance of justification to
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others that can be seen as reasonable. Each of these elements will be deeply connected
in the normative outlook of persons in society, and it would be shocking if these
substantive commitments could not serve as a wellspring of ideas for how to assess
nonideal conditions in the world. Yes, we will be left with “intuition” in some cases as
Rawls reminds us, 230 but this is not because his ideal theory is silent with respect to the
nonideal world, but rather because no one can work out a theory for each and every
possible circumstance. This is not possible given the nature and complexity of the world.
And yet, the tools that have been gained through the process of identifying the ideal will
be invaluable and will greatly aid citizens in providing solutions and navigating us toward
justice. 231
(b) Is the Ideal Necessary?
Next, we can move to the claim that transcendental theories of justice are not
necessary for advancing justice in nonideal circumstances. Recall that Sen employs the
analogy with Mount Everest and denies its relevance for making pairwise comparisons
between two other mountains in terms of their height. He then applies this reasoning
to ideal theories of justice, denying that they are necessary to identify and compare the
injustices of global malnutrition, gender discrimination in education, and other urgent
problems of our world. On the surface, this makes intuitive sense. It seems odd to
require the identification of the ideal to be able to make a judgement between two
230
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societies with varying degrees of illiteracy. Nevertheless, the analogy has significant
limitations when we examine its implications more carefully.
To begin, Simmons offers a response to Sen, arguing that we require the
identification of the ideal so as to provide a broader viewpoint from which to gauge our
piecemeal improvements. Simmons states: “To dive into nonideal theory without an
ideal theory in hand is simply to drive blind, to allow irrational free rein to the mere
conviction of injustice and to eagerness for change of any sort.” 232 Simmons warns us
that, under Sen’s approach, using a comparative approach is short-sighted and may only
lead to a temporary improvement to a situation, without actually leading us toward the
peak of justice. To illustrate, if I am trying to build a better car, I can make several
piecemeal improvements to the interior before realizing that, all along, I was making it
harder and harder to leave enough room for the engine. As such, we need a broader
picture of the blueprint before making improvements, which is what ideal theory seeks
to achieve.
Of course, Sen can reply that all considerations should be taken into account
when making improvements, so it would be unlikely that we would ever fail to leave
enough room for an engine. However, the objection still stands: there is no reason to
think that we are properly weighing all the considerations until we have a long-term
plan or goal. For instance, without a broader picture of the goals of car-building, we
might never accurately weigh the consideration for energy efficiency—it might simply
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be dropped out or dwarfed by other considerations of car design and so never get
implemented. Moreover, this outcome is compatible with making constant piecemeal
improvements to the car every year.
However, I believe we can strengthen Simmons’s point in a more robust manner
than he has presented. It is not simply the danger that we are “driving blind” without
ideal theory. Even more importantly, it is not clear that any piecemeal improvements
we make will last without ideal theory. Recall the importance of the stability condition
that Rawls builds into his theory of justice, which requires that our principles gain the
internal support of citizens through reliable psychological mechanisms. By utilizing ideal
theory, we are better able to test for which kinds of principles will genuinely garner the
support of citizens so that they carry well into the future. Without ideal theory, it is not
clear whether a given short-term improvement we make will not simply vanish in vain.
This can be a very costly oversight, for we may be directed on a comparative approach
to justice to make small improvements to literacy or poverty with no basis upon which
to think that such incremental advantages will pass on to future generations. Without
the lasting institutional structural changes regulated by principles of justice that can be
endorsed by citizens, we run the risk of sabotaging our noble, but short-sighted efforts.
As such, the stability condition that is offered by ideal theory should be viewed as
necessary for our work in nonideal theory. Sen’s comparative approach, by contrast,
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does not adequately incorporate the stability condition on proposed solutions, and so
there is no reliable method to make lasting change. 233
(c) Does the Ideal Even Exist?
We can now turn to a more radical objection to what I have proposed in defense
of ideal theory. According to David Schmidtz, these kinds of responses miss an
important element of Sen’s objections. 234 According to Schmidtz, “justice has no peak
form. For thousands of years we postulated that it did, but we never had any reason,
and we were wrong….Justice is not a place we need to get to.” 235 For Schmidtz, there is
no transcendental ideal theory of justice, so there is no reason to attempt to describe it
or assume it would be helpful to us. Instead, the most important task for us is to get out
of “pits” of injustice and avoid them in the future as best we can.236 Hence, the only
model available to us is the comparative approach to justice.
Schmitdz’s more skeptical conclusion about justice demands a fuller treatment
than I can provide here, but I will provide one major point to consider. We should
remember that, for Rawls, when he describes an ideal theory of justice, he is not
describing something like the tallest mountain, the perfect car, or a society governed by
a comprehensive doctrine of the good. Rawls would agree that this kind of ideally just
233
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society would be impossible. In contrast, however, Rawls is articulating a society that is
governed by the most reasonable principles given certain limitations and circumstances
in political life that Rawls believes can be subject to an overlapping consensus.
Framed in this manner, we must understand Schmidtz’s objection as amounting
to the claim that there simply are no principles of justice that all reasonable persons can
accept. However, this might seem to leave us with a bit of a puzzle then, for what is the
status of Sen’s comparative theory of justice? Surely, it advocates for principles that
people should agree upon. For instance, the comparative approach says the following:
“We ought to adopt an impartial spectator to rank-order different states of affairs by
aggregating all considerations of capabilities, rights, liberties, well-being, costs, etc.” All
societies that fail to do this would be unjust. Doesn’t Schmidtz’s skepticism apply to
Sen’s approach as well?
However, this would mischaracterize the comparative approach to justice, for
the recommendation to adopt the perspective of an impartial spectator, coupled with a
pluralistic account of goods to be maximized, is not justice, but is the method for best
realizing justice. For Sen, justice is about realizing states-of-affairs in society that we can
construct methods to help us achieve. In this sense, justice would be identified with a
concrete outcome such as achieving certain capabilities for freedom, literacy, health,
opportunity and a level of income. Anyone in society would be able to see and witness
justice being done, for they would be able to assess the freedoms and capabilities of
citizens increasing around them.
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In reply, this is not how Rawls conceives of justice, and it highlights the deep
chasm that exists between “contractarian deontological” 237 and consequentialist
approaches to political theorizing. Rawls does not think justice is fundamentally about
maximizing or aggregating anything, or evaluating states of affairs independent of social
institutions, even if those states of affairs involve thriving and flourishing persons. Such
states-of-affairs may realize other values that are important, but we cannot evaluate
justice from merely looking at how people’s lives are going.
Instead, for Rawls, justice is about selecting principles to govern social
institutions that reasonable persons who regard themselves as free and equal can agree
upon, provided that these principles take their higher-order interests seriously and
attempt to fairly distribute the goods that they jointly produce. Absent these deeply
social conditions between persons, justice cannot have any application or render any
verdict.
Of course, it is this very understanding of justice that Schmidtz and Sen seek to
reject and replace, as they believe that it is too limited in scope and unnecessarily
complicates our commonsense judgments about justice. After all, why can’t we simply
regard the malnourishment of persons in the world as a grave injustice that demands
rectification? Why isn’t the widespread subjection of women simply a fact of injustice,
regardless of its social origins?
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Rawls’s response here of course would be to admit that these are deep problems
with the world, and that many of them are, in fact, injustices. However, Rawls would
also urge us to separate humanitarian urgencies from grave injustices.238 The duties to
rectify these problems will take a different shape and fall on different agents who are
responsible for correcting them depending upon the ultimate source of these horrible
states-of-affairs. This will involve a complex set of considerations involving capability to
aid, responsibility for harm, and institutional failings, etc. I cannot develop a
comprehensive account of these considerations here, but it is important to emphasize
that distributive justice is a unique responsibility that is owed to persons in virtue of the
institutional and social relationships that exist between them, and that a
consequentialist or comparative approach to justice will fail to capture this important
normative difference in their proposed solutions to these problems.
Returning to the challenge at hand, even if Schmidtz and Sen agreed that Rawls’s
understanding of justice offered an important insight on the relevance of social
relationships for justice, it still would not settle the deeper objection that agreement is
not ultimately possible in Rawls’s model, despite all its other virtues. However, I believe
that this is mistaken. To be sure, Rawls recognizes at the later stages of his life that
agreement would only be possible on a family of liberal conceptions of justice, so Rawls
only needs to defend the weaker objection that even a more modest overlapping
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consensus would be impossible. 239 However, as I do not have the space to address that
more fundamental challenge here, I will instead end this section with a different reply to
Schmidtz’s challenge.
To deny, as Schmidtz does, that there is an ideal of justice at all is really to say
that there are no ideal conceptions that are possible at all in our thinking—only
recommendations that tell us of better or worse ways of doing things. It would be akin
to saying, there is no ideal of friendship—no principles that describe its ultimate shape.
Instead, there are only better or worse ways of being a friend. Or, it would amount to
claiming that truth is not a governing principle for the relations between persons.
Instead, there would only be better or worse ways of conveying information with each
other.
This more radical approach to our normative theorizing demands a more
comprehensive reply than I can provide here, but it is important nonetheless to see how
significantly it departs from our normative thinking in these matters.
(d) Sen’s Comparative Approach
Setting aside Schmidtz’s criticisms of ideal theory, we can now evaluate the
success of Sen’s comparative approach to justice on its own merits. Recall that Sen
believes the comparative approach to justice is better equipped to remedy injustice in
the world for it allows us to rank states of affairs against one another and suggests
immediate correction of an injustice. It does so by recommending that we adopt an
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impartial spectator that asks us to aggregate capabilities for functioning, along with
rights and liberties and concerns for fairness. These capabilities for functioning are the
resources, opportunities and tools necessary for citizens to achieve the conditions of
freedom. 240 However, what makes Sen’s approach distinct is his bundling together of
deontological considerations with consequentialist ones. He does so because he
recognizes the plurality of goods that people seek, and wants to safeguard the rights
and liberties of others if maximization of another metric threatens them.
However, according to Freeman, this kind of reformulation is “ad hoc” and “risks
sacrificing traditional strengths of utilitarianism by obscuring the practical consequences
of his view.” 241 One of the virtues of traditional utilitarianism is that it is able to provide
a clear metric for weighing conflicts against one another. But once we attempt to factor
in deontological elements such as rights and fairness, it will be more difficult to resolve
the tensions between the different components. 242 It is unclear, for instance, how we
are to weigh the capabilities for freedom for some at the expense of procedural fairness
for others.
In reply, Sen admits that there is some invariable “incompleteness” to his
account. However, he argues that it is not problematic, for we can sometimes sidestep
a concern with completeness for the sake of correcting an obvious injustice such as
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“torture.” 243 On Sen’s account, despite our inability to make precise determinations as
to how to weigh personal liberties against other concerns, we can nevertheless
condemn torture and call for its elimination immediately.244 Rawls’s theory, on Sen’s
account, does not have this luxury—it must provide a solution to the weighing problem
before it recommends a solution. That is, after all, the curse of transcendental theories
of justice.
However, there are two problems with this reply. First of all, it is a
mischaracterization of Rawls’s position to assume that Rawls’s theory of justice requires
a precise weighing of the basic liberties against one another at the level of his two
principles of justice. Instead, Rawls offers the general requirement that “liberty can be
restricted only for the sake of liberty itself.” 245 What this means is that we can only
curtail a basic liberty if only to safeguard the “fully adequate scheme” of liberties that
can be guaranteed for all. 246 However, at later stages—at the constitutional, legislative,
and administrative (judges and citizens) stages—more precise applications can be sorted
out which will require legal interpretation and information about the particular society
we live in. Importantly, Rawls acknowledges that these stages are “often indeterminate:
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it is not always clear which of several constitutions, or economic and social
arrangements would be chosen.” 247 Continuing, Rawls says that
We must fall back upon a notion of quasi-pure procedural justice: laws
and policies are just provided that they lie within the allowed range….This
indeterminacy in the theory of justice is not in itself a defect. It is what
we should expect. Justice as fairness will prove a worthwhile theory if it
defines the range of justice more in accordance with our considered
judgments than do existing theories, and if it singles out with greater
sharpness the graver wrongs a society should avoid. 248
Rawls’s notion of “procedural justice” is important here, for it means that, precisely how
we weigh and apply the basic liberties in society will largely be procedural. So long as
our selection and application of policies abide by the priority of liberty rule, whatever
results from the good faith implementation of the principles of justice will itself be just.
What this means is the following: At the level of ideal theory, we cannot give a direct
weight to the basic liberties other than they cannot be restricted except for the sake of
other liberties and that the resulting set of liberties is always a fully adequate scheme
for all. So long as this priority is followed and applied transparently to society, the
resulting institutions, laws and policies will be just. We cannot expect any more from
ideal theory than this.
If we bring this back to Sen’s criticism, Rawls’s indeterminacy is not as
objectionable as Sen makes it out to be, for Sen does not see justice as procedural.
Utilizing Rawls’s method, we can expect to construct a justifiable position on the
injustice of torture using the four-stage procedural sequence. Given the unlikelihood
247
248

TJ, 176.
TJ, 176.

121

that torture is necessary to preserve the other basic liberties, we can safely assume that
it will be condemned at the end of the sequence. However, at no point in this
deliberation must we decide, once and for all, what the precise weight the basic liberties
must have in a consequentialist rank-ordering sense. Given the procedural
understanding of the four-stage sequence, it is unlikely that such a precise weighing will
be possible or expected from Rawls’s theory. All justice as fairness aims to accomplish is
to “single out with greater sharpness the graver wrongs a society should avoid.” 249
Anything more than this sharper focus of the priority of liberty is outside the limits of
ideal theory.
We can now turn to the second problem with Sen’s criticism. Sen’s approach is,
in fact, more likely to lead to paralysis and indeterminacy in the negative sense than is
Rawls’s. Since Sen is a consequentialist, the problem of weighing considerations will be
much more important for deciding what justice requires. For, suppose we have a
conflict between torture and security. While Sen might argue that it is “obvious” that
we condemn torture, it is difficult to see how it follows from his consequentialist
reasoning without a clear account of how to weigh the deontological elements of his
theory against one another. This will prevent his theory from providing a solution to the
problem. In contrast, Rawls can assert that, so long as the reference to the priority of
liberty is maintained and is publicly recognized to be a reasonable interpretation of it,
the resulting outcome will be just. Hence, given Sen’s complex account of
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consequentialism, his approach, by a twist of fortune, ends up being the more
indeterminate when compared to Rawls’s procedural approach.
(e) The Purpose of Ideal Theory
While the previous sections have attempted to defend Rawls’s ideal theory from
Sen’s criticisms, it is important not to overstate our case. There is no reason to think
that Rawls believes that his conception of justice is all we need when attempting to
improve justice in society. We need to consult social and economic theory to aid us in
implementing, for instance, the difference principle. Nor does he think that, without an
ideal theory of justice, improvements in society are literally impossible. Instead, my
argument is that it will be much more difficult and haphazard if we do not. As such,
strictly speaking, an ideal theory of justice is neither necessary nor sufficient for
advancing justice in society. However, this does not show that ideal theory is pointless
or limited to a mere intellectual exercise. To see why, consider the following example:
Suppose we want to perform surgery on a patient. It is strictly true that, using sterile
gloves is neither necessary nor sufficient for a successful outcome. It is not necessary
for it is quite possible to perform surgery on a patient without them, and it is not
sufficient for you certainly require more than gloves to operate. But what does this
philosophical analysis tell us about the importance of sterile gloves? Not much. Hence,
there is a certain limitation in using necessary and sufficient conditions to determine the
usefulness or value of an undertaking. By analogy, it is not clear what value there is to
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be had in using necessary and sufficient conditions to determine the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of ideal theory.
There is, to be fair, a certain intuitive appeal to what Sen is highlighting as an
apparent problem with our thinking about justice. After all, if we can readily identify
serious problems of injustice—malnutrition, famine, lack of access to health and
education—why do we still need an ideal theory of justice? Do we not have sufficient
agreement upon the relevant values of fairness, rights, and well-being to devote our
intellectual energy to provide solutions to these concrete problems?
I will make just two final remarks here. First, as rehearsed earlier, some persons
regard the cases of injustice that Sen highlights as humanitarian failings or as
unfortunate conditions that persons face in life. That is, they do not see them as
uniquely problems of justice, but as other types of regrettable features of the world. As
such, it is one responsibility of the philosopher to systemize our normative judgments so
as to provide justification and coherence to our conviction that something is an instance
of injustice. If this sounds like an idle proclamation from the ivory tower, one need only
descend from it to find a cornucopia of different views and perspectives on what the
appropriate response is to various failings in society. It is the hope, albeit a distant hope,
that a theory of justice might be able to provide a vision that organizes and gives force
to our demands of society and its citizens in the most complete manner possible. This is
not to suggest that Sen has not done a great deal towards this goal. His work has been
invaluable in addressing serious problems in nonideal theory and in the legislative
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stages of achieving justice. 250 Nevertheless, it is Rawls’s view that a concept of justice
that is based on the social contract tradition will ultimately resonate with us far more
than a consequentialist vision will. I cannot, of course, provide a full argument in
support of this here, but it is important to recognize that these visions do find their way,
eventually, to the activists and reformers that change society from below.
My second remark to Sen’s challenge is to perhaps present the role of ideal
theory as similar to the work of mathematicians or theoretical physicists and to see the
task of solving complex problems to be the result of a “division of labor” of sorts
between various domains of inquiry. The thought is, just as the work of
mathematicians251 or physicists can seem “distant” to the task of constructing a bridge
or building an airplane, it would be a mistake to deem them pointless, for they typically
provide the impetus for further breakthroughs in development. In the same way, our
ideal theories of justice aim to provide the clearest expression of our deepest help
convictions about how reasonable and rational citizens can live and cooperate with one
another. While this more abstract approach appears distant to the relief of widespread
malnutrition and the subjection of women across the globe, it is the hope that Rawls’s
principles become further entrenched in our thinking and can be called upon with
greater regularity and firmness when reform is necessary—either by emphasizing the
importance of the worst-off members of society, or by highlighting the importance of
For Sen’s groundbreaking work on famines, see Sen, Amartya. Poverty and Famines. Oxford Clarendon
Press, 1981. In addition, Sen has greatly reformed economics and utilitarianism to move beyond mere
preference satisfaction or welfare as the appropriate metric of justice. See Sen, Amartya. Commodities
and Capabilities. Oxford University Press, 1999.
251
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equality of opportunity over concerns of increased GDP. This shift in our thinking can
take generations to fully be comprehended, and so it is premature to reject Rawls’s
model as inert with respect to the demands for justice.
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Chapter 5: Justice and Empirical Facts
I. Introduction
The central purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship between
principles of justice on the one hand, and empirical facts about human nature and
society on the other. One reason to investigate this connection is because it is common
to think that our normative principles should, in some way, be informed by facts about
the world. We might say that, for instance, the fact that human beings are only capable
of limited altruism should affect our choice of principles to govern behavior and our
institutions. We might also think that facts about human psychology and human
motivational capacities should set the limits for what normative principles can require
from us. For instance, as we have already seen in earlier chapters, Rawls regularly
appeals to facts about our moral psychology and the stability of society to question the
merits of utilitarianism and to advocate for his own principles. Indeed, Rawls’s
commitment to a realistic utopia depends upon on this methodology, as it ensures that
our normative principles are suitably grounded in the world and establishes that justice
is fundamentally achievable for creatures such as ourselves.
However, the method of appealing to facts to argue for or against principles of
justice has been left unchallenged thus far, despite its prima facie plausibility. As such,
it is still an open question whether this methodology for thinking about justice is
acceptable. And so, the question that confronts us is the following: Should our political
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principles be justified or constrained by empirical facts related to human beings and
their social life? And, if so, which facts should be relevant, and in what way?
Numerous philosophers have weighed in on this debate in strikingly diverse ways.
To illustrate, consider the following claims:
First, according to John Rawls:
In justice as fairness the first principles of justice depend upon those
general beliefs about human nature and how society works….First
principles are not, in a constructivist view, independent of such beliefs,
nor…true of all possible worlds. In particular, they depend on the rather
specific features and limitations of human life that give rise to the
circumstances of justice.252
In contrast, we have G.A. Cohen, who asserts the very opposite view:
The thesis to be defended here contradicts...that our beliefs about
principles should reflect facts about human nature, such as the fact that
human beings are liable to pain, or the fact that they are capable of
sympathy for each other, and also facts about human social organization,
such as the tendency for people to encounter collective action problems,
or for societies to be composed of individuals who have diverse interests
and conflicting opinions.253
Continuing, Cohen claims:
Facts are irrelevant in the determination of fundamental principles of
justice. Facts of human nature and human society…make no difference
to the very nature of justice itself. 254
This foundational disagreement between Rawls and Cohen about the role of facts in our
conception of justice will serve as the primary focus of this chapter. However, as the
Rawls, John. “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” in Collected Papers, ed. Samuel Freeman,
Harvard University Press, 1999: 351. Quoted by Samuel Freeman in “Constructivism, Facts and Moral
Justification,” in Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy, eds. Thomas Christiano and John
Christman, Blackwell Publishing, 2009: 41.
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questions before us are quite broad, we would do best to specify more clearly the kinds
of issues that are at stake in this disagreement.
In the first section, I consider the question of whether Rawls’s two principles of
justice are truly the fundamental principles of justice given their reliance on facts, or if,
as Cohen charges, they are instead “rules of regulation” that depend upon a more
ultimate principle that is “fact-free.” 255 I argue that Cohen misunderstands what
fundamental principles of justice are and that his charge that all fundamental principles
must be independent of facts is incorrect.
In the second section, I discuss a set of facts—limited beneficence and moderate
scarcity—called the “circumstances of justice,” which are said to be the preconditions
for the emergence of justice itself.256 Cohen and others have challenged this view,
arguing that justice does not depend upon factual circumstances at all and that justice
applies everywhere. In response, I defend Rawls (and Hume) who assert the
importance of these facts for determining when justice arises.
In the third section, I provide a general account of what kinds of facts are
permitted in the original position when deliberating about principles of justice. I argue
that the selection of facts that are relevant are based on several criteria: stability,
publicity, generating fair terms of agreement, and even making agreement possible.
The facts that are included will be general facts about human nature, our higher order
interests, human psychology, and our empirical understanding of the world and social
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life. In addition, I discuss the importance of the veil of ignorance in determining which
facts are irrelevant for justice. I argue that our conception of ourselves as free and
equal requires us to hide certain facts from ourselves and our society to determine what
justice requires.
Next, I turn to several criticisms of this account of the importance of facts by G.A.
Cohen and David Estlund. Cohen rejects the relevance of facts, arguing that we have a
concept of justice that is independent of them, and that concerns for notions such as
stability are “absurd.” 257 I reply on behalf of Rawls and emphasize that justice must be,
at its core, practical for us and that stability must be directly relevant. David Estlund
argues that facts about human nature that are permitted in the original position are
objectionable on the grounds that not all features of human nature are morally
acceptable and that we should be able to condemn them when they interfere with the
demands of justice. I argue that the objectionable elements of human nature are not
likely to occur in the well-ordered society, and that they are properly regarded as
contingent features of ourselves, or “special psychologies.” As such, they would not
pose problems for stability.
II. Are Fundamental Principles of Justice “Fact-Free?”
Rawls believes that his two principles of justice—the guarantee of the equal
basic liberties and the difference principle—are fundamental principles of justice. 258
257
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They are regarded as having the highest authority and providing the final answer as to
how we should arrange the basic structure of society, which includes the major legal,
political, and economic institutions of society. 259 Rawls’s principles are the consequence
of a constructed decision procedure, called the original position, which organizes and
systemizes our considered convictions about justice into one “coherent view.” 260 Within
the original position, we are allowed access to a set of facts about human psychology
and human nature, as well as general facts about the natural and social sciences to aid
us in our selection of principles. After utilizing this procedure to combine our
considered convictions and our assessment of facts, we are then able to clearly arrive at
and agree upon the most reasonable principles of justice for us--Rawls’s two ordered
principles—to regulate the conduct of institutions.
According to a series of criticisms by G.A. Cohen, however, Rawls has not actually
described fundamental principles of justice at all. Because of his reliance on the original
position and his appeal to a great number of facts inside the procedure, he has only
found “rules of regulation” or applied principles of justice. 261 A truly fundamental
principle of justice, for Cohen, cannot rely on any other facts or procedures. The reason
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normative architecture. It is these principles which are genuinely fundamental
principles of justice, not Rawls’s two principles of justice.
Let us provide an example to illustrate Cohen’s thesis and outline his basic
method. For instance, let us examine the following common-sense normative principle:
“One ought to arrive on-time to one’s appointments.” We might then wonder, is this
principle a fundamental principle? Cohen’s basic test for this is to ask what our
justification for it is. Suppose I answered with the following reply: “If we arrive late to
our appointments, other people will be inconvenienced and their plans will be
disrupted.” 262 Notice that my justification invoked a fact—the fact that people will be
inconvenienced or that their plans would be disrupted. Why is this important? Because,
whenever our justification for a principle requires a fact to support it, there must always
be a further principle that explains why the fact is relevant. To put it in Cohen’s
language:
Whenever a fact F confers support on a principle P, there is an
explanation why F supports P, an explanation of how, that is, F represents
a reason to endorse P. 263
If Cohen is right, then we should be able to discover another more basic principle that
explains why the fact of inconvenience is important. What might this principle be?
Naturally, the following: “One ought not disrupt the plans of others or cause them
inconveniences.” And so, the complete argument and each of its premises would look
like this:
262
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(1) One ought not disrupt the plans of others or cause them inconveniences.
(2) If we arrive late to our appointments, other people will be
inconvenienced and their plans will be disrupted.
Therefore,
(3) One ought to arrive on-time to one’s appointments.
With the argument presented in this way, we can more clearly see that our original
principle is really the conclusion to an argument that requires support from a fact and a
more fundamental principle. And so, our original principle cannot be a fundamental
principle.
But now we may then ask, is our new principle a fundamental principle, or is it
justified by yet another fact and a further principle that explains the relevance of that
fact? Let us examine our justification for why we ought not disrupt the plans of others
or cause them inconveniences. Suppose I say: “Disrupting plans and inconveniencing
others causes harm to people.” 264 Notice again that my justification invokes a fact—
that disrupting plans harms people. Using Cohen’s method, we should be able to invoke
a prior principle that explains why harm is relevant to the disruption of plans. This
further principle might be, for instance, “one ought not harm others.” With this, we can
complete our original argument in the same manner as above. And so on, and so forth.
We can continue this process only for so long, however. 265 Eventually, Cohen
believes that we will reach a point at which we can no longer appeal to facts to justify
our principles. For Cohen, these points lie at the “summit of our convictions” and
264
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represent genuine fundamental principles. 266 Moreover, these principles must always be
fact-free, for if ever we invoked a fact for their justification, it would always entail the
existence of a further principle to explain that fact’s relevance. Cohen states his
conclusion as follows:
A principle can respond to (that is, be grounded in) a fact only because it
is also a response to a more ultimate principle that is not a response to a
fact: accordingly, if principles respond to facts, then the principles at the
summit of our conviction are grounded in no facts whatsoever. 267
Whether or not we believe that the principle “do not harm others” is truly the final
resting point of our convictions is, of course, up for further investigation which I have
not tried to recreate here. Nevertheless, the important lesson is that Cohen’s toolkit
can be applied to any principle that we proffer as a fundamental principle, including
principles of justice. If, in our justification for it, we state a fact, then we can reiterate
Cohen’s methodology any number of times until we reach the pinnacle of our beliefs—
the top of which will necessarily contain a fact-free fundamental principle. And so,
according to Cohen, “every-fact sensitive principle reflects a fact-insensitive
principle.” 268
With this argumentative strategy at hand, Cohen then argues that Rawls’s two
principles of justice cannot possibly be the fundamental principles of justice, for Rawls
justifies these principles by invoking a plethora of facts to do so. For instance, let us
examine some of the arguments that Rawls marshals for the difference principle (DP),
266
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according to which inequalities are permitted only if they benefit the least advantaged
members of society.269
First, we might justify the DP based on a notion of reciprocity. 270 The underlying
idea would be that persons would not accept a principle, such as the principle of utility,
in which inequalities might be allowed that required the worst-off members to sacrifice
their interests for the sake of the majority. Such a principle would go against the fair
terms of social cooperation in which citizens work together to produce the goods and
services of society on terms that are acceptable to all fully cooperative members. The
difference principle, in contrast, expresses a commitment to reciprocal relations
between persons by guaranteeing that any inequalities are for the sake of those who
are least well-off and that their interests are never merely sacrificed for the greater
good of others. As Freeman notes:
The main argument in favor of the difference principle depends on a
strong idea of reciprocity (JF §36). In a society structured by the
difference principle gains to those more advantaged are never made at
the expense of those less advantaged; instead, any gains to the more
advantaged always benefit also the least advantaged, and do so more
than any other alternative measure. 271
Second, we may also justify the difference principle as necessary to preserve a
sense of self-respect among persons, which, according to Rawls, is “the most important
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primary good.” 272 Self-respect is “a psychological attitude that includes a sense that our
individual lives matter and are worth living.” 273 In a society governed by a principle that
permits the worst-off members to sacrifice the goods and opportunities necessary to
pursue a rational life plan, their sense of self-respect in society would be damaged for
they would not view their contributions as worthwhile or valuable. The implicit
message in society for these members would be that they are expendable and that the
fruits of their labor are not important for society. It is difficult for citizens subject to
these outcomes to view their lives as being socially valued.274
Returning to Cohen’s argument, we can use his methodology to examine the
justification of Rawls’s commitment to the difference principle.275 Since the difference
principle relies upon facts about reciprocity and psychological attitudes about selfrespect, we would be compelled to make the following argument:
(1) The difference principle best promotes self-respect between persons and
establishes a relationship of reciprocity.
(2) We ought to promote self-respect and encourage relationships based on
reciprocity.
Therefore,
(3) We ought to endorse the DP.
With the argument spelled out in this form, Cohen would argue that premise (2) is the
more fundamental principle of justice, namely, the principle that “we ought to promote

272

TJ, 386.
Freeman (2009): 46.
274
Hence, Rawls highlights how self-respect has a social basis: “Self-respect depends upon and is
encouraged by certain public features of basic social institutions, how they work and how people who
accept these arrangements are expected to (and normally do) regard and treat one another,” PL, 319.
275
There are, of course other justifications for the difference principle, such as the importance of maximin,
but I am using the concern for reciprocity and self-respect as examples to illustrate Cohen’s thesis.
273

136

self-respect and encourage relationships based on reciprocity.” This would serve to
show that the DP is not, in fact, the fundamental principle of justice.
Now, we can investigate this principle further if we think that we must appeal to
another fact to affirm it. We might think the following fact is necessary for its
justification: “By promoting self-respect and reciprocal relationships between persons,
we express a commitment to their freedom and equality.” 276 And, as such, the fact-free
principle that justifies this fact would be the following: “respect the freedom and
equality of persons.” The summit of our convictions has thus been reached. 277
Does Cohen’s strategy succeed? Must Rawls affirm the fact-free principle
“respect the freedom and equality of persons” as the fundamental principle of justice?
Are Rawls’s two principles of justice merely applied principles of these more
fundamental types given their reliance on facts?
There are at least two ways to respond to this conclusion. First, I will challenge
the notion that a fundamental principle of justice must be identical with the summit of
our normative convictions. Second, I will argue that our most basic normative
convictions stand in need of interpretation and cannot stand alone as principles of
justice.
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(a) Fundamental Principles are Domain Specific
To begin, I will attempt to show that our most basic normative convictions do
not necessarily equate to a fundamental principle within the same domain of inquiry.
Let me illustrate with an example from the empirical sciences to demonstrate
this thesis. Suppose I state Newton’s third law of motion as a fundamental principle of
classical mechanics. The third law is as follows:
When one body exerts a force on a second body, the second body
simultaneously exerts a force equal in magnitude and opposite in
direction on the first body. 278
Now, using Cohen’s methodology, suppose I demand a justification for the law. We will
presumably need to appeal to another fact to do so, such as the following:
F1: Our observations and measurements of the world corroborate
Newton’s Third Law of Motion.
And, continuing, implicit in this justification is the further fact:
F2: Our empirical observations represent the reality of the world.
We can certainly continue this line of inquiry for several more steps, but suppose
that we have reached the summit of our convictions after probing the justification of
our physical laws in this manner.279 The important point here is to notice what type of
claim we have arrived at. This certainly does not look like a fundamental principle of
motion, or of physics. After all, what would it mean to say that “our empirical
Wikipedia contributors. "Newton’s Laws of Motion." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Web. 12 April
2017 <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newton%27s_laws_of_motion>.
279
Further steps will inevitably involve claims about induction, or, in the case of Hume, a claim about the
relevance of custom. Nevertheless, it is not necessary to resolve the problem of induction for the
purposes of my argument here, which is simply to demonstrate that, wherever we end up, the principle
will be nothing like a fundamental principle of physics.
278
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observations represent the reality of the world” is a fundamental principle of physics?
Instead, it looks like a principle of justification that we must implicitly endorse in our
commitments to fundamental physical laws.
In other words, just because we have a principle—like a fundamental principle of
physics—that requires further principles to establish it, such as an epistemological or
justificatory principle, it does not mean that the status of those principles is no longer
fundamental.
If this is true, then what would it mean for something to be classified as a
fundamental principle, then? Put simply, it must be the most basic principle within a
particular domain of inquiry. For physics, a fundamental principle should be the
ultimate principle or principles that describe the interactions of matter. The claim that
“our empirical observations represent the reality of the world” offers no such
description, and so is not a fundamental principle of physics, even though it is needed to
justify those principles.
Let us apply this conclusion to Cohen’s criticism of Rawls. By parity of reasoning,
we should be able to defend Rawls by arguing that the “difference principle” and the
commitment to “respect the freedom and equality of persons” are not the same type of
principle. Even though the latter is required in our justification for the former, it does
not follow that “respect the freedom and equality of persons” is a fundamental principle
of justice.
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According to Rawls, justice is about what principles we should adopt to regulate
our institutions that determine the distribution of resources and the assignment of
rights and liberties given that persons see themselves as free and equal and understand
society as a fair system of social cooperation. 280 The principle “respect the freedom and
equality of persons” is not a principle that, on its own, can settle the central problem of
justice. The freedom and equality of persons is instead a normative conception that we
start with and must then be interpreted and reflected in our principles of justice and the
selection procedure for determining them.
Rawls’s two principles of justice, by contrast, do address the central problem of
justice, and should be interpreted as the most basic and fundamental principles we can
appeal to in that domain. 281 As such, these different principles operate at separate
levels and should therefore not be compared against one another as suitable candidates
for a fundamental principle of justice.282
One objection we might make here is that “respect the freedom and equality of
persons” is within the same domain as the difference principle—after all, they are both
normative. However, one consequence of this reply is that we must then deny that
justice is a separate domain of inquiry from the domain of the normative in general.
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JF, 7-8.
Freeman (2009) notes: “What makes a substantive principle of conduct fundamental is not that it is
self-evident or otherwise without normative justification, but that it is the ultimate standard for
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Rawls certainly believes that justice involves a distinct form of practical reasoning, one
that is not simply the result of direct deductive reasoning from basic moral principles. 283
Let me illustrate this disagreement with another analogy with the sciences. We
might think that physics and biology, despite being in the same category of the
“empirical,” may still be separate domains of inquiry and subject to different principles.
That is, just as there are fundamental principles of biology, there are also distinct
fundamental principles of physics, even if we admit that biological principles depend
upon principles of physics. Of course, this is controversial and involves debates within
the philosophy of science about the problem of reductionism and the ontological status
of laws of nature.284 Nevertheless, insofar as we are inclined to see the independence
of the political from the moral, or the independence of the different subjects of the
sciences, we should not accept Cohen’s demonstration as a successful refutation of
Rawls’s fundamental principles of justice.
(b) Our Basic Normative Convictions Must be Interpreted
I now wish to examine the second reply to Cohen’s argument which involves
Rawls’s own stated understanding of how the justification for his principles of justice is

283
Cohen’s methodology may perhaps unearth the fundamental principle of justice within a
consequentialist moral framework more perspicuously, but Rawls would reject that understanding of
justice. I will defend this in the next section.
284
For a general discussion of these problems see McShea, Daniel and Alex Rosenberg. Philosophy of
Biology. Routledge, 2008: 32-64. For a discussion of how all scientific disciplines face the same problems
of finding truly generalizable laws see Cartwright, Nancy. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford University
Press, 1983. And for a defense of the reality of biology “laws” in the form of stable generalizations see
Godfrey-Smith, Peter. Philosophy of Biology. Princeton University Press, 2014: 11-28. If we dislike the
example with biology, we may perhaps use chemistry instead.
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supposed to work. Let me begin with two quotes from Rawls near the final pages of A
Theory of Justice. 285 Rawls says:
The principles of justice are not derived from the notion of respect for
persons….it is precisely these ideas that call for interpretation. 286
Rawls continues:
Once the conception of justice is at hand, however, the ideas of respect
and human dignity can be given a more definite meaning. Among other
things, respect for persons is shown by treating them in ways that they
can see to be justified….The theory of justice provides a rendering of
these ideas but we cannot start out from them. There is no way to avoid
the complications of the original position, or of similar construction, if our
notions of respect and the natural basis of equality are to be
systematically presented. 287
There are several points that are important in these passages. First, Rawls does
not view the principles of justice as being “derived” from notions of respect or
equality. 288 Instead, Rawls requires that these concepts be “interpreted” and
represented in some way. Otherwise, we are left without a clear meaning of these
concepts and little can be deduced from them on their own. To illustrate, many
conceptions of justice—utilitarian, libertarian, egalitarian—assert the importance of
respecting the freedom and equality of persons as foundational for their normative
frameworks. However, it would be somewhat bizarre to claim that all utilitarians,
libertarians and egalitarians therefore agree on the fundamental principles of justice
simply because they all recognize their endorsement of the fact-free normative
285
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commitment to respect the freedom and equality of persons. After all, if everyone
already agrees, then what is everyone debating about, exactly?289
Instead, we should investigate how each conception of justice interprets these
more basic normative judgments and represents them. For instance, many utilitarians
represent the commitment to equality by imagining an impartial spectator as
encompassing everyone’s desires and acting upon them as one unified legislator. 290
This procedure reflects the commitment that each person’s desires should be counted
for equally. Hobbes, on the other hand, represents the freedom and equality of persons
by describing each person as equally capable of destroying one another in a state of
nature in which there are no laws or rules in place to constrain behavior. Rawls, in
contrast, reflects these concepts through the veil of ignorance in the original position.
The OP represents the freedom of persons by assuming that all persons have an interest
in developing their capacity to pursue and, upon reflection, refine their conception of
the good. It expresses their equality by having each person represented in the choice
situation “symmetrically,” by concealing morally arbitrary factors about themselves, in
addition to assuming that each person has an equal voice in the formulation of a public
conception of justice that each person can endorse. 291

Cohen’s answer here is that everyone is debating about how to apply principles of justice to the world.
But would we say that physicists agree on the fundamental principles of physics and merely disagree
about how to apply the principle, “our empirical observations mirror the world?” Perhaps, but it is
difficult to see what is gained by this argumentative strategy.
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Smith, Adam. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie. Oxford University
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Given these diverse ways in which freedom and equality are represented in
different methodological devices, we can see how each perspective highlights different
fundamental features of persons: Hobbes believes the core of who we are is best
represented by our self-interested behavior in the absence of a sovereign authority;
utilitarians believe that the person is fundamentally defined by their desires whatever
they turn out to be; and Rawls believes that we are persons endowed with “two
fundamental powers” to (1) pursue a rational plan of life and (2) develop and act upon a
sense of justice in which we recognize our responsibility for our own ends and endorse
the necessity to govern our socially cooperative activity on terms that are reasonable to
all. 292
This is, of course, not the place for a full argument about the merits of these
different approaches. Our main task here is to demonstrate how the commitment to
the freedom and equality of persons, on its own, cannot settle the question of justice by
means of a kind of “derivation,” as Rawls says. These ideas must be interpreted and
represented into the most appropriate model and tested against numerous other
considered convictions that we have. How we select which decision procedure to use—
the original position or the impartial spectator—will rely upon these other judgments
that we have, including input from other facts about our moral architecture. It does not
make sense to regard any of these elements as the most fundamental aspect of justice,
for they all operate at various levels of our judgment. Rawls believes that it is the
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conclusion to this “reflective equilibrium” between all the elements that determines
what the principles of justice ultimately will be. 293
In reply, Cohen rejects Rawls’s holistic approach to justice, 294 and he believes
that, despite Rawls’s insistence on the importance of reflective equilibrium, if we probe
his architectonic theory deeply enough, a fundamental principle will emerge that
ultimately informs us how to justify all the parts. To illustrate, Cohen first presses us to
articulate the basis upon which we select the original position. He states:
We have to reckon not only with the principles justified by the original
position procedure, but also with the principles that justify that procedure.
Procedure is not ultimate: as Rawls says, not everything is constructed.
And the reason why the constructive procedure is judged appropriate is,
to put the matter simply, that it reflects the ‘conception’ of persons as
free and equal. But that way of conceiving them either embodies or
presupposes a fact-insensitive principle. 295
It is clear that Cohen acknowledges that a conception of free and equal persons will
serve as the baseline in our determination of the original position. Indeed, he argues
that it “embodies” and “presupposes” this “fact-insensitive principle.” So far so good.
We have already addressed this concern. However, he then argues that “it is not
obvious” what justifies the conception of free and equal persons and how this
conception yields our judgements about the original position, and ultimately our
principles of justice. 296 Presumably, Cohen believes that there may be yet another fact-
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free principle that answers these questions, and that, once unearthed, we will be able to
fully justify Rawls’s methodology.
In order to buttress the reply to Cohen’s challenge that I have already provided
above, I will attempt to show, in two parts, that Cohen’s pressings will not yield fruitful
results, and that fundamental principles of justice are not of the foundationalist nature
that Cohen asserts them to be. First, I will attempt to briefly unearth the importance of
our conception of ourselves as free and equal according to Rawls’s “Kantian
Interpretation” in his Theory of Justice. 297 Second, I will turn to Rawls’s more limited
approach to the conception of the person that is political in nature, as developed in
Political Liberalism. 298 Whichever approach we use, the fundamental principle that lies
at Cohen’s “summit” will not be a fundamental principle of justice.
(c) The Kantian Argument
According to Rawls, the selection of the original position is “based upon Kant’s
notion of autonomy,” 299 and that “a person is acting autonomously when the principles
of his action are chosen by him as the most adequate possible expression of his nature
as a free and equal rational being.” 300 When we enter the original position, the veil of
ignorance hides the contingent features of ourselves, such as our particular ends or
desires, so that when we rationally choose principles, we are not acting heteronomously.

See TJ, 221-227. Also see Rawls, John. “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” The Journal of
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That is, we are not selecting principles based on our contingent ends. 301 Instead, we are
selecting principles based upon our fundamental capacity to pursue a rational plan of
life, whatever it happens to be. 302 As such, in the original position, we are all equals,
blinded by our particular ends, and we are acting freely, as we are not bound by them in
our selection of principles. 303
Finally, in addition to having the fundamental capacity to pursue a rational plan
of life, we have the desire to act upon a sense of justice. For Rawls, this desire “derives
from the desire to express most fully what we are or can be, namely free and equal
rational beings with a liberty to choose.” 304 In this sense, our sense of justice is based
upon our desire to express who we fundamentally are when we select and employ our
principles of justice. We do not want our principles to reflect who we might
contingently be, constrained by our particular aims or desires.305 We aim for principles
that express our fundamental nature. 306
We may then present the entire argument as follows:
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Rawls says: “The principles he acts upon are not adopted because of…the specific things that he
happens to want, ” TJ, 222.
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This is how Rawls derives the concern for the primary goods—as they are the goods that anyone would
rationally want, whichever final ends we select for ourselves. TJ, 223.
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Rawls says: “Thus men exhibit their freedom, their independence from the contingencies of nature
and society, by acting in ways they would acknowledge in the original position,” TJ, 225.
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When we act unjustly, Rawls says: “We have acted as though we belonged to a lower order, as though
we were a creature whose first principles are decided by natural contingencies,” TJ, 225.
306
We can contrast this approach with the utilitarian conception of the person which decides principles of
justice, at its core, heteronomously. Even though the impartial spectator represents a kind of equality
between persons, it does not represent their freedom, for the persons are selecting principles based upon
everyone’s particular aims or desires. For Rawls, the move from a single person’s desires to all persons’
desires does not solve the problem. It then just describes a “kingdom of ends” that is heteronomous.
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(1) We are fundamentally autonomous beings who are free and equal.
(2) We desire to select principles of justice that represent our essential
aims, not our contingent ones.
(3) The Original Position utilizes the veil of ignorance to represent
everyone equally and allows us to select principles in accordance with
our freedom.
Therefore,
(4) The Original Position is the best methodological device for
determining principles of justice.
(5) The Difference Principle is the only principle that persons would agree
to in the Original Position to regulate the distribution of resources. 307
Therefore,
(6) The Difference Principle is a fundamental principle of justice.
This is, of course, a long and complex argument, with still yet more premises to be filled
in. 308 Nevertheless, the important stages of the argument have been filled in for our
purposes of answering Cohen’s objection.
Returning to Cohen and his fact-finding mission, what would the fundamental,
fact-free principle of justice be in this long chain of argument? I believe Cohen must
claim that the fundamental principle required to justify the entire string of premises
would be as follows:
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This argument requires arguments that we have already outlined earlier about the importance of
reciprocity and self-respect.
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There are still the “circumstances of justice” and other facts about human nature and society that are
needed to determine what the primary goods will be. I will address the circumstances of justice and
claims about human nature later. In addition, because of Rawls’s commitment to “holism,” it will
generally be very difficult to list all the reasons and considerations that go into the justification for his
principles of justice. I have aimed only to focus on the most central aspects for the purposes of Cohen’s
argument, leaving other elements to be filled in. This should also serve to demonstrate why Rawls does
not generally regard his principles of justice to be based strictly on a deductive proof. Instead, Rawls
thinks we can at most provide “the balance of reasons” in favor of a particular conception, JF, 133-134.
However, Rawls does aim to be able to “present the parties’ reasoning” as “fully deductive, a kind of
moral geometry,” though he admits nevertheless that “our reasoning is highly intuitive and falls far short
of that ideal,” JF, 133.
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P: We ought to represent ourselves as we essentially are and select principles
of justice that reflect our fundamental nature.
Why is this the fundamental fact-free principle? Because when we ask what justifies the
claim that we ought to select principles based upon our autonomy, we must reply with
the claim that we “desire to express most fully what we are.” 309 And so, we arrive at the
pinnacle of our normative judgements to represent ourselves as who we fundamentally
are. 310
It should be apparent that, from the previous arguments outlined before, the
same kinds of objections will be relevant here, so Cohen’s instance that we probe the
depths of our normative judgments will still yield principles that stand in need of
interpretation. For in what sense is the principle “we must represent ourselves as we
essentially are” a fundamental principle of justice? Does it adequately serve as a public
criterion with which to organize our institutions? Can it be appealed to as having final
authority in the distribution of resources? Or is it simply too vague and indeterminate
on its own? These considerations should give us pause with respect to whether our
most basic normative convictions are identical with fundamental principles of justice.

309
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good.
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It may be objected here that Kant was surely able to derive fundamental
normative principles from the autonomy of human beings. After all, the categorical
imperative is supposed to be the supreme principle of morality and is implicit in our
fundamental nature as free and rational creatures. From it, we are able to derive both
our moral duties and the doctrine of Right. However, Rawls parts ways with Kant in this
regard:
The freedom of pure intelligences…are outside the range of the theory.
Kant may have meant his doctrine to apply to all rational beings as such
and therefore that men’s social situation in the world is to have no role in
determining the first principles of justice. If so, this is another difference
between justice as fairness and Kant’s theory. 311
Rawls, instead, attempts to “recast” Kant’s theory “within the scope of an empirical
theory.” 312 This is perhaps because Rawls must have rejected Kant’s account of justice
as being simply an application of the categorical imperative to the empirical world. Or,
he may not have believed that synthetic a priori judgments were possible, or that Kant
could not sufficiently demonstrate that the value of freedom was not based on human
desire. Whatever his reasons, if Rawls rejected these elements, then it would make
sense that he believed that the fundamental nature of justice would have to be
empirical. There would be no other way to proceed. And if this is true, then Cohen’s
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strategy to unearth fact-free principles will eventually lead to a dead end that will
require the input from facts to allow us to proceed any further. 313
(d) The Argument from Political Liberalism
I mentioned that there were two forks we might take in addressing Cohen’s
challenge—to either explore the full Kantian strategy, or to reject it and aim for a more
modest approach based on the arguments from Political Liberalism. Let us examine that
second fork now.
There are numerous problems with the more ambitious approach to justify
Rawls’s conception of justice in an ideal of autonomy and practical agency, 314 the most
important of which that it was not sustainable to premise the conception of the person
on a comprehensive doctrine.315 Rawls believed that there would not be legitimate
grounds for agreement in an overlapping consensus if his conception of justice required
the adoption of a singular account of practical agency as part of the fundamental nature
of persons. Rawls realized this, and, as Paul Guyer points out: “Rawls may have been
wise to eschew any attempt to demonstrate that actual human beings must adopt the
conception of themselves from which his constructivist justification of the principles of
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justice begins.” 316 Instead, Rawls addresses his conception of justice only to people who
already conceive themselves in this way. Guyer continues: “Rawls’s entire argument for
the principles of justice is analytical, beginning with a concept that may or may not be
accepted by any actual human being or beings,” 317 and is “aimed only at making clear to
such people what principles of justice they need to adopt in order to be able to live a
social life that conforms to the conception of a person that each person in a group of
such people wishes be realized for all.” 318
In other words, Rawls’s constructivism is limited to the arguments that follow
from a conception of the person. The conception of the person is simply taken as
given—which for Rawls means in Political Liberalism, contained within the liberal
democratic political culture. 319 As such, it is true that, insofar as people reject this
conception of the person, they will not be inclined to see Rawls’s methodology as
particularly gripping or applicable to them. This does not mean, of course, that we
cannot provide arguments in its favor, or “present it in a very attractive light.” 320 Rather,
it merely means that it “cannot be derived from any non-controvertible premise that
any human being must accept.” 321
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For Rawls, the reasons that we usher in its favor will be based on a variety of
implicit considered convictions and judgements that citizens make in liberal democratic
societies about the centrality of their conception of the good, their capacity to act upon
a sense of justice, and their conception of society as based on fair terms of
cooperation.322 In addition, there will be the recognition of reasonable pluralism and
the burdens of judgment that characterize democratic life, coupled with the realization
that one cannot live in a political society unified by a single conception of the good
without unacceptable state coercion.323 Importantly, these considerations do not rely
upon a particular conception of the good, and can be endorsed in an overlapping
consensus among members within society. 324 When we put all the arguments and
considerations together, we should arrive at a political conception of the person, which
should be seen as the most feasible way to provide coherence to our judgements as
citizens in liberal democratic societies.
What implications does this more modest method of justification have for
Cohen’s strategy against Rawls? Framed in this way, the fact-free fundamental principle
of justice would then have to be a complex multitude of considerations all taken
together that mutually reinforce each other. Perhaps something of the following:
P2: We ought to conceive of ourselves in the most reasonable way—as
one that provides coherence to our judgements within a liberal
democratic society and as one that can serve as the basis for an
overlapping consensus.
322
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To test whether this is truly fundamental, we may again ask if there are any facts that
are required to affirm it. However, as we test the different elements—the limitation on
liberal democratic societies, the concern for coherence, or the desire for an overlapping
consensus—we will find that there will be an interconnecting web of considerations,
none of which is alone at the pinnacle of our convictions. Instead, we will uncover the
importance of justification to others and securing the basis for rational and reasonable
agreement; or, on my own view, a view of justice as realistically utopian. 325
However, these are distinct considered convictions that we have, and it would be
a mischaracterization of them to consider them fundamental principles of justice. We
can return to an illustration with the sciences to conclude this section. If we ask, “What
is the aim of physics?,” we are not asking for the fundamental principles of physics, such
as the Principles of String Theory or Einstein’s Principles of Relativity. We would answer
that physics is about discovering the laws that underlie physical reality. We may also
ask, “What are the methodological constraints on physics?” We may answer that we
should utilize the scientific method to devise principles that are capable of being tested
through observation. And finally, we may ask, “What are some virtues of fundamental
principles of physics?” And we could say that principles ought to be subject to
Ockham’s Razor and should be parsimonious and simplistic. As we can see, none of
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these claims should be confused with fundamental principles of physics which are those
that ultimately describe reality.
Similarly, when we ask, “What is the aim of justice?,” we could answer that it is
to devise principles to regulate the institutions of society that are justifiable to others. If
we ask, “What are the methodological constrains on justice?” We might say that we
should utilize ideal theory to construct a choice-model to test theories of justice against
one another. And finally, if we ask, “What are some virtues of fundamental principles of
justice?” We might say that there are many, and include: the “formal constraints on
the principles of right,” 326 the idea that principles should generate agreement, and that
they should be realistically utopian and feasible for us.327
As we can see, none of these answers are properly “fundamental principles of
justice,” even if some might be fact-free and sit at the summit of our normative
convictions. To be sure, we might disagree about these more basic elements of justice,
just as there is disagreement about whether simplicity is a true virtue of scientific
theories. But we should not confuse disagreement about virtues or methodology with
disagreement about fundamental principles of justice. As such, Cohen’s argumentative
strategy fails to dethrone Rawls’s principles of justice from their status as fundamental
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principles. It merely serves to highlight all the different justificatory elements and
reasons that underlie them.
Leaving Cohen’s more grand strategy behind, we can now consider other
arguments that challenge Rawls’s use of facts to determine his principles of justice.
Briefly though, it is important to emphasize the limited scope of the arguments
presented against Cohen thus far. I have not demonstrated yet that facts should be
included in our determination of principles of justice. I have only shown that Cohen’s
Socratic method of questioning fails to unearth the true fundamental principles of
justice. In other words, the current section addressed the following objection: If you
rely upon a fact to justify a principle of justice, you must also acknowledge a fact-free
principle that is a more fundamental principle of justice. I resisted that conditional
argument. In contrast, the next sections will address a different criticism: Why is Rawls
even relying on certain facts in the first place to justify principles of justice? And so, the
following discussion will be devoted to addressing specific challenges to Rawls’s use of
facts, including the “circumstances of justice,” facts about human nature, and facts
related to the stability requirement on our conception of justice.
III. Rawls and the Relevance of Facts
Empirical facts play a diverse role in the overall structure of Rawls’s work and in
his justification of his principles of justice. They are generally appealed to in three
separate domains: first, facts play a role in determining when concerns of justice even
arise in society--called the circumstances of justice; second, facts appear in the Original

156

Position (and ‘disappear’ behind the veil of ignorance) in order to justify the principles of
justice over alternative conceptions; and third, facts appear in the final stage of
argument when Rawls tests his principles of justice for stability. I will begin with a
discussion of the circumstances of justice before considering the other stages of Rawls’s
arguments for the principles of justice in which facts play a role.
(a) The Circumstances of Justice
According to Rawls, “the first principles of justice depend…on the rather specific
features and limitations of human life that give rise to the circumstances of justice.” 328
The circumstances of justice are those features that are preconditions for the problem
of justice to arise in a society. These are not features that determine what the content
of the principles of justice are, but rather, features that determine when justice itself
emerges.
Rawls states that his understanding of the circumstances of justice does not
depart much from David Hume’s treatment of the idea in his Treatise of Human Nature
and the Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals, so it is natural to begin with Hume’s
discussion. 329
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(i) Limited Resources and Moderate Scarcity
The first feature among the circumstances of justice is the existence of limited
resources, or moderate scarcity. Before justice can arise, there must be sufficient
resources to meet the needs of persons. However, resources cannot be so plentiful
such that there are no genuine conflicts of interests between people. For instance, if
resources poured from the sky like manna from heaven, or if persons could merely
extend their hands into an infinite wellspring of nectar and ambrosia to satisfy their
thirst and appetite, there would be no need for principles of justice to determine the
rules of property. People would simply take what they required without the need to
assert ownership to one another. As Hume asks: “Why call this object mine, when upon
the seizing of it by another, I need but stretch out my hand to possess myself of what is
equally valuable?” 330
One might object that certain things like Shakespearean Sonnets would require
rules to protect them even in a state of abundance, since one could not acquire
something of ‘equal value’ in nature. Hence, we might still require rules to govern
resources generated through “artifice,” even if we did not require rules to govern purely
natural resources such as food, water and shelter. A possible reply could be that either
that nature was so abundant as to naturally produce objects of wonder that satiated our
artistic needs, or that the value of taking a Sonnet from another person would be close

330

Hume (1975): 184.

158

to zero, for one would have no reason not to share the sonnet with you, assuming it is
infinitely reproducible.331
Instead of an absolute abundance of resources in society, we many next consider
whether justice would apply if there was an extreme dearth of resources. In this
scenario, we are to imagine “such want of all common necessities, that the utmost
frugality and industry cannot preserve the greater number from perishing, and the
whole from extreme misery.” 332 Here, neither nature nor the fruits of cooperative
activity would sufficiently provide for the necessities of life. In this scenario, the rules of
property would appear to be fruitless, for there would be no disposition to follow them.
Whatever it was that people needed in this state of scarcity would simply be taken. For
instance, in a shipwreck, people are generally regarded as entitled to take whatever
property that was left behind in order to ensure their survival. 333
Some philosophers, such as Brian Barry, have criticized Hume’s circumstances of
justice as improperly setting the preconditions of justice with respect to scarcity. 334
Barry argues that, even within a condition of extreme scarcity where resources could
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not satisfy the basic needs of persons, there could still be principles of rationing. 335 For
instance, if society were facing a famine or a drought, there could still be restrictive
principles that prevented people from simply taking whatever it was that they needed.
This is because people recognize that maintaining the rule of law would outweigh the
chaos that would ensue if societal rules governing property broke down.
Another analogy one could make to illustrate this point is to examine the
problem that hospitals face when allocating scarce resources to persons who need
organs. Patients recognize that there are insufficient organs to meet the needs of all;
and yet, we do not generally see patients attempting to steal organs from others or
jump the queue when their time runs out. Rather, patients themselves recognize that
there are binding social rules to determine who gets treatment first, even in conditions
where patients stand to suffer or die. Using these examples, one could argue that
Hume’s circumstances of justice are incorrect, for there are, in fact, problems of justice
that arise even within conditions of extreme scarcity.
Simon Hope’s reply to this worry is to state that these examples are simply
“special cases” that arise in society, and are not genuine examples of scarcity that Hume
had in mind. Hope argues: “to make Hume’s point clear, we must imagine the entire
domain of agents facing potential death.” 336 So, instead of a local or temporary scarcity,
we should imagine that the entire world was impoverished such that no social
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cooperation or efficient distribution could forestall the immediate threat of death. It is
in this scenario where no rules governing the institution of property would arise. People
would simply take whatever they could find, wherever they could find it.
Some may still be unconvinced by this line of reasoning. Utilitarians, for instance,
may argue that, despite the extreme scarcity, there can still be an inequality of pain that
members can suffer in this cruel state of affairs. We might think, for example, that an
adult should nonetheless distribute and prioritize resources to children or others who
were sick or injured. On this view, while it might be true that everyone stands to suffer
and die, it does not follow that anything goes. There would still be constraints on our
behavior that relate to the distribution of pain and suffering.
In reply, we should note that neither Hume nor Rawls believes that justice is the
only constraint on our behavior. Hume, for instance, holds that persons still have
natural virtues such as benevolence that may constrain what people do to one another,
even during times of scarcity. For example, if I notice someone at a dried-up river
securing one final cup of water to quench his thirst, I may naturally be unwilling to pry
the cup from his hands, even if I needed water myself. This unwillingness would be
explained by natural virtues, rather than by considerations of justice, and would be the
only limiting constraint on my behavior.
To provide another example, Rawls may argue that we have duties of rescue if
we happen to find ourselves in favorable circumstances to help another. Rawls says we
have “the duty of helping another when he is in need or jeopardy,” so if we see that

161

someone is trapped underneath a tree, and will die unless we help her out, we may be
obligated to do so, even if we need to continue hunting for food. 337 And, by parity of
reasoning, this would not be required out of respect for justice, but because of the
existence of natural duties.
(ii) G.A. Cohen’s Challenge
Despite this division between natural duties and justice, G.A. Cohen still objects
to Rawls and rejects that justice would fail to apply or emerge in cases of extreme
scarcity. 338 In fact, Cohen does not believe that the circumstances of justice have any
meaning whatsoever with respect to what justice requires. Cohen employs two tactics
in his challenge to Rawls. First, he attempts to describe a situation under extreme
scarcity where justice would nevertheless apply. Second, Cohen argues that it is always
possible to describe the requirements of justice, independent of any factual
circumstances that make it impossible or unlikely to be realized.
First, let us examine Cohen’s example. According to Cohen:
There is a rule that respects the general conception [of justice] under
extreme scarcity, to wit, some sort of (deliberatively contrived) lottery. It
may be that most people would be unwilling to introduce that rule or
sustain it or submit to it under scarcity, but that does not make the rule
impossible. Consider what Rawls might say of that rare and powerful
someone who could have seized the only life preserver but who instead
rolled dice to determine who would get it, and who had the power to
enforce his will, which is to say to impose a just, because equal-chances,
337
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structure. Would Rawls say only that he was amazingly generous? Would
he not also say, should he not also say: what a just man he was, to
impose an egalitarian structure to his own detriment, under those
conditions? 339
Cohen’s strategy here is to argue that extreme scarcity does not make it impossible for
someone to realize a duty of justice, which, for Cohen, means to ensure an “equalchances” distribution. If someone were to stumble upon some food and decide to cast
lots for it to ensure that everyone had an equal chance to eat it, what should we say of
that person? Cohen believes that this person is realizing justice in the world—he is not
just expressing the natural virtue of beneficence. In fact, the truly beneficent thing to
do would be as follows: Suppose, after the lots were cast, this person decided to give
the life jacket away to someone else. In this scenario, justice would have already been
fulfilled, and so any further action would be supererogatory.
There are various responses we can make to Cohen here. First, by arguing that
justice is simply the requirement to realize an “equal-chances” distribution of resources,
Cohen is adopting a view of justice that departs from Rawls’s understanding of the idea.
Through his example, we find that Cohen believes that justice applies whenever a
distribution of resources is at stake. And since there are still resources that some people
get and others do not in conditions of extreme scarcity, justice will enact a judgment
upon how those resources are distributed.
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Rawls, in contrast, does not share this “allocative” view of justice. 340 Rawls
believes that “a distribution cannot be judged in isolation,” and that we must know the
relevant background structure by which resources are produced.341 For instance, we
will need to know of “any existing cooperative relations” that determined the
production of goods.342 Otherwise, “there is simply no answer to this question”
regarding what the just distribution of resources is. 343 Merely appealing to the needs
and desires of the individuals is not sufficient for determining the requirements of
justice. Other principles might be appealed to in order to address meeting the needs of
others absent any social cooperation, but justice is not one of them.
Rawls’s resistance to an allocative view of justice is connected to his view that
“justice is the first virtue of social institutions,” and that “the primary subject of justice”
is “the basic structure of society.” 344 On this view, principles of justice are to apply to
institutional structures and not to the individual choices of persons. One of the primary
reasons for this insistence is that justice is about the social relations that exist between
persons within a set of economic, political, and social institutions. Justice does not
concern our relations to human beings as such, or to all persons in the world. The
natural duties cover our relations with other persons, and the principles of mutual aid
and assistance apply to societies across the world. As such, principles of justice will only
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apply in cases where those special cooperative relationships exist that are mediated
through institutions.
Given these two considerations about justice—that it is not allocative (it is
relational), and that it primarily applies to institutions—what can we say about that
“rare and powerful someone” who decides to cast lots for the last life preserver in
Cohen’s example? On Rawls’s view, it does not make sense to call that remarkable
person a just person on the grounds that he realized the principle of “equal-chances” in
the world. Instead, one option might be to argue that what the person did was
supererogatory since he is benefitting others at great cost to himself. 345 However, a
more plausible response is possible. I believe that Rawls would argue that the principle
of casting lots could be a valid principle to adopt, but it would not count as a principle of
justice, and instead would fall under a moral or ethical category. 346 As such, we may call
the person a moral or ethical person, as his behavior would respond to the moral
demands of how we treat others independent of our institutional relationships. We
cannot, however, deem his behavior as “what justice demands,” as there is no special
relationship of social cooperation that can exist without institutions in conditions of
extreme scarcity. 347
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Now, Cohen, aware of the “basic structure objection,” tries to preempt it by
building into his example the fact that the person has “the power to enforce his will”
and impose a just “structure” on society. 348 Hence, we are to understand the example
as one in which a person could forcibly generate institutional structures that would
require the casting of lots for all resources. But this is a poor attempt at satisfying the
core of Rawls’s objection. If I, for example, had the absolute power to impose an
institutional structure on society that complied with the difference principle, this would
not be justice-serving. Justice is not about enforcing one’s will on others to comply with
the difference principle, even if that principle were the correct principle that should
apply to the institutional framework of society. The institutional structures that are in
place must also be “stable for the right reasons,” and must be justifiable to others on
terms they can accept. 349 One person usurping power to impose one’s will on others
through the creation of institutions, even if benevolent, would fail these requirements.
It would be difficult to see how these institutions would be deserving of our support and
allegiance if they did not arise politically and with reinforcing support from citizens.
They would most likely deteriorate shortly after being imposed, rendering the exercise
of one’s powerful will fruitless.
We can now move to Cohen’s second objection to the relevance of extreme
scarcity for the circumstances of justice. Recall that Cohen uses his life-preserver
example to provide a counterexample to Rawls’s insistence that, in conditions of
348
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extreme scarcity, justice would not emerge. However, Cohen’s second tactic is to argue
that, even if justice could never be satisfied due to extreme scarcity, our knowledge of
justice would still be the same—and it would still rightfully “apply” and condemn unjust
circumstances. Cohen states the following two claims: “It will always be possible to
characterize a situation as either just or unjust: it’s false that the question will
sometimes fail to apply.” 350 Continuing, he argues:
Even if, and contrary to what I have argued, there could not be Rawlsian
justice under extreme scarcity, it would not follow that Rawlsian just
rules for such circumstances could not be described, and it therefore
would not follow that we could not describe such circumstances as
productive of injustice.351
Cohen’s claim here is that, even if extreme scarcity makes it impossible for Rawlsian
justice to be realized, justice would still condemn any distributions that failed to realize
the difference principle. In other words, even if there could not be any remarkable
person who had the will to enforce a just distribution, it would not change the fact that
justice still requires a particular distribution to be realized. It may be unfortunate, on
Cohen’s view, that no one is able to realize justice, but we can still conceptually label the
resulting state of affairs as “productive of injustice.”
Cohen is essentially implying that justice is like any other conceptual label we
might utilize. Consider, for instance, the label “green.” If I am describing the clouds, the
fact that clouds can’t be green does not prevent us from being able to say that “green is
not being realized in the clouds.” In other words, the fact that something cannot be
350
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green does not inhibit our ability to label something as failing to achieve greenness. And
likewise, with justice, we can describe a state of affairs as “failing to realize justice,”
even if that state of affairs cannot realize it, especially in conditions of extreme scarcity.
Only a brief reply is in order here, as I will discuss a version of this objection at a
later stage. Cohen is again viewing justice as simply a property of distributions that can
be applied anywhere and in all circumstances, rather than as a relational concept that
arises within certain institutional parameters that form the basis for social cooperation.
In the case of extreme scarcity where institutional rules are impossible, Rawls says that
there is simply no answer to the question of what justice requires in terms of
distributional requirements. Rawls will not say, pace Cohen, that the difference
principle ought to be the distribution of resources across society in conditions of
extreme scarcity, but it is unfortunate that it cannot occur. Instead, Rawls will say that
our behavior will now be subject only to moral or ethical constraints as the conditions
are now substantially different—there is no possibility for regulative institutions. If the
distribution of resources happened to match by mere chance what the difference
principle would have required if institutions were in place, Rawls would have nothing
whatsoever to say about it. Distributions in and of themselves are simply not relevant
to the requirements of justice and the difference principle would not prescribe
distributional outcomes on society in the absence of the relevant institutions.
Continuing, I will now leave our discussion of the relevance of scarcity and
continue to develop our account of the other feature of the circumstances of justice.
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(iii) Limited Altruism
The second feature of the circumstances of justice is the existence of limited
altruism. If humans were constructed to be perfect altruists, such that each person’s
good was contained within everyone else’s, there would be no need for an institution of
property to demarcate one’s possessions from another’s; whatever it was that someone
needed for his good, another would happily extend it to him if he possessed it, for it
would be equally part of his good. As Hume states:
Suppose, that, though the necessities of human race continue the same
as at present, yet the mind is so enlarged, and so replete with friendship
and generosity, that every man has the utmost tenderness for every man,
and feels no more concern for his own interest than for that of his fellows;
it seems evident, that the use of justice would, in this case, be suspended
by such an extensive benevolence, nor would the divisions and barriers of
property and obligation have ever been thought of. 352
The central idea is that, since there would be no genuine conflicts of interests in a
society composed of perfect altruists, justice would never need to be “thought of” to
resolve them.
On the other hand, if persons were so selfish such that they lived in a “society of
ruffians” who exhibited such “a disregard to equity, such contempt of order, such stupid
blindness to future consequences” that social cooperation would be impossible, people
would simply take whatever it was they needed to pursue their own aims.353 Persons in
such an unfortunate state of affairs would only “consult the dictates of self-preservation
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alone.” 354 In such conditions, justice would fail to constrain the choices of individuals as
they would be unable to see social cooperation and property ownership as possible or
available to them. There would be no disposition to follow any of the rules to govern
them.
(iv) An Ambiguity About Justice
Cohen raises objections to the condition of limited altruism that are similar to
the ones presented in our discussion of moderate scarcity, so we will not rehearse them
here.355 Instead, I wish to draw attention to an important ambiguity in Rawls about the
relationship between justice and altruism and whether or not justice would truly fail to
apply in a society composed of perfect altruists.
Recall earlier in our discussion of ideal theory that Rawls argues that the
principle of utility would more accurately be a principle applicable to “perfect
altruists.” 356 We discussed the hypothetical scenario in which humans were constructed
like bees or ants, and were prosocial to the point of regarding the good of oneself to be
equivalent to the good of all. In such a scenario, Rawls argues that the most appropriate
principle to guide institutions and behavior would be the principle of utility, as it would
best fit their motivational structures.
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However, we are now faced with the following dilemma: if society were
composed of perfect altruists, and humans were akin to bees or ants 357, we must either
say that (a) the principle of utility is the correct principle of justice for them, or that (b)
justice does not apply. According to the circumstances of justice argument, justice
should not apply at all; however, according to Rawls’s rejection of utilitarianism, justice
would apply in such a scenario, but it would be the principle of utility. How shall we
resolve this ambiguity?
I believe the correct response to this problem requires us to formulate an
answer to the following questions: (1) Would citizens in this society view it as a system
of social cooperation? and, (2) Would there be a relevant distinction between the
“Right” and the “Good?” 358 The answer to (1) seems to be yes. Bee and ant-like
persons would view society as a system of social cooperation, except that the society
would be organized around a single dominant end—the greatest good of all—rather
than a multiplicity of different ends. Because of this, the political community would be
similar to a communitarian or perfectionistic one in which the cohesion of the group
would be contingent upon a shared conception of the good.
However, we might also think that a society of perfect altruists could support
persons with a multitude of different ends to pursue. The idea would be that, while
pluralism would be accepted, everyone would always be ready and willing to sacrifice
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their own good to enable others to pursue their projects. However, it is difficult to see
how it could be genuinely possible for persons to pursue a conception of their own good
if it is constantly threatened by the needs of others. 359 The perpetual disruptions would
make it particularly difficult to have one’s own plan of life, and so the society may agree
that the best thing for them would be to organize around a dominant end. The
possibility of pursuing one’s own rational plan of life would therefore drop out
altogether.
Regardless of how we interpret the way in which perfect altruism would be
realized, it seems clear that citizens would regard their interactions with others as part
of a socially cooperative endeavor to maximize the good. This, however, means that the
answer to question (2) seems to be no; there would be no relevant distinction between
the Right and the Good. They would be synonymous. And given that justice is primarily
conceived of as a matter of right, there would be no reason to think that matters of
justice would arise in a society of perfect altruists.
If justice is not possible, then how should we make sense of Rawls’s claim that
the principle of utility would apply to them? The best way to interpret Rawls here is
that the principle of utility would not be a principle of justice, but an ethical or moral
principle that governs their relations. It would be part of their natural duties toward
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others. This interpretation would also explain why Rawls also says that the principle of
utility is the “ethic of perfect altruists.” 360
Our discussion here has important implications for how we should interpret the
circumstances of justice. While most interpretations see them as depicting the
necessary conditions for social cooperation (Rawls) or the necessary conditions to
develop the disposition to obey rules of property (Hume), we should also add the
further justification—namely, to provide the necessary conditions for persons to
recognize a distinction between the Right and the Good itself.
(v) Recap of Circumstances of Justice
In addition to the aforementioned reasons, the two circumstances of justice—
limited altruism and moderate scarcity—rule out the existence of justice in either
strongly utopian or dystopian societies.361 In societies where people are blessed with a
limitless abundance of resources or exhibit boundless generosity, or in societies where
there exists a paucity of goods and a preponderance of hostile feelings that render
cooperation impossible, the “cautious, jealous virtue” 362 of justice would not arise. In
this regard, justice itself lies within the domain of a realistic utopia. If we are dealing
with a utopian society—justice will have no purpose—and if we have a brutally realistic
society in which people must largely fend for themselves, justice will be in vain.
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Put in the context of ideal theory, the circumstances of justice describe “features
of the world no plausible conception of justice can idealize away.” 363 To attempt to find
a basis for agreement in such idealized conditions would be without purpose and would
not solve the particular problem of how to devise principles of justice to dictate fair
terms of cooperation among free and equal citizens who have an interest in pursuing a
rational plan of life and developing a sense of justice. In either utopian or dystopian
societies, people will not identify with these stated purposes of justice and will instead
employ other normative principles to guide and regulate their behavior, if possible.
(b) Facts in the Original Position
Now that we have discussed the importance of facts which precondition the
emergence of justice itself, we can now move on to describe the general facts that are
invoked in the Original Position to argue for the principles of justice. The way in which
this section is organized is as follows: first, I describe a general account of the facts that
are permitted and the rationale behind their inclusion or exclusion; and second, I
describe facts about human nature and their importance for understanding Rawls’s
project. I conclude by responding to objections by G.A. Cohen and David Estlund.
(i) Justification for Inclusion and Exclusion of Facts in the OP
One of the most prominent places where facts are discussed with respect to the
justification of principles of justice occurs within Rawls’s discussion of the original
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position and the veil of ignorance. 364 The original position is a model, or hypothetical
standpoint, that represents the appropriate conditions in which representatives of free
and equal persons rationally deliberate about the principles of justice for society. The
“appropriate conditions” under which this deliberation should occur are, in part,
stipulated by our conception of ourselves as free and equal, and is reflected in the veil
of ignorance.
The veil of ignorance notoriously shields parties from significant information
about the persons they represent—such as facts about their conception of the good,
their class and level of wealth, their talents and personality, and the special
circumstances of their society. While we recognize that these facts are important to us,
we recognize that this information may bias and distort the selection of the principles of
justice. Rawls says: “Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific contingencies
which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to
their own advantage…In order to do this I assume that the parties are situated behind a
veil of ignorance.” 365
Hence, the central idea is that such information, if it were not hidden, would give
individuals powerful bargaining power and leverage over other members by enabling
them to exploit their natural talents, wealth, and social standing to negotiate better
principles for themselves. In this sense, the veil of ignorance is a tool to ensure that the
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outcome of the deliberations in the original position is fair and not affected by morally
arbitrary features.
In addition, the OP and the veil of ignorance is said to mirror our conception of
ourselves as free and equal. 366 It reflects our freedom in the sense that it represents—
as one of our higher order interests—our freedom to pursue and revise a conception of
the good. It also reflects our equality by representing each person in the same way—as
having the two moral powers and having a fundamental interest in developing them. As
such, by imposing a veil of ignorance on the parties, the principles of justice that would
result would truly reflect reasons that stem from our fundamental conception of
ourselves as free and equal—and not contingent features of our society or situation.
From this analysis, we can see that Rawls is primarily concerned with at least two
features when determining which facts to include or exclude in our deliberations: (1)
achieving fair terms of deliberation, and (2) representing ourselves as free and equal.
However, this now presents us with a question: Do we need to consult any other facts?
Can’t parties in the original position determine the correct principles of justice simply
from the fact that we are free and equal persons, endowed with two moral powers to
pursue a conception of the good and develop a sense of justice? Wouldn’t the
consideration of other facts be “morally arbitrary” as they would not reflect our
fundamental and higher order interests?
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Rawls’s answer to this question is no, and there are two reasons for this. First,
Rawls does not believe that we will have a sufficient basis for agreement on principles
without additional facts available to the parties. Rawls says: if we abstract too much,
“the conception [of the original position] would cease to be a natural guide to intuition
and would lack a clear sense.” 367 For example, if we did not know that humans required
energy to navigate the world and pursue their conception of the good, it is not clear that
parties would agree that income and wealth would be part of the bundle of primary
goods in need of distribution in society. After all, what would they agree upon instead if
they did not know this fact? Or, to provide an example from Kant, our conception of
property and the principles that govern it are wholly dependent upon the fact that
human beings live on a finite globe in which we must share physical spaces with other
beings.368 Absent this fact about the earth, our conception of property itself would be
radically different. As these examples illustrate, Rawls believes that we must consult
additional facts in order to provide a sufficient basis for agreement in the original
position. Otherwise, our deliberations would be indeterminate.
Second, as we have discussed in our discussion on ideal theory, Rawls believes
that the principles of justice selected in the original position must be stable. Rawls says:
An important feature of a conception of justice is that it should generate
its own support. Its principles should be such that when they are
embodied in the basic structure of society men tend to acquire the
corresponding sense of justice and develop a desire to act in accordance
367
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with its principles. In this case, a conception of justice is stable. This kind
of general information is admissible in the original position. 369
According to Rawls then, if we do not have facts available to us to test for stability, the
hypothetical exercise in the original position would be futile, as it would not solve a
central problem of justice, which is to find principles that citizens can endorse and affirm.
It is a pointless task to derive principles of justice based solely on a conception of
freedom and equality alone without any knowledge as to whether such a conception of
justice would be able to gain the support of persons. Hence, we need to consult
additional facts to make the stability test determinate.
What kinds of facts are needed to generate a sufficient basis for agreement and
to test for stability? Rawls says:
As far as possible, then, the only particular facts which the parties know is
that their society is subject to the circumstances of justice and whatever
this implies. It is taken for granted, however, that they know the general
facts about human society. They understand political affairs and the
principles of economic theory; they know the basis of social organization
and the laws of human psychology. 370
We can see clearly from this statement that there are three categories of facts that
Rawls believes are permitted in the original position: (1) facts that “give rise to the
circumstances of justice,” which we have already discussed, (2) facts produced by the
empirical sciences about the world and the workings of society, and (3) facts about
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human nature and human psychology. 371 It is these facts about human psychology and
human nature that are the most important for the stability test.
However, it is important to note that these facts must be general facts, and not
particular facts about specific human beings or societies. We do not test the principles
of justice based on each person’s unique psychology or personality. 372 Instead, the
original position only contains general facts about human beings and societies as such.
This is to ensure that parties in the original position do not exploit these facts for their
own advantage when selecting principles. To illustrate, if I know, for instance, that I
have a cunning personality, I will attempt to use this information as leverage when it
comes to debating which liberties I should afforded, or how resources should be
distributed. I might argue, for example, that the difference principle is unnecessary for
me since my cunning nature would allow me to deceive others into attaining higher
positions of power in society. As a result, Rawls denies particular psychological facts
about persons in the original position, but allows general facts.
In contrast, we do not typically think that knowledge of general empirical laws
generates objectionable biases in our reasoning about what fair terms of social
cooperation are, or what rights and liberties we think people should be afforded. This is
because these laws apply to everyone equally. Of course, we know that scientific laws
may lead to eventual harm or misfortune to specific persons—say, lightning striking a
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tree and falling on you, or the genetic lottery dealing you a deleterious mutation that
causes significant disease—but the point is that we do not know who will be harmed or
benefitted from these general laws; the veil of ignorance shields this information from
us. It is in this sense that the general facts are tolerable in the original position—their
effects upon us are unknown, and so we cannot use them for our particular benefit. 373
A further restriction imposed on the general facts available to persons in the
original position is that they must be publicly accessible. According to this “publicity
condition,” the principles of justice and their full justification must be transparent to all
persons in society. 374 All persons must be able to discern the reasons upon which the
principles of justice are based, and they must understand and have access to the facts
that determine the selection of these principles.
The explanation for the publicity condition is threefold for Rawls. First, if citizens
are to be coerced through sanctions imposed by the basic institutions of society, then
the principles that organize them should be publicly available as a way of justifying that
coercion. Otherwise, people will challenge and reject those principles, leading to
instability. Second, social institutions have a significant role in determining how citizens
shape their wants, desires and aspirations. In order for people to adequately plan and
373
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take responsibility for their conception of the good, people must have the ability to
assess and evaluate the principles that regulate their institutions that have a significant
impact on their plan of life; and third, Rawls believes that it is a “precondition of
freedom” to have knowledge about the rules and principles that govern social life.375
What Rawls means by this is that, if the justification of principles were not sufficiently
public, then the maintenance of society would depend upon “delusions” or an “ideology”
of “false consciousness” to support them.376 This would be an unacceptable basis for
our principles and would not yield a suitably stable conception of justice. To summarize,
Rawls says:
If institutions rely on coercive sanctions…and influence people’s deepest
aspirations, the grounds and tendency of these institutions should stand
up to public scrutiny….Publicity ensures…that free and equal persons are
in a position to know and to accept the background social influences that
shape their conception of themselves as persons, as well as their
character and conception of their good. 377
Putting all these conditions together, we can now claim that the facts that are
permitted in the original position are the following: (1) facts that express our
commitment to freedom and equality, (2) facts that do not create unfair bargaining
power between citizens, (3) facts that are relevant for the stability test regarding the
principles of justice, (4) facts that are publicly accessible, and (5) general facts about
human nature, the empirical sciences, and human societies.
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With these conditions, Rawls believes that he will be able to provide a sufficient
basis for agreement on principles of justice that reflect his commitment to a realistic
utopia. It is realistic in the sense that he allows facts to constrain our principles based
upon human nature and the empirical world; however, it is utopian in the sense that he
employs a moral conception of the person as free and equal as a starting point, and
aims to show how principles of justice can be chosen that reflect this normative ideal. It
is realistically utopian in the sense that these principles of justice and the moral ideal on
which they are based are compatible and feasible for us given facts about who we are
and the world in which we live.
In the following sections, I will now answer a series of objections by various
philosophers who have rejected Rawls’s reliance upon facts to argue for principles of
justice, including objections by G.A. Cohen and David Estlund.
(ii) G.A. Cohen’s and David Estlund’s Challenge to the Stability Condition
According to G.A. Cohen, Rawls’s concern with stability is misguided and is
irrelevant for our understanding of justice. Cohen states:
To treat the evident desideratum of stability as a constraint on what
justice might be thought to be, to judge that principles qualify as
principles of justice only if, once instituted, their rule has a propensity to
last, is absurd. 378
Cohen provides two central arguments for this claim. First, Cohen does not believe that
the stability requirement allows us to make sense of the fragility of justice, and that the
following utterance would be nonsensical: “’This society is at the moment just, but it is
378
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likely to lose that feature very soon: justice is such a fragile achievement.’” 379 He thinks
this is true because stability is built into the very idea of justice itself: “it is true by
definition that there is no danger that justice won’t last. And that is absurd.” 380
In order to reply to Cohen’s criticism, we need to separate two different states of
affairs: the well-ordered society, and the non-ideal world. In the well-ordered society, it
is true that justice is stable. This is part of its appeal to us. However, this does not
mean that there will not be threats to it—partial tendencies to injustice will inevitably
occur due to the burdens of judgment, and other limitations of human nature. For
instance, Rawls recognizes the real possibility that “an intolerant sect comes to exist
within a well-ordered society.” 381 However, Rawls believes that there will be internal
mechanisms in society that will aid in the conversion of the intolerant sect to becoming
a tolerant one. Rawls says: “This persuasion works on the psychological principle that
those whose liberties are protect by and who benefit from a just constitution will, other
things equal, acquire an allegiance to it over a period of time.” 382
In other words, the intolerant sect will come to see, through time, the benefits of liberty
and will eventually come to acknowledge it as a principle of justice. Hence, what makes
a well-ordered society stable, for Rawls, is the following: “Stability means that when
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tendencies to injustice arise, other forces will be called into play that work to preserve
the justice of the whole arrangement.” 383
Despite these equilibrium forces, Rawls would certainly recognize that the wellordered society is not immune from dissolution. Significantly unfavorable circumstances
may make it simply impossible for it to survive. For example, a series of natural
disasters may disrupt the workings of institutions, weakening their effects on the
psychologies of the future generations of children who may not grow up to see the
benefits of them. Since a society depends upon its future generations to witness and
experience the reasonableness of just institutions, if this is made impossible for a long
enough period of time, the future generations will likely be set back and unjust
institutions may arise. As such, it is quite possible for citizens in the well-ordered
society to proclaim that “justice is such a fragile achievement.” It is not, pace Cohen,
“true by definition that there is no danger that justice won’t last.” Citizens would
recognize that well-ordered does not mean that it is guaranteed to remain so, and that
the uncertainties of the world may conspire against its persistence.
Despite some fragility to the well-ordered society, the power and force of
Rawls’s conception of justice derives from the fact that it is not so fragile that it ceases
to motivate us or provide us with genuine and reasonable hope in the non-ideal world.
When a society is thrown into disarray and chaos, we can know that, when the dust
settles, and nature’s forces finally wane, the well-ordered society will still stand as a
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beacon of hope that can unshakably serve to motivate and ease our frustrations with
the unpredictability of the world. This is because we recognize that it is, at its core,
compatible with our fundamental interests and our moral conception of ourselves. In
the right favorable circumstances, and with enough perseverance, it is fundamentally
achievable for us.
As such, the citizens in the non-ideal world recognize the difficulty of achieving
justice, and would assert the following claim: injustice is very robust. They recognize
that the steps required to achieve justice will be met with numerous false starts and
disappointments. However, they would simultaneously assert that justice is also very
robust. If it were not, and if it was viewed as fundamentally fragile as to be essentially
brittle, it would lose its value and importance for us. We would see no reason to aim for
it or strive to realize it.
We can now turn to Cohen’s second criticism of the stability condition. Cohen
states the following:
To reject a presumptive principle of justice precisely and solely because it
is unworkable (as a rule of regulation) is to endorse it as a principle of
justice…Why does Rawls assign a defect to that conception of
justice…rather than to people’s moral capacities? Is it an axiom that
human beings are capable of justice? Is ‘original sin’ a contradiction in
terms?” 384
Here Cohen asserts that, if we recognize a principle of justice to adequately reflect all of
our considered convictions about justice, but only fails the stability test, we should
thereby conclude that we have found the true principle of justice and that it is our
384
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human nature that is flawed. After all, if such a principle adequately gives shape to our
moral conception of ourselves, why would we reject it simply because it was
incompatible with human nature? Why isn’t the correct response to condemn our
nature and bemoan its frailty?
Recall that one main reason for the rejection of utilitarianism was that it failed
the stability test—it was shown to be incompatible with our moral motivations in that
we could not expect citizens to adhere to its mandates over time. The implication of
Cohen’s view would then be the opposite conclusion: Instead of condemning the
principle, we ought to condemn the human race for failing to be a society of bees with a
hive-mind psychology.
David Estlund voices a similar criticism of Rawls’s reluctance to criticize human
nature’s imperfections. 385 Estlund argues that it is part of our normative framework to
condemn features of ourselves that we find abhorrent and that Rawls’s reliance upon
human nature to influence our stability judgments is mistaken. Estlund argues:
“Rawls’s doctrine…silences concerns about whether some motivational
structures—however much they might be part of our natures—might be
justice-tainting rather than justice-shaping.” 386
To illustrate his point, Estlund argues that Rawls’s method forces us to make the
following absurd argument:
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People tend to a certain degree of cruelty, and this is part of what they
are motivationally like as a matter of human nature. (Suppose this is so.)
Therefore, requirements to be otherwise are specious and false. 387
On Estlund’s view, Rawls must allow the parties in the original position to have access to
this information when they test the principles for stability. As such, we might find the
requirement to secure the equal basic liberties for all persons to be utterly infeasible for
human beings because their cruelty would make it motivationally difficult for them to
endorse it. They would recognize their desire to dominate and subjugate others, and so
they would not accept a principle that required them to deny their basic human nature.
As a final blow to Rawls, Estlund then asks us to consider a hypothetical problem
of envy and its potential “justice-tainting” properties. 388 Estlund says:
Suppose that it is part of human nature that people who recognize their
own superior talents will tend to resent and envy people who are, owing
to the operation of social institutions, as well-off as they are but without
as much talent and ability. 389
Estlund believes that, if this were true, the difference principle would generate too
much envy among the talented and gifted, and so it would be rejected. In such a
hypothetical case, Estlund believes that Rawls’s methodology would instead
recommend principles of justice that “apportion the distribution of social goods
according to levels of talent and ability” and that this would then “constitute perfect
social justice.” 390
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Given these problems, Estlund concludes that “it is never a feature’s status as
characteristic of humans by nature that constrains the concept of justice,” 391 and that
“the rules and institutions that should be constructed given what is known about
everyone’s likely compliance are hardly guaranteed to be rules and institutions that
qualify a society as just.” 392 As such, Estlund believes we should reject the stability test
if it permits us to illegitimately smuggle in objectionable features of human nature into
our determination of principles of justice. Estlund believes we have independent moral
reasons for criticizing or affirming these motivational features of human nature. We can,
for instance, condemn the selfishness or the narrow-mindedness of human psychology
rather than resign oneself to it at the level of fundamental normative principles. While
the application of these principles must take these features into consideration, the
utmost peak of our normative framework should steer clear from them.
Cohen corroborates Estlund’s position in his final pithy remark:
The flesh may be weak, but one should not make a principle out of that. 393
(iii) Rawls’s Reply to Cohen and Estlund
My reply to these criticisms will be separated into two parts. First, I will argue
that the features of human nature that we find most problematic—our tendency toward
cruelty, envy, or our desire for power and domination over others—are actually “special
psychologies” that we do not have good reasons to believe would exist in dangerous
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levels in the well-ordered society.394 As such, we would not permit them in the original
position as a basis for the selection of our principles of justice. In the second part, I will
argue that Rawls does have the tools to criticize features of human nature if it turns out
that humans would be so disfigured as to be truly unfit for justice in Rawls’s sense.
Let us begin with the first claim, that the special psychologies will not exist to a
large extent in the well-ordered society, and that they should also not be included in the
original position. According to Rawls, “a rational individual is not subject to envy, at
least when the differences between himself and others are not thought to be the result
of injustice and do not exceed certain limits.” 395 Rawls also says that the “various
tendencies to dominate or to submit” will also be mitigated for similar reasons. 396 The
central argument for this conclusion is that many of our beliefs about our basic
psychological attitudes are actually the result of injustice in the world, and are likely to
fade away under just institutions.397
To illustrate, Rawls argues that a well-ordered society governed by the
difference principle would not largely consist of individuals with strong desires to
accumulate more wealth. Rawls states that the desire for wealth typically results “from
insecurity and anxiety,” and that “to the extent that just institutions alleviate these
394
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psychological conditions, they reduce the strength of the quest for wealth and
position.” 398 As such, we do not have reasons to believe that these desires are general
features of human beings, or even if they were, they would not be so pronounced as to
pose a threat to the stability of our institutions. Hence, Rawls argues that we should not
allow the parties in the original position to be affected by them.
However, even if we challenged Rawls on this point, Rawls also argues that
including the special psychologies in the original position would pose a further problem
for the deliberators. At the very least, there would be great uncertainty as to how much
persons would be affected by them. Rawls says, “without rather definite information
about which configuration of attitudes existed, one might not be able to say what
agreement if any would be reached.” 399 Given this problem, we must “avoid the
complications in the bargaining process that would result.” 400 And so, “for reasons both
of simplicity and moral theory, I have assumed an absence of envy and a lack of
knowledge of the special psychologies.” 401
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We can also frame Rawls’s point in another way. Recall that one of the
limitations on the facts allowed in the original position is that they must satisfy the
publicity criterion. If there would be no consensus on the general facts about our
liability to envy or other special psychologies, we cannot appeal to them. As such, it
would be preferable to withhold them from the parties, for otherwise the full
justification for the principles of justice would not be available to all persons.
However, one worry for Rawls’s strategy here might be that our criteria for what
should be included as a special psychology is now too stringent. Could we not argue
that all claims about human nature are controversial and liable to be part of a special
psychology? And if so, how could we justify relying upon any claims about human
nature at all? To provide some plausibility to this, consider the range of views from
prominent biologists as well as philosophers of science about the matter.
According to Michael Ghiselin:
What does evolution teach us about human nature? It tells us that
human nature is a superstition. 402
And David Buller argues:
The idea of a universal human nature is deeply antithetical to a truly
evolutionary view of our species…A truly evolutionary psychology should
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abandon the quest for human nature and with it any attempt to discover
universal laws of human psychology. 403
And finally, Tim Lewens argues:
Many philosophers of biology today think about human nature in the
same way that they think about race. Race is commonly regarded as
having no basis in biological reality, and the same, it is sometimes said,
goes for human nature. 404
This is, of course, not the place to engage in these extensive debates. However, I
believe Rawls can largely deflect these more skeptical views about human nature when
we consider what Rawls actually includes when he discusses the general facts about
human nature.
Let us examine, for instance, the sense of justice which is perhaps the most
central psychological capacity that human beings have, as it includes the capacity for
reciprocity, which entails tit-for-tat motivations and “a tendency to answer in kind.” 405
According to Rawls:
A capacity for a sense of justice built up by responses in kind would
appear to be a condition of human sociability….Beings with a different
psychology either have never existed or must soon have disappeared in
the course of evolution. 406
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In other words, Rawls argues that the very foundation for social cooperation as we
know it rests upon human beings having a capacity for reciprocity. Otherwise,
coordination would not be possible for us and societies as we know them would not
exist. Rawls also invokes the theory of evolution to explain how persons who
cooperated with a sense of justice were more likely to form stable unions that persisted
over time than those groups who did not.407 He even argues that social groups that had
more utilitarian psychologies could not be stable for “its members would risk
domination” by other social groups that would emerge to take advantage of their
universal benevolence. 408
Of course, Rawls merely stating these features of human psychology does not
make them true, as they are largely empirical conjectures.409 However, the level of
skepticism about human nature in general should not be understood to apply to these
more basic elements that are viewed as preconditions for our capacity to view society as
a system of social cooperation based on reciprocity. If this turned out to be false, the
entire conception of justice would need to be entirely recast. As Rawls states:
A person who lacks a sense of justice lacks certain fundamental attitudes
and capacities included under the notion of humanity….there is no way
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for us to avoid a liability to them [moral feelings] without disfiguring
ourselves. 410
As such, we cannot plausibly suspend judgement upon these features of human nature,
as they are intricately connected with our moral conception of ourselves as being
fundamentally reasonable creatures capable of restraining our behavior based on
considerations of reciprocity. To deny this about ourselves would be to say that humans
are not, in fact, capable of justice as we know it at all. Hence, Rawls argues:
It is hard to imagine realistically any new knowledge that should convince
us that these ideals are not feasible, given what we know about the
general nature of the world. 411
Consequently, for Rawls, there is little reason to be skeptical of these more general
features of human nature. 412
This completes the first stage of my reply to Cohen and Estlund. The central idea
is that we should not expect the special psychologies of envy or the desire to dominate
others to be destabilizing forces in the well-ordered society, and that there are certain
empirical generalizations of human nature that are plausible for Rawls to appeal to in
the original position to argue for the stability of principles of justice.
We must now turn to the second stage of my reply, for Cohen and Estlund are
also making a much deeper criticism of Rawls’s reliance upon facts related to stability,
human nature and feasibility to argue for his principles of justice. Their argument is not
410
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simply that envy or cruelty might taint the principles of justice in our world. Rather, it is
the stronger claim that we would not be able to condemn it as a flaw of human nature if
it turned out to be endemic to human life in some other possible world. As Estlund
argues, if, hypothetically, human beings were so envious of others that they could not
tolerate the difference principle, we should not acquiesce to the frailty of human nature
and revise our conception of justice. We should instead condemn it as an utmost
affront to justice. It is this more radical claim that I must reply to now.
Implicit in both Estlund’s and Cohen’s criticism is that our conception of justice
can be “hopelessly” unattainable if it turns out that human nature is not up to the
challenge to meet its demands.413 However, Rawls makes the opposite conclusion.
Rawls does not believe that a conception of justice must always be a slave to our more
demanding moral ideals about what kinds of creatures we ought to be. Rawls says:
A political conception must be practicable, fall under the art of the
possible. This contrasts with a moral conception that is not political: a
moral conception may condemn the world and human nature as too
corrupt to be moved by its precepts and ideals. 414
So, Rawls does acknowledge that human nature may be judged to be fundamentally
corrupt or morally bankrupt. However, these pronouncements must be a part of our
conception of the good and cannot be a part of the political realm. The reason for this is
because a conception of justice must be fundamentally achievable for us. It is part of
Rawls’s vision of a realistic utopia that our conception of justice is possible and capable
413
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of generating agreement among reasonable and rational persons. If our conception of
justice itself condemned human nature, it would not be possible for persons to
rationally agree upon it. After all, what purpose would it serve other than to make it
impossible to “reconcile” ourselves with the world? 415 How could we expect persons to
develop the requisite motives to affirm it without trouncing upon the freedom of
others? 416
And so, to answer Estlund’s claim about envy, if it were hypothetically possible
that human beings were too envious of others to endorse the difference principle, the
principles of justice would have to be recast. Again, Rawls vehemently denies this
possibility 417, and it would only be a theoretical exercise. 418 And, since it is only a
theoretical point, it should have no bearing on the thoroughly practical components of
justice.
However, there is one caveat to Rawls’s claim here, and Cohen and Estlund may
take solace in his words:
If a reasonably just society…is not possible, and human beings are largely
amoral, if not incurably cynical and self-centered, one might ask with
Kant whether it is worthwhile for human beings to live on the earth.419
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It might seem as if Rawls is contradicting himself in these two statements. After all,
shouldn’t Rawls concede that, if human beings were entirely selfish that different
principles of justice should apply to them? Principles that, in a sense, “fit their nature?”
Rawls’s answer here is that, if human nature does not even afford the basic
materials to allow humans to be governed by the reasonable, it would be pointless to
attempt to constrain their behavior by justice. The sense of justice would not exist in
these persons, and it would therefore be impossible for all persons to be able to pursue
their conception of the good in this world with any degree of security. Such persons
would forever live in fear of others and would likely die alone and in misery. Such a
world would be akin to Hobbes’s state of war, in which life was “solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short.” 420 In this world, Rawls would join the chorus of Cohen and Estlund,
condemning the miserable fate of humanity, for it would turn out that the higher-order
interests of all persons would be permanently left unfulfilled and no principles of justice
could ever be affirmed to secure them.
However, if Rawls’s empirical musings and conjectures are at all accurate, our
worry about whether such humans would be fit for the earth would quickly be
answered—Rawls believes such beings would quickly die out as their capacity for social
life would be impossible. The forces of evolution would eliminate them from the earth,
sparing us the thought of such unfortunate creatures.
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To answer Cohen’s claim then, if the flesh is weak, our conception of justice will
likely mitigate those weaknesses; if the flesh is still weak, we may need to revise our
principles of justice; but if the flesh is too weak, then such creatures would not be fit for
justice and would not be long for this world.
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Chapter 6: Embracing a Hopeful Ideal
I. Resisting Hopeless Ideals
David Miller, in the conclusion to his book, Justice for Earthlings, urges us not to
succumb to the idea of “political philosophy as lamentation,” according to which the
task of political philosophy is to cling to hopeless ideals in defiance against the world.421
Miller’s target is the political philosophy of the late G.A. Cohen, as well as David Estlund,
who both assert in differing degrees that the demands of justice are independent of our
flawed human nature, our corrupted society, and the circumstances of the world which
make justice fundamentally infeasible for us. According to this philosophical orientation,
all facts about human nature and society are contingent and morally arbitrary
distractions that prevent us from fully grasping the true essence of justice which resides
in a “Heavenly City,” never to be reached by mere mortals such as ourselves. 422 In
contrast, the “Earthly City,” where imperfect human creatures reside, should be
lamented and condemned for failing to realize the high demands of justice from above,
perpetually reminding us of our frailty and fundamental weaknesses.
According to Miller, such a view of the world is a “pathological” response to our
shaken and defeated moral aspirations when confronted with the realization that there
is no place on earth in which such aspirations can be fulfilled. 423 Instead of relinquishing
Miller, David. Justice for Earthlings. Oxford University Press, 2013: 228-249.
Miller borrows the idea of the Heavenly City and the Earthly City from Augustine’s City of God in which
Augustine argues that justice could never be achieved in the earthly city, and that it resided in the City of
God instead. Miller (2013): 228-230.
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these ideals, we project them, unscathed, onto a distant utopia. By placing these ideals
forever out of reach, we, in a final effort to forestall defeat, “rescue justice and equality”
by enshrining them in a timeless and sacrosanct city, never to be ransacked or
destroyed again.
Miller believes that this escape now turns political philosophy into a “purely
speculative activity,” 424 detached with concerns of feasibility and achievability, and
tainted with undertones of resignation, lamentation, and perhaps even resentment.
Consider the almost iconic statement from Cohen:
The question for political philosophy is not what we should do but what
we should think, even when what we should think makes no practical
difference. 425
And so, we think, contemplate, and muse on perfect justice. If our penetrating thoughts
reveal that justice condemns the world and humanity, that is to be our fate; we are
forever bound to its demands. Here is Cohen, again:
In believing that justice must be so crafted as to be bottom-line feasible,
they believe that it is possible to achieve justice, and I am not so sanguine.
It follows from my position that justice is an unachievable (although a
nevertheless governing) ideal. 426
David Estlund supports Cohen’s outlook and defends an approach to political philosophy
which he calls “hopeless aspirational theory,” according to which justice “defends
standards even though they will not be met, and even if we knew this for sure.” 427
Continuing, Estlund argues that truth is the governing ideal for justice, just as it is in
424
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“pure mathematics,” and that its practical value is of secondary importance. 428 While
Estlund does believe that hopeless theories can have practical value, justice,
nevertheless, is a theoretical exercise that is grounded in “curiosity,” 429 and if it turns
out to have absolutely no practical value, justice remains what it is, unaffected by its
impossibility and inapplicability for us. Estlund states:
Even if (as I doubt) understanding justice would have no practical value,
and even if (as I doubt) for that reason, not the kind of thing a person
should spend a lot of time on, and even if (as I doubt) such understanding
has little or no value of any kind, none of this would show that the truth
about justice is bound to have practical value. Whether there is any
value in knowing about it or not, I have argued that a standard of justice
is not automatically shaped so as to guarantee that we ought, given what
we know about how we and others will behave in the future, to set out
toward achieving it. Looked at the other way around, just because it is
not something we ought to set out for does not mean it is not the
genuine standard of social justice. 430
According to Estlund and Cohen, then, we have a standard of justice that is only
tangentially related to the practical, and is primarily considered an exercise in
theoretical thought at the highest level of abstraction, unadulterated with factual
constraints about feasibility. If these pure concepts of justice end up fundamentally
unachievable for us, or provide us with no action-guiding potential, it is no fault of the
conception of justice. Instead, it would just be a fact about justice that humans are
unable to achieve it and act upon its demands.
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In order to assess Cohen’s and Estlund’s radical approach to justice, I will
investigate two questions: first, in what sense can a hopeless theory of justice,
according to Cohen, serve as a “governing ideal,” or, according to Estlund, potentially
have any practical value (even though it does not necessarily have to); and second, is
justice fundamentally a theoretical or a practical endeavor? To answer these two
questions, I must first outline what I believe to be Cohen’s political methodology that is
implicit in much of his work. After doing so, we will see that the action-guiding potential
of a purely speculative discipline will not ultimately be fruitful, and that justice should
be conceived of as a primarily practical discipline.
(a) Cohen’s Method: Intuitionism and Radical Pluralism
G.A. Cohen adheres to a normative philosophical method that he calls, “radical
pluralism,” or what Rawls would call “intuitionism,” which is a method of political
philosophizing that consists of identifying a set of irreducibly moral concepts that lie at
the foundation of our normative thought. 431 These might be, for instance, Justice,
Beauty, Happiness, Prudence, etc. 432 The role of the philosopher, according to this
method, is to engage in a thorough-going dialectic to eventually discover what these
concepts are, eventually leading to a pinnacle or summit at which no further explication
is possible. After discovering what each consists of, we then attempt to apply them to
the empirical world to guide our actions and direct our institutions in particular cases.
431
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However, what is crucial about the intuitionist method is that there is no
“higher-order” court of appeals that we can summon in order to weigh these
fundamental concepts against one another other should they conflict. Instead, we must
rely upon pure “intuition” and clarity of thought.433 So, when justice and other values
conflict, such as efficiency or prudence, it is up to us to determine what best course of
action best balances these different demands.
One consequence of this view is that certain moral concepts, like justice, will lack
a certain primacy over our other values. 434 As such, Cohen reminds us that justice must
give way to efficiency or other considerations when we must design the institutions to
regulate society. 435 It is doubtful, then, that justice could ever be fully realized in the
world. There are simply too many other valuable considerations that must be
accommodated, and it is not possible to simultaneously realize them all at once. So,
when Cohen asserts that justice may not be feasible for us, he means that its demands
are fundamentally incompatible with other values that must be realized in the world
once we are presented with all the facts, which include facts about human beings and
social life.
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To illustrate, suppose that, upon reflection, we discern that justice demands
equality or the neutralization of luck on all distributive outcomes. 436 Cohen absolutely
recognizes that this value cannot be fully realized or instantiated in the world—human
imperfections and limitations, including our inability to settle the free will problem, all
inhibit our understanding and implementation of it. Moreover, the level of state
interference in our own personal lives required to realize it will vehemently count
against the demands of justice. 437 However, this does not bother Cohen, for he never
claims that we ought to actually implement justice and nothing else. 438 Instead, we
must always be engaged in a balancing act of sorts, weighing and considering on a case
by case basis which trade-offs of our values will be best. It is in this sense that Cohen’s
philosophical method is both radically pluralist and intuitionist: there are numerous
values that exist that do not trump the other, and the only way to determine the best
course of action is to think about it, test it, and subject it to numerous critical inquiry.
The goal is that, at the end of the process, we will end up with a greater clarity with
respect to the ultimate question as to what we should do.
We can now answer the two questions that framed our discussion. With respect
to the question in what sense hopeless theories can have practical value, the answer is
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that they figure indirectly in our ultimate normative calculus when deciding the “allthings-considered” best course of action.439 While the institutions we build in society
may fail to fully implement justice, they are still directed and shaped in some way by its
mandates. Regarding the second question, the search for justice is primarily theoretical
in the sense that it aims to provide a clear understanding of the concept of justice first,
independent of the contexts in which it is to be applied, before turning to the question
of how we should act practically. These two inquiries are distinct, and one concerns
purely matters of belief and thought, and the other, norms for action.440
(b) Rawls’s Criticism of Intuitionism
Rawls views his contributions in A Theory of Justice as a response to the kind of
intuitionist theorizing endorsed by Cohen.441 Rawls is primarily unsatisfied with the
radical uncertainty regarding the weighing of different values and principles when they
conflict with one another. According to Rawls, “Intuitionism holds that in our judgments
of social justice we must eventually reach a pluralism of first principles in regard to
which we can only say that it seems to us more correct to balance them this way rather
than that.” 442 To illustrate, for a luck egalitarian, they must find a way to balance the
claims to neutralize luck and to promote efficiency. The hope, is, for intuitionist, that
“men will in fact balance them more or less similarly.” 443
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However, Rawls believes that the open-endedness and the limitless number of
cases to which these principles must be applied makes this convergence unlikely, and
that different conceptions of justice will likely emerge. The result of this is deeply
problematic for Rawls, as he says that “the assignment of weights is an essential and not
a minor part of a conception of justice. If we cannot explain how these weights are to
be determined by reasonable ethical criteria, the means of rational discussion have
come to an end.” 444 In this sense, agreement on principles of justice would not be likely,
and the problem of justice will then not be adequately solved.
Rawls seeks to solve this problem by limiting the role of intuition and allowing it
to operate in a more confined and restricted domain. He does not believe that we can
eliminate altogether the role of intuition in our normative judgments. Indeed, Rawls
says that the goal of justice as fairness is “reducing and not of eliminating entirely the
reliance on intuitive judgments. There is no reason to suppose that we can avoid all
appeals to intuition.” 445 Instead, the goal should be to determine a method by which
we can more clearly and fruitfully appeal to our intuitions and generate a basis for
agreement. 446 Rawls accomplishes this task in three ways.
First, Rawls constructs the original position to provide greater clarity and
impartiality to our intuitions. The veil of ignorance, more specifically, prevents our own
circumstances from clouding and biasing our intuitive judgments. One major source of
444
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disagreement in how to apply our intuitions is due to the disparate effects
circumstantial facts have on our intuition. Rawls eliminates this source of disagreement
through the imposition of the veil of ignorance. In addition, Rawls allows parties
knowledge of general basic facts to shape our intuitive judgments. If we did not supply
reasoners with the general circumstances of justice and basic facts about human beings
as such, including an account of their fundamental and higher-order interests, the task
of finding principles that could generate agreement would be near impossible. Rawls
states his case against intuitionism in the following powerful paragraph:
Some philosophers have thought that ethical first principles should be
independent of all contingent assumptions, that they should take for
granted no truths except those of logic and others that follow from these
by an analysis of concepts. Moral conceptions should hold for all possible
worlds. Now this view makes moral philosophy the study of creation: an
examination of the reflections an omnipotent deity might entertain in
determining which is the best of all possible worlds. Even the general
facts of nature are to be chosen. Certainly we have a natural religious
interest in the ethics of creation. But it would appear to outrun human
comprehension. From the point of view of contract theory it amounts to
supposing that the persons in the original position know nothing at all
about themselves or their world. How, then, can they possibly make a
decision? A problem of choice is well defined only if the alternatives are
suitably restricted by natural laws and other constraints…Without a
definite structure of this kind the question posed is indeterminate….If
these assumptions are true and suitably general, everything is in order,
for without these elements, the whole scheme would be pointless and
empty. 447
Rawls’s statement here expresses the importance of establishing the materials
necessary for agreement. If we are to merely concern ourselves with our intuitive
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concepts in isolation, our musings will be indeterminate and may not yield conclusive
judgments about what we ought to do.448
Interestingly, and perhaps to Cohen’s relief, Rawls says that “there is nothing
intrinsically irrational about this intuitionist doctrine. Indeed, it may be true.” 449
However, Rawls does not regard “truth” to be the goal for justice. Instead, justice is
about finding reasonable principles that are capable of being agreed upon to govern our
institutions and determine how rights and resources are to be assigned and
distributed.450 As such, our intuitive judgements must be restricted and clarified in
order to produce the basis for public agreement. Otherwise, we will not have solved the
problem of justice.
For this reason, Rawls does not regard the principles of justice to be “self-evident”
or foundationalist in our thinking in the same way that our pure intuitions might be.451
Because the principles of justice are the result of a choice-situation in which our
intuitive judgments are considered against one another in a limited fashion, it is difficult
to see in what sense justice might be self-evidently true. In fact, it would be quite
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difficult to arrive at the principles of justice without the original position procedure, for
otherwise our convictions would be muddled and indeterminate. 452
In addition to allowing general facts and imposing a veil of ignorance in the
original position, Rawls also limits the choice-situation in the original position by
“substituting prudential for moral judgment.” 453 By stipulating that the parties in the
original position are to be governed by the principles of rational choice, 454 we further
limit the role of our intuitive moral judgements about how we should distribute
resources and assign rights and liberties. By stipulating an account of the primary goods
that any rational person can be seen to want, and describing persons as having two
fundamental capacities—an interest in pursuing and revising a conception of the good
and developing a sense of justice—we can adopt prudential reasoning to determine
which principles would be selected to best safeguard these interests. If we allow other
forms of reasoning into the deliberation, such as moral reasons that stem from a
conception of the good, our agreement will again be indeterminate.455
Finally, Rawls limits the role of intuition in our determination of principles of
justice by providing a list of conceptions of justice to select from that have been
developed in our philosophical legacy. Of course, Rawls admits that, “ideally one would
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like to say that they are to choose among all possible conceptions of justice.” 456
However, it is simply not available to us to know with any clarity what these full
conceptions of justice would look like without them first being developed into a
concrete framework. In the future, if other conceptions are fully articulated, they may
be considered as alternatives, but it makes no sense to consider partial or undeveloped
accounts.457
Taking all these conditions into account, (1) the construction of the original
position, (2) the description of the parties as rational, 458 and (3) the limited selection of
conceptions of the justice, we are now able to build a “framework designed to focus our
moral sensibilities and to put before our intuitive capacities more limited and
manageable questions for judgement.” 459 It is Rawls’s belief that, only in such a
confined choice situation can we determine principles of justice and assign the
appropriate weights to our different intuitions—such as deriving the priority of liberty
over the desire for an increased number of primary goods. 460
With Rawls’s methodology outlined, we can now return to the two questions
posed to Cohen and Estlund and offer a criticism of their answers. First, with respect to
the question of what practical value a conception of justice would have if it were part of
456
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a pure intuitive judgment that was independent of all facts and limiting conditions,
Rawls’s answer would be that it would have very little practical value, for there would
be no way to determine what its recommendations would be for how we should
fundamentally regulate our basic institutions. This is because an intuitionist account of
what we should “all-things-considered” do would unlikely generate agreement about
how best to balance and weigh the various values and principles against one another.
For, according to what metric would these disputes be resolved? The intuitionist
methodology has no other answer than to recommend a retreat further and further into
a theoretical cocoon with the hope that a more definite answer can be provided. As
such, the prospects for practical proposals to be reached to guide the design of our
institutions becomes much more challenging and haphazard. To be sure, it can be done
in the sense that some decision can be made by some particular person—but whether
or not that decision can be justified to all members and agreed upon is another matter
altogether and should be the ultimate goal of justice.
Rawls’s solution, alternatively, is to condense the space in which these
judgments may be pursued, preventing the unending retreat into the limitless
theoretical space in which these Forms of Justice and other values operate. In doing so,
we open the possibility for agreement on practical principles to govern our institutions.
Regarding the second question, to what extent political philosophy is a
theoretical or a practical exercise, Rawls would reiterate that the primary concern for
justice is to find reasonable principles that persons can agree upon. The question of
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truth is either inapplicable to justice, or, more modestly, best left to a conception of the
good. Given the impossibility of an agreement on these more controversial and limitless
interpretations of our intuitive judgments, they cannot serve as a public criterion by
which to navigate and frame our social relations with others. While there may be some
“truth” to the matter to be found in the deep speculative libraries of the Heavenly City,
it is not likely to be an ideal to which citizens can endorse for all. It is, after all, unlikely
that each person would engage in the “ethics of creation” in the same manner.
With these criticisms in place, we may now return to Miller’s diagnosis of
Cohen’s outlook on political philosophy. Despite Cohen’s “rescue” of justice and
equality and the attempt to enshrine these concepts in a pristine and flawless city, this
rescue of justice is really an imprisonment, a Trojan Horse designed to sabotage and
hijack our normative outlook. For now, instead of inspiring us and motivating us to
rectify the wrongs of the earth, we are left with an account of justice that can only be
contemplated and eternally refined. When we try to act upon it, we are left with an
indeterminate muddle of conflicting claims that can only serve to paralyze and frustrate
our aims and aspirations. Without any possibility for agreement, we can only retreat
into the greater confines in our minds, clinging onto our ideals of justice and remaining
in a permanent state of aporia, wondering if the world will ever live up to its demands.
It is perhaps Miller’s psychological thesis that this aporia leads to condemnation
and lamentation of the world. 461 The idea would be that a permanent inability for
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humans to realize justice in the world must have some connection with our moral
psychology and our attitudes. If our conception of justice is such that it remains forever
out of reach—that luck can never ultimately be neutralized, or that we can never live in
a perfectly socialist society 462—our psychological reaction to this perpetual failure of
justice must be devastating for us and a source of unrelenting sorrow. There would be
truly no hope for us, no matter our best efforts; the Earthly City would forever be a
mere shadow of true Justice and should be mourned, and ultimately condemned. Such
an assault on our moral psychology is bound to leave us disfigured and debilitated.
Cohen has three possible responses to this line of thought. First, he could reject
the connection between violations of justice and the changes in our moral attitudes and
emotions. After all, if justice is, as Estlund and Cohen claim, purely a theoretical concept
akin to the “curiosity” of “pure mathematics,” 463 why should it have any relationship to
our moral emotions whatsoever?
However, this would only serve to highlight the strangeness of Cohen’s view. By
relying upon a theoretical concept of justice, he now cannot provide us with an account
of any moral emotions at all. For, while mathematical truths may invoke a sense of
wonder or amazement, or may even generate frustration when we are unable to unfold
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their deepest mysteries, these are not moral emotions. 464 Consequently, if justice is
purely a theoretical concept that does not necessarily connect with moral attitudes,
then it is difficult to see why we should care that much about justice outside of its
theoretical interests. It would be just one among many other values that compete in a
timeless and unending struggle with other ideals in the realm of theoretical reason.
This reply should also serve as a sufficient answer to Estlund’s attempt to save
hopeless theories of justice by claiming that they can still have value in the way that
pure mathematics can. While it is true that theoretical justice in this sense could still
provide value, it is not the right kind of value that we require from a concept of justice.
We need a concept that allows for the relevant engagement with the moral emotions—
not one that is limited to theoretical wonder and puzzlement. Our failings of justice
must evoke resentment. 465 If they did not, we would doubt that we genuinely regarded
them as unjust in the first place. As such, the study of justice as a purely mathematical
or theoretical exercise cannot generate the relevant emotions necessarily connected
with injustice.
Hence, if one endorses a hopeless conception of justice as Cohen and Estlund do,
then one is faced with a dilemma: either you cannot provide an adequate account of
the moral emotions associated with justice, or, even if you could, our moral attitudes
464
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would be so overwhelmed by the persistent impossibility of achieving justice that they
would morph into unhindered resentment and lamentation. 466 Either of these
outcomes should be unacceptable to us, for it would entail that our response to the
world in the face of injustice should either resemble the attitude of a coolly distant
mathematician who discovers a mathematical proof—“Eureka! I have discovered the
true nature of injustice!”—or, it should drive us downright mad, our emotions flooded
with such melancholy and eventual contempt for the world and its inhabitants that we
are left with no choice but to retreat to the citadels of the Heavenly City to achieve
some semblance of calm as we contemplate the peace and happiness that are
ultimately possible there.
Faced with this dilemma, I believe that Cohen would assert that our conception
of justice should, in some sense, drive us to the brink of insanity. 467 He would insist that
the injustices of the world are what they are and anyone with enough clarity of mind
should be in a state of perpetual sorrow, dejection, and dissatisfaction. While we may
certainly attempt to correct it, we can never fully purge its corruption. This is simply the
reality of our condition. Anyone who attempts to deny this essential fact is under the
grip of a weak and corrupted ideology that seeks to drag down justice into the dirt of
humanity. It would be the ultimate delusion to think that justice must somehow answer
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to the facts of humanity and our world. Instead, justice condemns it and tells us that
our reality is fundamentally a reality of unmet ideals and shattered dreams.
However, is such a moral outlook possible for us? Where is our hope, our relief?
Can we be truly and deeply motivated to fix the world if it is ultimately impossible for us
to do so? Cohen’s vision bears a striking resemblance to the doctrine of original sin and
the psychological responses to it.468 When faced with the judgment that man’s nature is
fundamentally fallen, many are driven to the religious promise of heaven. It is how
many people tolerate a world endlessly marred by injustice and human corruption. Our
moral psychology demands some respite from such a wretched judgment and so, it is no
surprise that people turn to God and the Heavenly City to provide that salvation for us.
And while many are motivated to do God’s work on the earth to improve it, ultimate
peace and relief are found in heaven, far beyond the capabilities of this world. This is
how we achieve some semblance of moral psychological stability.
However, Cohen does not allow for the promise of salvation in Heaven, and nor
does he recommend a belief in God to reconcile our fate. And so, we must seek relief
elsewhere—our moral psychology demands it. While we might think that we would
now have more motivation to fight for a better world without the distraction of Heaven,
this does not occur. Now, without the relief from the divine, Cohen instead creates it in
our own minds. The Heavenly City now exists in the deep crevices of theoretical and
abstract human reason, unspoiled by the rotting prison of the empirical world. Pure
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reason then is our new version of God—it is timeless, limitless, and is the only fortress
left to provide us with respite in the face of perpetual injustices that cannot end.
And so, Cohen’s vision is as follows: We are fundamentally unfit for justice,
though we can at least take solace in our discovery and contemplation of the timeless
theoretical truth of The Just Society. The clarity of mind that is reached in this discovery
is its own version of tranquility. As we contemplate the perfect socialist society in which
equality reigns and the brute forces of luck are extinguished, we find peace. And while
we may be motivated to make the world a better place, as many religious individuals
strive to do, ultimate peace is only found in the workings of the mind and not through
our actions to improve the earth. And there is the fatal flaw of Cohen’s approach. Our
vision of utopia is not possible for us, and so our motivation to create it on this earth will
be motivationally stunted and frustrated. While it is certainly not impossible to be
motivated to work towards achieving justice, it will be weak and extraordinarily difficult
for us to translate those theoretical recommendations into practice. This is because
there is no genuine clarity of vision as to how to enact justice in this world. As Estlund
reminds us, “actions in pursuit of what will never be achieved [even if it is what justice
requires] can be wasteful or even disastrous.” 469 And so, what shall we do with our
thoughts about justice when we cannot satisfactorily combine them with our other
values and the factual constrains of the world? We retreat into our mind and
contemplate them once again.
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While Cohen may think that criticizing the wealthy 470 and condemning the
economic incentives necessary to work hard will produce more justice in the world, this
only serves to demonstrate the weakness of his mathematical understanding of justice
and its detached pronouncements from the Heavenly City of pure reason. For without a
hopeful and possible vision of a just society to offer people, these criticisms will fall flat
and fail to reliably motivate such persons to relinquish their privileges and accept
change. No amount of prophetic demonization of their injustice will create genuine
change, for there is no way to connect those criticisms into a vision that people can see
enacted in their world.
It is the ultimate irony of ironies that Marx, who condemned religion for its
creation of passive individuals with a diminished interest in correcting the injustices on
Earth, has now produced an acolyte whose vision of justice creates a similar psychology.
It is also surprising that Cohen failed to heed one of Marx’s most important dictates,
that “the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point,
however, is to change it.” 471 Cohen’s utopia and his purely theoretical account of justice
is antithetical to Marx’s vision and cannot produce the required conditions necessary to
produce genuine and lasting change in the world.

Cohen, G.A. If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? Oxford University Press, 2000.
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II. A Realistic Utopia Defended
I believe that Rawls’s vision can do better. However, he must now answer to the
criticisms of those on the other side of the spectrum who subject his vision of a realistic
utopia to an intense scrutiny of the same rigor that I have presented against Cohen.
According to these critics, Rawls’s vision of the just society is simply another inert ideal,
incapable of generating real change in the world. Indeed, even if we acknowledge that
Rawls’s conception of justice is not so far into heaven as Cohen’s vision, might it not still
be somewhere out of reach for us? It is this criticism to which I must now provide an
answer.
At the core of the realist criticism is a great skepticism about the possibility for
genuine agreement between persons on a conception of justice. In this regard, realists
share a similarity with intuitionists, for both recognize the impossibility of persons to
converge on ultimate principles. Intuitionists assert that the world is simply too
complex and our judgments too disparate to ever produce agreement on all the
fundamental normative values. Rawls says: “The intuitionist believes…that the
complexity of the moral facts defies our efforts to give a full account of our judgments
and necessitates a plurality of competing principles,” 472 and that intuitionists remind us
to “recognize the possibility that there is no way to get beyond a plurality of
principles.” 473 I have already attempted to respond to this criticism by showing how
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agreement is nevertheless possible when we subject our intuitions to the constrains
outlined in the original position.
Realists, in contrast, highlight an alternative source of disagreement and
skepticism: a less sanguine account of human nature and our psychological motivations.
Realists emphasize the deep and perpetual conflicts of interests that are inherent to
social and political life, and they do not believe that persons possess the requisite
psychological materials to ultimately be guided by Rawls’s methodology and vision. For
instance, what actual motivations do people have to enter into the perspective of the
original position? Why would they deny information about their conception of the good
when it is fundamental to their identity? 474
At the core of these criticisms is that people will simply be unwilling to endorse a
conception of justice that does not serve their current interests. It is simply too much to
ask of people to bracket what is most important to them just for the purposes of
agreement—they will seek agreement in other ways that are more temporary and
short-lived if it means protecting their current interests.
Hence, the original position, while an interesting model for what hypothetical
persons might agree upon, is not appealing to actual persons who are too entrenched
by their own conceptions of the good and cannot, in good faith, be asked to set them
aside for purposes of fairness. As such, justice must always be a compromise between
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particular and “contingent” interests people have. Contra Rawls, people do not see a
distinction between their fundamental or higher-order interests and their actual
interests. Persons believe that their actual conception of the good is fundamental to
them, not their capacity to pursue their conception of the good.
And so, justice must retreat from the domain of universal agreement, and
descend to the level of bargaining and compromise. This capacity—our capacity to
strike agreements and bargain with our interests—defines our sense of justice. Rawls’s
insistence that there is some “deep reciprocity” at the heart of social relations is just
another myth and a fiction. 475 Instead, this notion of reciprocity is what Rawls aspires
there to be in persons—it is, in other words, an ideal of reciprocity, not actual
reciprocity as it is realized in the actual world. While some persons may possess it and
develop it, it is really akin to the distribution of benevolence and altruism in society—it
is quite limited and scarce among humanity.
These are deep criticisms of Rawls’s vision regarding what human beings can
strive to achieve in this world, and they challenge the limits of what persons can be
expected to do in the name of fairness. However, I believe that this objection can be
answered.
Let me begin with the following uncontroversial claim, and deduce from it what I
believe to be the strongest case for Rawls’s belief in the possibility of a realistic utopia.
That claim is this: The existence of injustice in the world has truly devastating
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consequences for us all—not only for those who suffer directly from it, but also for
those who benefit from it and do not incur its most severe costs. The psychological
disfigurement that results in persons who benefit from injustice can, however, be
internally felt and acknowledged—it is not something that is imposed on them from a
religious ideology or other external doctrine. It may, perhaps, begin that way, but it is
Rawls’s belief that people can come to internally recognize their own aversion to
benefiting from injustice, and that the cognitive dissonance that results from it will be
deeply disconcerting for them. As such, they will be motivated to eliminate it.
If this were not the case, it would be remarkable that any great advancement of
justice by persecuted minorities could ever have transpired within liberal democracies.
For, without the ability to appeal to the sense of justice of the broader community, their
clamors for change would be entirely in vain. This is the lesson of Rawls’s account of civil
disobedience. We must convince others—particularly those who are in power and are
already benefitting from injustice—that living with injustice is intolerable and
unacceptable. However, Rawls again believes that our capacity to convince these
persons that injustice cannot be experienced as a good for them can ultimately come
from within, by appeal to our considered convictions that the original position can more
clearly manifest for us. And, importantly, the original position is not an external
demonstration, but a heuristic engagement with our own considered convictions and
our moral sensibilities to allow us to see for ourselves that we are benefiting from
injustice and that this should cause us deep distress.
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One consequence of this approach is that, in societies in which there is no
common sense of justice to appeal to, especially in those that are not liberal
democracies by any measure, Rawls’s conception of justice will have limited application,
and an entirely different theory will be required.476 For in such societies, the need for
revolution, violent resistance, or succession may be the best course of action in
response to injustice.
However, I must now pause and address a deep objection put forth by those
who might find my defense of Rawls’s theory of justice to be perverse. For the
implication of my defense is the following idea: A theory of justice is not fundamentally
addressed to those who are the victims of injustice, but is instead an appeal to the
already powerful and privileged group, in order to get them to acknowledge that living
with injustice is a great harm to them. Doesn’t this make the whole idea of justice a
concept limited to the privileged? 477 Is this not a deeply offensive notion that a
conception of justice must be fundamentally addressed to those who do not suffer from
injustice?
This is, however, only partly true. To be sure, it does speak to Sen’s criticism of
ideal theories of justice as being oddly disconnected with the actual injustices of the
world. Sen’s question is essentially the following: What use is a theory of justice
anyway? People already know they are suffering from injustice. We do not need to

Rawls began this project in The Law of Peoples, but it is inadequate to address these other kinds of
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construct an ideal theory of justice to demonstrate that to them. We should start
working now towards eliminating it.
My response to this objection is the following: Rawls’s theory of justice is for
everyone in the sense that it can serve as the legitimate public criterion of justice that
each and every person can endorse and accept in society, no matter what their position
or circumstance. However, in terms of the impact of Rawls’s theory of justice, it is to
some extent a redundancy for those who are already suffering. They already know their
fundamental interests are not taken seriously, and they are deeply aware of the utter
damage that has been done to their sense of self-respect and standing in society. Their
hurt is real and palpable, and they stand ready to be motivated to act for change. In this
sense, a theory of justice will perhaps not motivate them any further. Nevertheless, it
will still answer and resonate with their deepest aims and voiced frustrations. In fact, it
may even serve to demolish any false illusions that persons have constructed about
themselves who are victims of injustice without acknowledging it. They may have tried
to deny the horrible treatment to them in order to save their own sense of psychological
integrity and self-respect. A theory of justice may serve to liberate these persons from
the psychological damage of self-deception and malformed adaptive preferences.
However, for the powerful and the privileged, Rawls’s theory of justice must be
utterly transformative if it is to be deemed successful. And on that front, I believe Rawls
will be shown to have succeeded, for the basic ingredients of Rawls’s theory are within
the framework of liberal democratic political life, and are represented in the considered

224

convictions of all persons who regard themselves as free and equal—the powerful
included. His vision will eventually work to shape the attitudes of those persons who
have the power to reconstruct the basic institutions of society, and it will also influence
the powerful to rally behind and speak up for those who have no voice in society. They
are already well aware of their grievances, they simply need the influence to make them
heard by the entirety of society.
And so, I conclude with two final thoughts: First, realists may respond by arguing
that, fundamentally, Rawls’s project will fail for human psychology is simply too weak to
overcome our natural biases, and that humans will never relinquish their power and
resources once they have them secured. The reason for this pessimism is that realists
have seen the subjugation, the domination, the brutal and bloodied political arena, and
the adamant refusal by the powerful to rectify egregious wrongs. They do not believe
that it is any stretch to conclude that these domineering elements of human nature will
ever be controlled or eliminated.
However, maybe, just maybe, those who benefit from injustice are not at root
too devilish to give up their benefits, but are perhaps simply fearful that, in the absence
of a realistic utopia, when they relinquish control, they themselves will be the ones who
end up being subjected and victimized. While those who are currently suffering from
injustice may clamor for this kind of divine retribution against the privileged—it is their
turn now—this is not the kind of change Rawls believes is at the heart of justice. By
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constructing a realistic utopia, all persons can endorse and be motivated to work
towards the establishment of just institutions.
And so, the hesitation by the powerful to vote for policies that divert powers,
opportunities, and resources from themselves is actually quite a natural human
response to the desire for a realistic utopia that can be achieved for us. The reluctance is
not due to a devilish desire grounded in selfishness and hatred. 478 Persons mostly
desire assurance that their sacrifices are not in vain and merely squandered by society
and corrupt politicians with no grand vision for how to transform society. Without
some ideal of a well-ordered society that can be shown to be possible for us, no one can
be expected to relinquish their opportunities and sacrifice their resources to pursue any
haphazard desire to simply do good. Persons are owed a reasonable expectation that
their labor be used for purposes that have a deep possibility of lasting success.
The idea of a realistic utopia can provide that vision for us all. A pure or hopeless
utopia, in contrast, cannot provide this vision. Persons cannot be expected to comply
with judgments from the high citadel that offer no hope whatsoever for us. The
theoretical pronouncements from pure reason are insufficient and cannot form the
basis for a public conception of justice for all reasonable persons. They will invariably
fall on deaf ears, for there is no deep connection within it to our moral motivations that
desire to see lasting change in the world that is not ultimately in vain.
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And now a final concluding thought. While a theory of justice shares some
similarities with mathematics in its higher abstractions, political philosophy is a
humanistic discipline that must answer to our deepest and most fundamental interests
that form the conception of ourselves as free and equal human beings. If political
philosophy ever diverts from this main focus, its relevance and importance for us will be
diluted and its potential to inspire us will vanish.
And so I will leave us with an answer to our initial question of how ideal and
utopian we should view Rawls’s theory. Is it in the Heavenly City, or does it reside
elsewhere? I shall say that the vision of a realistic utopia should reside in the stars. For
the stars are somewhere we can go, and they are inspiring to us. We acknowledge that
they are deeply difficult to reach, but they are real enough to keep our motivations
intact and steady. Humanity depends on the belief that justice is within reach in order
to have a chance at peace—not the kind of peace that is defined by the absence of war,
but a kind of internal peace that derives from the recognition that “each person
possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole
cannot override.” 479 I believe that Rawls would have endorsed this vision for his world.
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